1
0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2025-01-08 12:44:23 +01:00
gnupg/agent/pkdecrypt.c

Ignoring revisions in .git-blame-ignore-revs. Click here to bypass and see the normal blame view.

630 lines
18 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/* pkdecrypt.c - public key decryption (well, actually using a secret key)
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
2007-07-04 19:49:40 +00:00
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include "agent.h"
/* DECRYPT the stuff in ciphertext which is expected to be a S-Exp.
Try to get the key from CTRL and write the decoded stuff back to
OUTFP. The padding information is stored at R_PADDING with -1
for not known. */
gpg_error_t
2006-09-06 16:35:52 +00:00
agent_pkdecrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
const unsigned char *ciphertext, size_t ciphertextlen,
membuf_t *outbuf, int *r_padding)
{
gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL, s_cipher = NULL, s_plain = NULL;
unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
int no_shadow_info = 0;
char *buf = NULL;
size_t len;
*r_padding = -1;
if (!ctrl->have_keygrip)
{
log_error ("speculative decryption not yet supported\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_cipher, NULL, (char*)ciphertext, ciphertextlen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to convert ciphertext: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
{
log_printhex (ctrl->keygrip, 20, "keygrip:");
log_printhex (ciphertext, ciphertextlen, "cipher: ");
}
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
NULL, &shadow_info,
CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey, NULL, NULL);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
no_shadow_info = 1;
else if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");
goto leave;
}
if (shadow_info || no_shadow_info)
{ /* divert operation to the smartcard */
if (!gcry_sexp_canon_len (ciphertext, ciphertextlen, NULL, NULL))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto leave;
}
if (s_skey && agent_is_tpm2_key (s_skey))
err = divert_tpm2_pkdecrypt (ctrl, ciphertext, shadow_info,
agent: Add new shadow key type and functions to call tpm2daemon * agent/call-tpm2d.c: New. * divert-tpm2.c: New. * agent/Makefile.am: Add new files. * agent/agent.h (DAEMON_TPM2D): New. Add stub fucntions. * agent/call-daemon.c (GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_TPM2DAEMON): New. * agent/command.c (do_one_keyinfo): Handle tpmv2. * agent/gpg-agent.c (oTpm2daemonProgram): New. (opts): New option --tpm2daemon-program. (parse_rereadable_options): Handle option. * agent/pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Divert to tpm2d. (agent_pksign_do): Ditto. --- A new shadow key type: "tpm2-v1" is introduced signalling that the shadowed key is handled by the tpm2daemon. A function to identify this type is introduced and diversions to the tpm2daemon functions are conditioned on this function for pkign and pkdecrypt where the same diversions to scd are currently done. The (info) field of the shadowed key stores the actual TPM key. The TPM key is encrypted so only the physical TPM it was created on can read it (so no special protection is required for the info filed), but if the (info) field becomes corrupt or damaged, the key will be lost (unlike the token case, where the key is actually moved inside the token). Note, this commit adds handling for existing TPM format shadow keys, but there is still no way to create them. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Additional changes: * Add ChangeLog entries. * Some minor indentation fixes. * agent/Makefile.am (gpg_agent_SOURCES): Change to make distcheck work. * agent/agent.h [!HAVE_LIBTSS]: Do not return -EINVAL but an gpg_error_t. Mark args as unused. * agent/protect.c (agent_is_tpm2_key): Free BUF. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2021-03-09 13:50:29 -08:00
&buf, &len, r_padding);
else
err = divert_pkdecrypt (ctrl, ctrl->keygrip, ciphertext,
&buf, &len, r_padding);
if (err)
{
/* We restore the original error (ie. no seckey) is no card
* has been found and we have no shadow key. This avoids a
* surprising "card removed" error code. */
if ((gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CARD_REMOVED
|| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CARD_NOT_PRESENT)
&& no_shadow_info)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
else
log_error ("smartcard decryption failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
2006-08-29 16:18:30 +00:00
put_membuf_printf (outbuf, "(5:value%u:", (unsigned int)len);
put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len);
put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2);
}
else
{ /* No smartcard, but a private key */
/* if (DBG_CRYPTO ) */
/* { */
/* log_debug ("skey: "); */
/* gcry_sexp_dump (s_skey); */
/* } */
err = gcry_pk_decrypt (&s_plain, s_cipher, s_skey);
if (err)
{
log_error ("decryption failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
{
log_debug ("plain: ");
gcry_sexp_dump (s_plain);
}
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_plain, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0);
log_assert (len);
buf = xmalloc (len);
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_plain, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buf, len);
log_assert (len);
2006-08-29 16:18:30 +00:00
if (*buf == '(')
put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len);
else
{
/* Old style libgcrypt: This is only an S-expression
part. Turn it into a complete S-expression. */
put_membuf (outbuf, "(5:value", 8);
put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len);
put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2);
}
}
leave:
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
gcry_sexp_release (s_plain);
gcry_sexp_release (s_cipher);
xfree (buf);
xfree (shadow_info);
return err;
}
static void
reverse_buffer (unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length)
{
unsigned int tmp, i;
for (i=0; i < length/2; i++)
{
tmp = buffer[i];
buffer[i] = buffer[length-1-i];
buffer[length-1-i] = tmp;
}
}
static gpg_error_t
agent_hybrid_kem_decap (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, int kemid,
gcry_sexp_t s_cipher, membuf_t *outbuf)
{
gcry_sexp_t s_skey0 = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t s_skey1 = NULL;
unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
int no_shadow_info = 0;
unsigned int nbits;
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
gcry_mpi_t encrypted_sessionkey_mpi;
const unsigned char *encrypted_sessionkey;
size_t encrypted_sessionkey_len;
gcry_mpi_t ecc_sk_mpi;
unsigned char ecc_sk[32];
gcry_mpi_t ecc_pk_mpi;
unsigned char ecc_pk[32];
gcry_mpi_t ecc_ct_mpi;
const unsigned char *ecc_ct;
size_t ecc_ct_len;
unsigned char ecc_ecdh[32];
unsigned char ecc_ss[32];
gcry_mpi_t mlkem_sk_mpi;
gcry_mpi_t mlkem_ct_mpi;
const unsigned char *mlkem_sk;
const unsigned char *mlkem_ct;
unsigned char mlkem_ss[GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_SHARED_LEN];
gcry_buffer_t iov[13];
unsigned char head136[2];
unsigned char headK[2];
const unsigned char pad[95] = { 0 };
unsigned char right_encode_L[3];
unsigned char kekkey[32];
size_t kekkeylen = 32; /* AES-256 is mandatory */
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
unsigned char sessionkey_encoded[256];
size_t sessionkey_encoded_len;
const unsigned char fixedinfo[1] = { 105 };
(void)kemid; /* For now, only PGP. */
/*
(enc-val(pqc(s%m)(e%m)(k%m))))
*/
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
NULL, &shadow_info,
CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey0, NULL, NULL);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
no_shadow_info = 1;
else if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");
goto leave;
}
if (shadow_info || no_shadow_info)
{ /* divert operation to the smartcard */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); /* Not implemented yet. */
goto leave;
}
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
NULL, &shadow_info,
CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey1, NULL, NULL);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
no_shadow_info = 1;
else if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");
goto leave;
}
if (shadow_info || no_shadow_info)
{ /* divert operation to the smartcard */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); /* Not implemented yet. */
goto leave;
}
/* No smartcard, but private keys */
gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_cipher, NULL, "/e/k/s",
&ecc_ct_mpi,
&mlkem_ct_mpi,
&encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, NULL);
encrypted_sessionkey = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &nbits);
encrypted_sessionkey_len = (nbits+7)/8;
encrypted_sessionkey_len--;
if (encrypted_sessionkey[0] != encrypted_sessionkey_len)
{
err = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
goto leave;
}
encrypted_sessionkey++;
/* Fistly, ECC. */
gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey0, NULL, "/q/d",
&ecc_pk_mpi, &ecc_sk_mpi, NULL);
p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_pk_mpi, &nbits);
len = (nbits+7)/8;
memcpy (ecc_pk, p+1, 32);
p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_sk_mpi, &nbits);
len = (nbits+7)/8;
memset (ecc_sk, 0, 32);
memcpy (ecc_sk + 32 - len, p, len);
reverse_buffer (ecc_sk, 32);
mpi_release (ecc_pk_mpi);
mpi_release (ecc_sk_mpi);
ecc_ct = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_ct_mpi, &nbits);
ecc_ct_len = (nbits+7)/8;
/* Remove the 0x40 prefix*/
ecc_ct++;
ecc_ct_len--;
/*FIXME make sure the lengths are all correct. */
/*FIXME: check the internal of optional to determine the KEK-algo and KEKKEYLEN. */
err = gcry_kem_decap (GCRY_KEM_RAW_X25519,
ecc_sk, 32,
ecc_ct, ecc_ct_len,
ecc_ecdh, 32,
NULL, 0);
mpi_release (ecc_ct_mpi);
iov[0].data = ecc_ecdh;
iov[0].off = 0;
iov[0].len = 32;
iov[1].data = (unsigned char *)ecc_ct;
iov[1].off = 0;
iov[1].len = 32;
iov[2].data = ecc_pk;
iov[2].off = 0;
iov[2].len = 32;
gcry_md_hash_buffers (GCRY_MD_SHA3_256, 0, ecc_ss, iov, 3);
/* Secondly, ML-KEM */
gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey1, NULL, "/s", &mlkem_sk_mpi, NULL);
mlkem_sk = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (mlkem_sk_mpi, &nbits);
len = (nbits+7)/8;
mlkem_ct = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (mlkem_ct_mpi, &nbits);
len = (nbits+7)/8;
err = gcry_kem_decap (GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768,
mlkem_sk, GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_SECKEY_LEN,
mlkem_ct, GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_ENCAPS_LEN,
mlkem_ss, GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_SHARED_LEN,
NULL, 0);
mpi_release (mlkem_sk_mpi);
mpi_release (mlkem_ct_mpi);
/* Then, combine two shared secrets into one */
// multiKeyCombine(eccKeyShare, eccCipherText,
// mlkemKeyShare, mlkemCipherText,
// fixedInfo, oBits)
//
// Input:
// eccKeyShare - the ECC key share encoded as an octet string
// eccCipherText - the ECC ciphertext encoded as an octet string
// mlkemKeyShare - the ML-KEM key share encoded as an octet string
// mlkemCipherText - the ML-KEM ciphertext encoded as an octet string
// fixedInfo - the fixed information octet string
// oBits - the size of the output keying material in bits
//
// Constants:
// domSeparation - the UTF-8 encoding of the string
// "OpenPGPCompositeKeyDerivationFunction"
// counter - the 4 byte value 00 00 00 01
// customizationString - the UTF-8 encoding of the string "KDF"
//
// eccData = eccKeyShare || eccCipherText
// mlkemData = mlkemKeyShare || mlkemCipherText
// encData = counter || eccData || mlkemData || fixedInfo
//
// KEK = KMAC256(domSeparation, encData, oBits, customizationString)
// return KEK
//
// fixedInfo = algID (105 for ML-KEM-768-x25519kem)
//
// KMAC256(K,X,L,S):
// newX = bytepad(encode_string(K), 136) || X || right_encode(L)
// cSHAKE256(newX,L,"KMAC",S)
len = 4 + 32 + 32 + GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_SHARED_LEN + GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_ENCAPS_LEN;
iov[0].data = "KMAC";
iov[0].off = 0;
iov[0].len = 4;
iov[1].data = "KDF";
iov[1].off = 0;
iov[1].len = 3;
head136[0] = 1;
head136[1] = 136;
iov[2].data = head136;
iov[2].off = 0;
iov[2].len = 2;
headK[0] = 1;
headK[1] = 37;
iov[3].data = headK;
iov[3].off = 0;
iov[3].len = 2;
iov[4].data = "OpenPGPCompositeKeyDerivationFunction";
iov[4].off = 0;
iov[4].len = 37;
iov[5].data = (unsigned char *)pad;
iov[5].off = 0;
iov[5].len = sizeof (pad);
iov[6].data = "\x00\x00\x00\x01"; /* Counter */
iov[6].off = 0;
iov[6].len = 4;
iov[7].data = ecc_ss;
iov[7].off = 0;
iov[7].len = 32;
iov[8].data = (unsigned char *)ecc_ct;
iov[8].off = 0;
iov[8].len = 32;
iov[9].data = mlkem_ss;
iov[9].off = 0;
iov[9].len = GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_SHARED_LEN;
iov[10].data = (unsigned char *)mlkem_ct;
iov[10].off = 0;
iov[10].len = GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_ENCAPS_LEN;
iov[11].data = (unsigned char *)fixedinfo;
iov[11].off = 0;
iov[11].len = 1;
right_encode_L[0] = (kekkeylen * 8) >> 8;
right_encode_L[1] = (kekkeylen * 8) & 0xff;
right_encode_L[2] = 2;
iov[12].data = right_encode_L;
iov[12].off = 0;
iov[12].len = 3;
gcry_md_hash_buffers_extract (GCRY_MD_CSHAKE256, 0, kekkey, kekkeylen,
iov, DIM (iov));
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
{
log_printhex (kekkey, kekkeylen, "KEK key: ");
}
err = gcry_cipher_open (&hd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
if (err)
{
log_error ("ecdh failed to initialize AESWRAP: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
mpi_release (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi);
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, kekkey, kekkeylen);
sessionkey_encoded_len = encrypted_sessionkey_len - 8;
gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, sessionkey_encoded, sessionkey_encoded_len,
encrypted_sessionkey, encrypted_sessionkey_len);
gcry_cipher_close (hd);
mpi_release (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi);
if (err)
{
log_error ("KEM decap failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
put_membuf_printf (outbuf, "(5:value%u:", (unsigned int)sessionkey_encoded_len);
put_membuf (outbuf, sessionkey_encoded, sessionkey_encoded_len);
put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2);
leave:
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey0);
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey1);
xfree (shadow_info);
return err;
}
gpg_error_t
agent_kem_decap (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, int kemid,
const unsigned char *ciphertext, size_t ciphertextlen,
membuf_t *outbuf,
const unsigned char *option, size_t optionlen)
{
gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL, s_cipher = NULL;
unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
int no_shadow_info = 0;
if (!ctrl->have_keygrip)
{
log_error ("speculative decryption not yet supported\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_cipher, NULL, (char*)ciphertext, ciphertextlen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to convert ciphertext: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
{
log_printhex (ctrl->keygrip, 20, "keygrip:");
log_printhex (ciphertext, ciphertextlen, "cipher: ");
}
if (ctrl->have_keygrip1)
{
err = agent_hybrid_kem_decap (ctrl, desc_text, kemid, s_cipher, outbuf);
goto leave;
}
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
NULL, &shadow_info,
CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey, NULL, NULL);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
no_shadow_info = 1;
else if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n");
goto leave;
}
if (shadow_info || no_shadow_info)
{ /* divert operation to the smartcard */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); /* Not implemented yet. */
goto leave;
}
else
{ /* No smartcard, but a private key */
unsigned int nbits;
gcry_mpi_t seckey_mpi;
gcry_mpi_t ephemkey_mpi;
gcry_mpi_t encrypted_sessionkey_mpi;
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
unsigned char seckey[32];
size_t seckeylen;
const unsigned char *ephemkey;
size_t ephemkeylen;
const unsigned char *encrypted_sessionkey;
size_t encrypted_sessionkey_len;
unsigned char kekkey[32]; /* FIXME */
size_t kekkeylen;
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
unsigned char sessionkey_encoded[256];
size_t sessionkey_encoded_len;
gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey, NULL, "/d", &seckey_mpi, NULL);
gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_cipher, NULL, "/e/s",
&ephemkey_mpi,
&encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, NULL);
p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (seckey_mpi, &nbits);
len = (nbits+7)/8;
memset (seckey, 0, 32);
memcpy (seckey + 32 - len, p, len);
seckeylen = 32;
reverse_buffer (seckey, seckeylen);
ephemkey = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ephemkey_mpi, &nbits);
ephemkeylen = (nbits+7)/8;
/* Remove the 0x40 prefix*/
ephemkey++;
ephemkeylen--;
encrypted_sessionkey = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &nbits);
encrypted_sessionkey_len = (nbits+7)/8;
/*FIXME make sure the lengths are all correct. */
encrypted_sessionkey_len--;
if (encrypted_sessionkey[0] != encrypted_sessionkey_len)
{
err = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
goto leave;
}
encrypted_sessionkey++;
/*FIXME: check the internal of optional to determine the KEK-algo and KEKKEYLEN. */
kekkeylen = 16;
err = gcry_kem_decap (GCRY_KEM_PGP_X25519,
seckey, seckeylen,
ephemkey, ephemkeylen,
kekkey, kekkeylen,
option, optionlen);
mpi_release (seckey_mpi);
mpi_release (ephemkey_mpi);
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
{
log_printhex (kekkey, kekkeylen, "KEK key: ");
}
/*FIXME*/
err = gcry_cipher_open (&hd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
if (err)
{
log_error ("ecdh failed to initialize AESWRAP: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
mpi_release (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi);
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, kekkey, kekkeylen);
sessionkey_encoded_len = encrypted_sessionkey_len - 8;
gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, sessionkey_encoded, sessionkey_encoded_len,
encrypted_sessionkey, encrypted_sessionkey_len);
gcry_cipher_close (hd);
mpi_release (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi);
if (err)
{
log_error ("KEM decap failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
put_membuf_printf (outbuf, "(5:value%u:", (unsigned int)sessionkey_encoded_len);
put_membuf (outbuf, sessionkey_encoded, sessionkey_encoded_len);
put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2);
}
leave:
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
gcry_sexp_release (s_cipher);
xfree (shadow_info);
return err;
}