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gnupg/g10/encode.c

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IDEA removed, signing works
1997-11-24 11:04:11 +00:00
/* encode.c - encode data
* plaintext.c: Copyright. * encode.c (encode_simple): Show cipher with --verbose. * options.h, g10.c (main), keyedit.c (sign_keys): Add --ask-cert-level option to enable cert level prompts during sigs. Defaults to on. Simplify --default-cert-check-level to --default-cert-level. If ask-cert-level is off, or batch is on, use the default-cert-level as the cert level. * options.h, g10.c (main), trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Simplify --min-cert-check-level to --min-cert-level.
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* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
* 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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*
See ChangeLog: Wed Dec 23 13:34:22 CET 1998 Werner Koch
1998-12-23 12:41:40 +00:00
* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
See ChangeLog: Wed Dec 23 13:34:22 CET 1998 Werner Koch
1998-12-23 12:41:40 +00:00
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
See ChangeLog: Wed Dec 23 13:34:22 CET 1998 Werner Koch
1998-12-23 12:41:40 +00:00
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "errors.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "keydb.h"
Update head to match stable 1.0
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#include "memory.h"
initially checkin
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#include "util.h"
#include "main.h"
Armor works now
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#include "filter.h"
intermediate check in
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#include "trustdb.h"
intermediate release
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#include "i18n.h"
Update head to match stable 1.0
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#include "status.h"
initially checkin
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* g10.c (main): Add --no-groups to zero --group list. * encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of symmetrically encrypted session key. Use --s2k-cipher-algo to choose cipher, rather than the default cipher. * parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Give a warning if an symmetrically encrypted session key is seen without salt. Show in --list-packets if a symetrically encrypted session key is present. * pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning unless --quiet is set. Use text name of cipher in warning.
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static int encode_simple( const char *filename, int mode, int use_seskey );
textual changes
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static int write_pubkey_enc_from_list( PK_LIST pk_list, DEK *dek, IOBUF out );
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/****************
applied Mathews typo and grammar fixes
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* Encode FILENAME with only the symmetric cipher. Take input from
initially checkin
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* stdin if FILENAME is NULL.
*/
int
encode_symmetric( const char *filename )
{
* g10.c (main): Add --no-groups to zero --group list. * encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of symmetrically encrypted session key. Use --s2k-cipher-algo to choose cipher, rather than the default cipher. * parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Give a warning if an symmetrically encrypted session key is seen without salt. Show in --list-packets if a symetrically encrypted session key is present. * pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning unless --quiet is set. Use text name of cipher in warning.
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return encode_simple( filename, 1, 0 );
initially checkin
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}
/****************
applied Mathews typo and grammar fixes
1998-04-14 17:51:16 +00:00
* Encode FILENAME as a literal data packet only. Take input from
initially checkin
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* stdin if FILENAME is NULL.
*/
int
encode_store( const char *filename )
{
* g10.c (main): Add --no-groups to zero --group list. * encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of symmetrically encrypted session key. Use --s2k-cipher-algo to choose cipher, rather than the default cipher. * parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Give a warning if an symmetrically encrypted session key is seen without salt. Show in --list-packets if a symetrically encrypted session key is present. * pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning unless --quiet is set. Use text name of cipher in warning.
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return encode_simple( filename, 0, 0 );
initially checkin
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}
Update head to match stable 1.0
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static void
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
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encode_seskey( DEK *dek, DEK **seskey, byte *enckey )
Update head to match stable 1.0
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{
CIPHER_HANDLE hd;
byte buf[33];
* g10.c (main): Add --no-groups to zero --group list. * encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of symmetrically encrypted session key. Use --s2k-cipher-algo to choose cipher, rather than the default cipher. * parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Give a warning if an symmetrically encrypted session key is seen without salt. Show in --list-packets if a symetrically encrypted session key is present. * pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning unless --quiet is set. Use text name of cipher in warning.
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assert ( dek->keylen <= 32 );
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
2003-10-26 03:26:14 +00:00
if(!*seskey)
{
*seskey=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(DEK));
(*seskey)->keylen=dek->keylen;
(*seskey)->algo=dek->algo;
make_session_key(*seskey);
/*log_hexdump( "thekey", c->key, c->keylen );*/
}
buf[0] = (*seskey)->algo;
memcpy( buf + 1, (*seskey)->key, (*seskey)->keylen );
Update head to match stable 1.0
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hd = cipher_open( dek->algo, CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1 );
cipher_setkey( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
cipher_setiv( hd, NULL, 0 );
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
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cipher_encrypt( hd, buf, buf, (*seskey)->keylen + 1 );
Update head to match stable 1.0
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cipher_close( hd );
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
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memcpy( enckey, buf, (*seskey)->keylen + 1 );
* build-packet.c (do_plaintext), encode.c (encode_sesskey, encode_simple, encode_crypt), sign.c (write_plaintext_packet): Use wipememory() instead of memset() to wipe sensitive memory as the memset() might be optimized away.
2002-10-31 15:40:42 +00:00
wipememory( buf, sizeof buf ); /* burn key */
Update head to match stable 1.0
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}
See ChangeLog: Mon May 17 21:54:43 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-05-17 20:03:24 +00:00
* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression algo 2 and symmetric compressed files. * encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed. This is to help against the chosen ciphertext attack. * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the first found. * cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple, encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use a MDC. We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
2002-08-13 19:00:23 +00:00
/* We try very hard to use a MDC */
static int
use_mdc(PK_LIST pk_list,int algo)
{
* g10.c (main): Error out if --multifile is used with the commands that don't support it yet (--sign, --clearsign, --detach-sign, --symmetric, and --store). * g10.c (main): Add --multifile as an alias to turn --encrypt into --encrypt-files (plus --verify-files, --decrypt-files). * encode.c (use_mdc), g10.c (main): Use RFC1991 and RFC2440 directly to check for MDC usability. Do not set the force_mdc or disable_mdc flags since there is no point any longer.
2003-09-09 00:25:53 +00:00
/* RFC-1991 and 2440 don't have MDC */
if(RFC1991 || RFC2440)
return 0;
* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression algo 2 and symmetric compressed files. * encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed. This is to help against the chosen ciphertext attack. * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the first found. * cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple, encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use a MDC. We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
2002-08-13 19:00:23 +00:00
/* --force-mdc overrides --disable-mdc */
if(opt.force_mdc)
return 1;
if(opt.disable_mdc)
return 0;
/* Do the keys really support MDC? */
if(select_mdc_from_pklist(pk_list))
return 1;
/* The keys don't support MDC, so now we do a bit of a hack - if any
of the AESes or TWOFISH are in the prefs, we assume that the user
can handle a MDC. This is valid for PGP 7, which can handle MDCs
though it will not generate them. 2440bis allows this, by the
way. */
if(select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
CIPHER_ALGO_AES,NULL)==CIPHER_ALGO_AES)
return 1;
if(select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
CIPHER_ALGO_AES192,NULL)==CIPHER_ALGO_AES192)
return 1;
if(select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
CIPHER_ALGO_AES256,NULL)==CIPHER_ALGO_AES256)
return 1;
if(select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH,NULL)==CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH)
return 1;
/* Last try. Use MDC for the modern ciphers. */
if(cipher_get_blocksize(algo)!=8)
return 1;
return 0; /* No MDC */
}
* g10.c (main): Add --no-groups to zero --group list. * encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of symmetrically encrypted session key. Use --s2k-cipher-algo to choose cipher, rather than the default cipher. * parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Give a warning if an symmetrically encrypted session key is seen without salt. Show in --list-packets if a symetrically encrypted session key is present. * pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning unless --quiet is set. Use text name of cipher in warning.
2003-10-01 15:15:58 +00:00
/* We don't want to use use_seskey yet because older gnupg versions
can't handle it, and there isn't really any point unless we're
making a message that can be decrypted by a public key or
passphrase. */
initially checkin
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static int
* g10.c (main): Add --no-groups to zero --group list. * encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of symmetrically encrypted session key. Use --s2k-cipher-algo to choose cipher, rather than the default cipher. * parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Give a warning if an symmetrically encrypted session key is seen without salt. Show in --list-packets if a symetrically encrypted session key is present. * pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning unless --quiet is set. Use text name of cipher in warning.
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encode_simple( const char *filename, int mode, int use_seskey )
initially checkin
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{
IOBUF inp, out;
PACKET pkt;
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
PKT_plaintext *pt = NULL;
new release
1998-05-04 18:49:26 +00:00
STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
Update head to match stable 1.0
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byte enckey[33];
initially checkin
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int rc = 0;
Update head to match stable 1.0
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int seskeylen = 0;
initially checkin
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u32 filesize;
cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
Output armor works, RSA keygen works.
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armor_filter_context_t afx;
compress stuff implemented
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compress_filter_context_t zfx;
See ChangeLog: Wed Mar 17 13:09:03 CET 1999 Werner Koch
1999-03-17 12:13:04 +00:00
text_filter_context_t tfx;
* Makefile.am (AM_CFLAGS): Make use of AM_CFLAGS and AM_LDFLAGS. * g10.c, options.h: New option --enable-progress-filter. * progress.c (handle_progress): Make use of it.
2003-04-15 15:46:13 +00:00
progress_filter_context_t pfx;
* encode.c (encode_simple), sign.c (sign_symencrypt_file): Properly use default_compress_algo (--compress-algo, followed by the highest --personal-compress-preference, followed by ZIP) to get the algorithm.
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int do_compress = !RFC1991 && default_compress_algo();
initially checkin
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memset( &cfx, 0, sizeof cfx);
Output armor works, RSA keygen works.
1997-11-19 13:12:23 +00:00
memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
compress stuff implemented
1997-11-23 15:38:27 +00:00
memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
See ChangeLog: Wed Mar 17 13:09:03 CET 1999 Werner Koch
1999-03-17 12:13:04 +00:00
memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
bug fix release
1998-08-11 17:29:34 +00:00
init_packet(&pkt);
Update head to match stable 1.0
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initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
/* prepare iobufs */
if( !(inp = iobuf_open(filename)) ) {
intermediate release
1998-07-06 10:23:57 +00:00
log_error(_("%s: can't open: %s\n"), filename? filename: "[stdin]",
initially checkin
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strerror(errno) );
Update head to match stable 1.0
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return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
initially checkin
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}
* Makefile.am (AM_CFLAGS): Make use of AM_CFLAGS and AM_LDFLAGS. * g10.c, options.h: New option --enable-progress-filter. * progress.c (handle_progress): Make use of it.
2003-04-15 15:46:13 +00:00
handle_progress (&pfx, inp, filename);
See ChangeLog: Wed Mar 17 13:09:03 CET 1999 Werner Koch
1999-03-17 12:13:04 +00:00
if( opt.textmode )
iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx );
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
/* Due the the fact that we use don't use an IV to encrypt the
session key we can't use the new mode with RFC1991 because
it has no S2K salt. RFC1991 always uses simple S2K. */
* g10.c (main): Add --no-groups to zero --group list. * encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of symmetrically encrypted session key. Use --s2k-cipher-algo to choose cipher, rather than the default cipher. * parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Give a warning if an symmetrically encrypted session key is seen without salt. Show in --list-packets if a symetrically encrypted session key is present. * pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning unless --quiet is set. Use text name of cipher in warning.
2003-10-01 15:15:58 +00:00
if ( RFC1991 && use_seskey )
use_seskey = 0;
Update head to match stable 1.0
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initially checkin
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cfx.dek = NULL;
if( mode ) {
Update head to match stable 1.0
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s2k = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *s2k );
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c (do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old sig cache subpacket. This wasn't completely harmless as it caused subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export. * options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them. No functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level. * sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference warning. * sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key. * main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string, compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one place. * options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification. Use a single enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.) * g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys, and refresh-keys. * options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules. * keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp mode. * sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of 0.
2003-05-03 04:07:45 +00:00
s2k->mode = RFC1991? 0:opt.s2k_mode;
* main.h: Create S2K_DIGEST_ALGO macro so we do not need to always set opt.s2k_digest_algo. This helps fix a problem with PGP 2.x encrypted symmetric messages. Change all callers (encode.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, keygen.c, passphrase.c, sign.c). * armor.c, cardglue.c, getkey.c, import.c, keygen.c: Be consistent in some more quoted strings. Always use 'user ID', not 'user id', "quotes" for user IDs, etc.
2004-09-24 20:34:38 +00:00
s2k->hash_algo=S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
See ChangeLog: Thu Jul 1 12:47:31 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-01 10:53:35 +00:00
cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0,
* passphrase.c (read_passphrase_from_fd): Do a dummy read if the agent is to be used. Noted by Ingo Kl�cker. (agent_get_passphrase): Inhibit caching when we have no fingerprint. This is required for key generation as well as for symmetric only encryption. * passphrase .c (agent_get_passphrase): New arg CANCELED. (passphrase_to_dek): Ditto. Passed to above. Changed all callers to pass NULL. * seckey-cert.c (do_check): New arg CANCELED. (check_secret_key): Terminate loop when canceled. * keyedit.c (change_passphrase): Pass ERRTEXT untranslated to passphrase_to_dek and translate where appropriate. * seckey-cert.c (check_secret_key): Ditto. * keygen.c (ask_passphrase): Ditto. * passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Translate the TRYAGAIN_TEXT. Switch the codeset to utf-8.
2003-04-10 09:56:47 +00:00
default_cipher_algo(), s2k, 2,
NULL, NULL);
new release
1998-05-04 18:49:26 +00:00
if( !cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen ) {
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
rc = G10ERR_PASSPHRASE;
m_free(cfx.dek);
m_free(s2k);
initially checkin
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iobuf_close(inp);
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
log_error(_("error creating passphrase: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
initially checkin
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return rc;
}
* g10.c (main): Add --no-groups to zero --group list. * encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of symmetrically encrypted session key. Use --s2k-cipher-algo to choose cipher, rather than the default cipher. * parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Give a warning if an symmetrically encrypted session key is seen without salt. Show in --list-packets if a symetrically encrypted session key is present. * pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning unless --quiet is set. Use text name of cipher in warning.
2003-10-01 15:15:58 +00:00
if (use_seskey && s2k->mode != 1 && s2k->mode != 3) {
use_seskey = 0;
Cleanups and minor fixes.
2002-09-10 08:40:12 +00:00
log_info (_("can't use a symmetric ESK packet "
"due to the S2K mode\n"));
}
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
2003-10-26 03:26:14 +00:00
if ( use_seskey )
{
DEK *dek = NULL;
seskeylen = cipher_get_keylen( default_cipher_algo() ) / 8;
encode_seskey( cfx.dek, &dek, enckey );
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
m_free( cfx.dek ); cfx.dek = dek;
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
2003-10-26 03:26:14 +00:00
}
* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression algo 2 and symmetric compressed files. * encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed. This is to help against the chosen ciphertext attack. * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the first found. * cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple, encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use a MDC. We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
2002-08-13 19:00:23 +00:00
* plaintext.c: Copyright. * encode.c (encode_simple): Show cipher with --verbose. * options.h, g10.c (main), keyedit.c (sign_keys): Add --ask-cert-level option to enable cert level prompts during sigs. Defaults to on. Simplify --default-cert-check-level to --default-cert-level. If ask-cert-level is off, or batch is on, use the default-cert-level as the cert level. * options.h, g10.c (main), trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Simplify --min-cert-check-level to --min-cert-level.
2004-02-24 23:37:18 +00:00
if(opt.verbose)
log_info(_("using cipher %s\n"),
cipher_algo_to_string(cfx.dek->algo));
* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression algo 2 and symmetric compressed files. * encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed. This is to help against the chosen ciphertext attack. * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the first found. * cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple, encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use a MDC. We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
2002-08-13 19:00:23 +00:00
cfx.dek->use_mdc=use_mdc(NULL,cfx.dek->algo);
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
}
* options.h, g10.c (main), compress.c (init_compress), compress-bz2.c (init_compress): Add --compress-level and --bzip2-compress-level. -z sets them both. Change various callers.
2003-11-15 22:31:58 +00:00
if (do_compress && cfx.dek && cfx.dek->use_mdc
&& is_file_compressed(filename, &rc))
* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression algo 2 and symmetric compressed files. * encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed. This is to help against the chosen ciphertext attack. * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the first found. * cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple, encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use a MDC. We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
2002-08-13 19:00:23 +00:00
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info(_("`%s' already compressed\n"), filename);
do_compress = 0;
}
if( rc || (rc = open_outfile( filename, opt.armor? 1:0, &out )) ) {
See ChangeLog: Fri Jul 14 19:38:23 CEST 2000 Werner Koch
2000-07-14 17:34:53 +00:00
iobuf_cancel(inp);
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
m_free(cfx.dek);
m_free(s2k);
bug fix release
1998-08-11 17:29:34 +00:00
return rc;
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
}
if( opt.armor )
Output armor works, RSA keygen works.
1997-11-19 13:12:23 +00:00
iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c, getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c, options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c, signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 21:50:33 +00:00
#ifdef ENABLE_COMMENT_PACKETS
bug fix release
1998-08-11 17:29:34 +00:00
else {
add-key works
1998-05-26 13:38:00 +00:00
write_comment( out, "#created by GNUPG v" VERSION " ("
some import functionality
1998-02-16 20:05:02 +00:00
PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ")");
bug fix release
1998-08-11 17:29:34 +00:00
if( opt.comment_string )
write_comment( out, opt.comment_string );
}
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c, getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c, options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c, signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 21:50:33 +00:00
#endif
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c (do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old sig cache subpacket. This wasn't completely harmless as it caused subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export. * options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them. No functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level. * sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference warning. * sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key. * main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string, compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one place. * options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification. Use a single enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.) * g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys, and refresh-keys. * options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules. * keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp mode. * sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of 0.
2003-05-03 04:07:45 +00:00
if( s2k && !RFC1991 ) {
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
PKT_symkey_enc *enc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *enc + seskeylen + 1 );
new release
1998-05-04 18:49:26 +00:00
enc->version = 4;
enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo;
enc->s2k = *s2k;
* g10.c (main): Add --no-groups to zero --group list. * encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of symmetrically encrypted session key. Use --s2k-cipher-algo to choose cipher, rather than the default cipher. * parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Give a warning if an symmetrically encrypted session key is seen without salt. Show in --list-packets if a symetrically encrypted session key is present. * pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning unless --quiet is set. Use text name of cipher in warning.
2003-10-01 15:15:58 +00:00
if ( use_seskey && seskeylen ) {
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
enc->seskeylen = seskeylen + 1; /* algo id */
memcpy( enc->seskey, enckey, seskeylen + 1 );
}
new release
1998-05-04 18:49:26 +00:00
pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC;
pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = enc;
if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
log_error("build symkey packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
m_free(enc);
new release
1998-05-04 18:49:26 +00:00
}
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
if (!opt.no_literal) {
/* setup the inner packet */
if( filename || opt.set_filename ) {
char *s = make_basename( opt.set_filename ? opt.set_filename
tidied RISC OS filetype support
2002-10-29 14:37:12 +00:00
: filename,
iobuf_get_real_fname( inp ) );
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
pt = m_alloc( sizeof *pt + strlen(s) - 1 );
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
pt->namelen = strlen(s);
memcpy(pt->name, s, pt->namelen );
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
m_free(s);
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
}
else { /* no filename */
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
pt = m_alloc( sizeof *pt - 1 );
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
pt->namelen = 0;
}
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
}
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
/* Note that PGP 5 has problems decrypting symmetrically encrypted
data if the file length is in the inner packet. It works when
only partial length headers are use. In the past, we always
used partial body length here, but since PGP 2, PGP 6, and PGP
7 need the file length, and nobody should be using PGP 5
nowadays anyway, this is now set to the file length. Note also
that this only applies to the RFC-1991 style symmetric
messages, and not the RFC-2440 style. PGP 6 and 7 work with
either partial length or fixed length with the new style
messages. */
* progress.c (handle_progress) * sign.c (write_plaintext_packet) * encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): Make sure that a filename of "-" is considered to be stdin so that iobuf_get_filelength won't get called. This fixes bug 156 reported by Gregery Barton.
2003-05-21 08:48:26 +00:00
if (filename && *filename && !(*filename == '-' && !filename[1])
&& !opt.textmode ) {
* encode.c (encode_simple): Make sure that files larger than about 4G use partial length encoding. This is required because OpenPGP allows only for 32 bit length fields. From Werner on stable branch. * getkey.c (get_pubkey_direct): Renamed to... (get_pubkey_fast): this and made extern. (get_pubkey_byfprint_fast): New. From Werner on stable branch. * keydb.h, import.c (import_one): Use get_pubkey_fast instead of get_pubkey. We don't need a merged key and actually this might lead to recursions. (revocation_present): Likewise for search by fingerprint. From Werner on stable branch. * g10.c (main): Try to create the trustdb even for non-colon-mode list-key operations. This is required because getkey needs to know whether a a key is ultimately trusted. From Werner on stable branch.
2002-11-13 17:43:27 +00:00
off_t tmpsize;
if ( !(tmpsize = iobuf_get_filelength(inp)) )
log_info(_("%s: WARNING: empty file\n"), filename );
/* We can't encode the length of very large files because
OpenPGP uses only 32 bit for file sizes. So if the the
size of a file is larger than 2^32 minus some bytes for
packet headers, we switch to partial length encoding. */
if ( tmpsize < (IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT - 65536) )
filesize = tmpsize;
else
filesize = 0;
bug fix release
1998-08-11 17:29:34 +00:00
}
else
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
filesize = opt.set_filesize ? opt.set_filesize : 0; /* stdin */
if (!opt.no_literal) {
pt->timestamp = make_timestamp();
pt->mode = opt.textmode? 't' : 'b';
pt->len = filesize;
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c (do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old sig cache subpacket. This wasn't completely harmless as it caused subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export. * options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them. No functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level. * sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference warning. * sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key. * main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string, compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one place. * options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification. Use a single enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.) * g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys, and refresh-keys. * options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules. * keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp mode. * sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of 0.
2003-05-03 04:07:45 +00:00
pt->new_ctb = !pt->len && !RFC1991;
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
pt->buf = inp;
pkt.pkttype = PKT_PLAINTEXT;
pkt.pkt.plaintext = pt;
cfx.datalen = filesize && !do_compress ? calc_packet_length( &pkt ) : 0;
}
else
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
{
cfx.datalen = filesize && !do_compress ? filesize : 0;
pkt.pkttype = 0;
pkt.pkt.generic = NULL;
}
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
/* register the cipher filter */
if( mode )
iobuf_push_filter( out, cipher_filter, &cfx );
add-key works
1998-05-26 13:38:00 +00:00
/* register the compress filter */
*** empty log message ***
1998-09-28 19:25:31 +00:00
if( do_compress )
* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression algo 2 and symmetric compressed files. * encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed. This is to help against the chosen ciphertext attack. * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the first found. * cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple, encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use a MDC. We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
2002-08-13 19:00:23 +00:00
{
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): Changed the wording of a warning. * encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): Use new style CTB for compressssed packets when using MDC. We need to do this so that concatenated messages are properly decrypted. Old style compression assumes that it is the last packet; given that we can't determine the length in advance, the uncompressor does not know where to start. Actually we should use the new CTB always but this would break PGP 2 compatibility. * parse-packet.c (parse): Special treatment for new style CTB compressed packets. * build-packet.c (do_mdc): Removed. Was not used. (do_encrypted_mdc): Count the version number and the MDC packet.
2002-08-30 16:34:13 +00:00
if (cfx.dek && cfx.dek->use_mdc)
zfx.new_ctb = 1;
* encode.c (encode_simple), sign.c (sign_symencrypt_file): Properly use default_compress_algo (--compress-algo, followed by the highest --personal-compress-preference, followed by ZIP) to get the algorithm.
2003-11-15 15:38:43 +00:00
push_compress_filter(out,&zfx,default_compress_algo());
* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression algo 2 and symmetric compressed files. * encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed. This is to help against the chosen ciphertext attack. * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the first found. * cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple, encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use a MDC. We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
2002-08-13 19:00:23 +00:00
}
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
/* do the work */
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
if (!opt.no_literal) {
if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
log_error("build_packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
}
else {
/* user requested not to create a literal packet,
* so we copy the plain data */
byte copy_buffer[4096];
int bytes_copied;
while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read(inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1)
if (iobuf_write(out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied) == -1) {
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
log_error("copying input to output failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
break;
}
* build-packet.c (do_plaintext), encode.c (encode_sesskey, encode_simple, encode_crypt), sign.c (write_plaintext_packet): Use wipememory() instead of memset() to wipe sensitive memory as the memset() might be optimized away.
2002-10-31 15:40:42 +00:00
wipememory(copy_buffer, 4096); /* burn buffer */
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
}
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
/* finish the stuff */
iobuf_close(inp);
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
if (rc)
iobuf_cancel(out);
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
else {
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
iobuf_close(out); /* fixme: check returncode */
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
if (mode)
write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION );
}
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
if (pt)
pt->buf = NULL;
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
free_packet(&pkt);
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
m_free(cfx.dek);
m_free(s2k);
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
return rc;
}
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --sign --encrypt. * main.h, encode.c (setup_symkey): New. Prompt for a passphrase and create a DEK for symmetric encryption. (write_symkey_enc): New. Write out symmetrically encrypted session keys. (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Use them here here when creating a message that can be decrypted with a passphrase or a pk. * sign.c (sign_file): Call setup_symkey if we are doing a --symmetric --sign --encrypt.
2003-11-13 02:54:12 +00:00
int
setup_symkey(STRING2KEY **symkey_s2k,DEK **symkey_dek)
{
*symkey_s2k=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(STRING2KEY));
(*symkey_s2k)->mode = opt.s2k_mode;
* main.h: Create S2K_DIGEST_ALGO macro so we do not need to always set opt.s2k_digest_algo. This helps fix a problem with PGP 2.x encrypted symmetric messages. Change all callers (encode.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, keygen.c, passphrase.c, sign.c). * armor.c, cardglue.c, getkey.c, import.c, keygen.c: Be consistent in some more quoted strings. Always use 'user ID', not 'user id', "quotes" for user IDs, etc.
2004-09-24 20:34:38 +00:00
(*symkey_s2k)->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --sign --encrypt. * main.h, encode.c (setup_symkey): New. Prompt for a passphrase and create a DEK for symmetric encryption. (write_symkey_enc): New. Write out symmetrically encrypted session keys. (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Use them here here when creating a message that can be decrypted with a passphrase or a pk. * sign.c (sign_file): Call setup_symkey if we are doing a --symmetric --sign --encrypt.
2003-11-13 02:54:12 +00:00
*symkey_dek=passphrase_to_dek(NULL,0,opt.s2k_cipher_algo,
*symkey_s2k,2,NULL,NULL);
if(!*symkey_dek || !(*symkey_dek)->keylen)
{
m_free(*symkey_dek);
m_free(*symkey_s2k);
return G10ERR_PASSPHRASE;
}
return 0;
}
static int
write_symkey_enc(STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k,DEK *symkey_dek,DEK *dek,IOBUF out)
{
int rc,seskeylen=cipher_get_keylen(dek->algo)/8;
PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
byte enckey[33];
PACKET pkt;
enc=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_symkey_enc)+seskeylen+1);
encode_seskey(symkey_dek,&dek,enckey);
enc->version = 4;
enc->cipher_algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
enc->s2k = *symkey_s2k;
enc->seskeylen = seskeylen + 1; /* algo id */
memcpy( enc->seskey, enckey, seskeylen + 1 );
pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC;
pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = enc;
if((rc=build_packet(out,&pkt)))
log_error("build symkey_enc packet failed: %s\n",g10_errstr(rc));
m_free(enc);
return rc;
}
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
/****************
* Encrypt the file with the given userids (or ask if none
* is supplied).
*/
int
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
2003-10-26 03:26:14 +00:00
encode_crypt( const char *filename, STRLIST remusr, int use_symkey )
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
{
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
PACKET pkt;
*** empty log message ***
1998-01-13 19:04:23 +00:00
PKT_plaintext *pt = NULL;
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
2003-10-26 03:26:14 +00:00
DEK *symkey_dek = NULL;
STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k = NULL;
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
int rc = 0, rc2 = 0;
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
u32 filesize;
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
Output armor works, RSA keygen works.
1997-11-19 13:12:23 +00:00
armor_filter_context_t afx;
compress stuff implemented
1997-11-23 15:38:27 +00:00
compress_filter_context_t zfx;
See ChangeLog: Wed Mar 17 13:09:03 CET 1999 Werner Koch
1999-03-17 12:13:04 +00:00
text_filter_context_t tfx;
* Makefile.am (AM_CFLAGS): Make use of AM_CFLAGS and AM_LDFLAGS. * g10.c, options.h: New option --enable-progress-filter. * progress.c (handle_progress): Make use of it.
2003-04-15 15:46:13 +00:00
progress_filter_context_t pfx;
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
PK_LIST pk_list,work_list;
* options.h, g10.c (main), compress.c (init_compress), compress-bz2.c (init_compress): Add --compress-level and --bzip2-compress-level. -z sets them both. Change various callers.
2003-11-15 22:31:58 +00:00
int do_compress = opt.compress_algo && !RFC1991;
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
memset( &cfx, 0, sizeof cfx);
Output armor works, RSA keygen works.
1997-11-19 13:12:23 +00:00
memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
compress stuff implemented
1997-11-23 15:38:27 +00:00
memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
See ChangeLog: Wed Mar 17 13:09:03 CET 1999 Werner Koch
1999-03-17 12:13:04 +00:00
memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
bug fix release
1998-08-11 17:29:34 +00:00
init_packet(&pkt);
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --sign --encrypt. * main.h, encode.c (setup_symkey): New. Prompt for a passphrase and create a DEK for symmetric encryption. (write_symkey_enc): New. Write out symmetrically encrypted session keys. (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Use them here here when creating a message that can be decrypted with a passphrase or a pk. * sign.c (sign_file): Call setup_symkey if we are doing a --symmetric --sign --encrypt.
2003-11-13 02:54:12 +00:00
if(use_symkey
&& (rc=setup_symkey(&symkey_s2k,&symkey_dek)))
return rc;
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
if( (rc=build_pk_list( remusr, &pk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) )
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
return rc;
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c (do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old sig cache subpacket. This wasn't completely harmless as it caused subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export. * options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them. No functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level. * sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference warning. * sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key. * main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string, compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one place. * options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification. Use a single enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.) * g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys, and refresh-keys. * options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules. * keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp mode. * sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of 0.
2003-05-03 04:07:45 +00:00
if(PGP2) {
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
for(work_list=pk_list; work_list; work_list=work_list->next)
if(!(is_RSA(work_list->pk->pubkey_algo) &&
nbits_from_pk(work_list->pk)<=2048))
{
log_info(_("you can only encrypt to RSA keys of 2048 bits or "
"less in --pgp2 mode\n"));
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c (do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old sig cache subpacket. This wasn't completely harmless as it caused subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export. * options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them. No functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level. * sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference warning. * sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key. * main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string, compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one place. * options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification. Use a single enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.) * g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys, and refresh-keys. * options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules. * keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp mode. * sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of 0.
2003-05-03 04:07:45 +00:00
compliance_failure();
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
break;
}
}
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
/* prepare iobufs */
if( !(inp = iobuf_open(filename)) ) {
intermediate release
1998-07-06 10:23:57 +00:00
log_error(_("can't open %s: %s\n"), filename? filename: "[stdin]",
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
strerror(errno) );
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
goto leave;
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
}
else if( opt.verbose )
See ChangeLog: Tue Dec 29 14:41:47 CET 1998 Werner Koch
1998-12-29 13:47:31 +00:00
log_info(_("reading from `%s'\n"), filename? filename: "[stdin]");
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
* Makefile.am (AM_CFLAGS): Make use of AM_CFLAGS and AM_LDFLAGS. * g10.c, options.h: New option --enable-progress-filter. * progress.c (handle_progress): Make use of it.
2003-04-15 15:46:13 +00:00
handle_progress (&pfx, inp, filename);
See ChangeLog: Wed Mar 17 13:09:03 CET 1999 Werner Koch
1999-03-17 12:13:04 +00:00
if( opt.textmode )
iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx );
bug fix release
1998-08-11 17:29:34 +00:00
if( (rc = open_outfile( filename, opt.armor? 1:0, &out )) )
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
goto leave;
bug fix release
1998-08-11 17:29:34 +00:00
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
if( opt.armor )
Output armor works, RSA keygen works.
1997-11-19 13:12:23 +00:00
iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c, getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c, options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c, signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 21:50:33 +00:00
#ifdef ENABLE_COMMENT_PACKETS
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
else {
write_comment( out, "#created by GNUPG v" VERSION " ("
PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ")");
if( opt.comment_string )
write_comment( out, opt.comment_string );
}
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c, getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c, options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c, signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 21:50:33 +00:00
#endif
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
/* create a session key */
cfx.dek = m_alloc_secure_clear (sizeof *cfx.dek);
if( !opt.def_cipher_algo ) { /* try to get it from the prefs */
cfx.dek->algo = select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,-1,NULL);
/* The only way select_algo_from_prefs can fail here is when
mixing v3 and v4 keys, as v4 keys have an implicit
preference entry for 3DES, and the pk_list cannot be empty.
In this case, use 3DES anyway as it's the safest choice -
perhaps the v3 key is being used in an OpenPGP
implementation and we know that the implementation behind
any v4 key can handle 3DES. */
if( cfx.dek->algo == -1 ) {
cfx.dek->algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c (do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old sig cache subpacket. This wasn't completely harmless as it caused subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export. * options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them. No functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level. * sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference warning. * sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key. * main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string, compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one place. * options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification. Use a single enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.) * g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys, and refresh-keys. * options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules. * keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp mode. * sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of 0.
2003-05-03 04:07:45 +00:00
if( PGP2 ) {
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
log_info(_("unable to use the IDEA cipher for all of the keys "
"you are encrypting to.\n"));
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c (do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old sig cache subpacket. This wasn't completely harmless as it caused subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export. * options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them. No functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level. * sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference warning. * sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key. * main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string, compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one place. * options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification. Use a single enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.) * g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys, and refresh-keys. * options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules. * keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp mode. * sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of 0.
2003-05-03 04:07:45 +00:00
compliance_failure();
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
}
}
}
else {
if(!opt.expert &&
select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
opt.def_cipher_algo,NULL)!=opt.def_cipher_algo)
* encode.c, exec.c, g10.c, sign.c: Some translatable string cleanup. Change some "this" to `this'.
2004-08-27 17:32:31 +00:00
log_info(_("WARNING: forcing symmetric cipher %s (%d)"
" violates recipient preferences\n"),
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
cipher_algo_to_string(opt.def_cipher_algo),
opt.def_cipher_algo);
cfx.dek->algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
}
* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression algo 2 and symmetric compressed files. * encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed. This is to help against the chosen ciphertext attack. * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the first found. * cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple, encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use a MDC. We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
2002-08-13 19:00:23 +00:00
cfx.dek->use_mdc=use_mdc(pk_list,cfx.dek->algo);
/* Only do the is-file-already-compressed check if we are using a
MDC. This forces compressed files to be re-compressed if we do
not have a MDC to give some protection against chosen
ciphertext attacks. */
* options.h, g10.c (main), compress.c (init_compress), compress-bz2.c (init_compress): Add --compress-level and --bzip2-compress-level. -z sets them both. Change various callers.
2003-11-15 22:31:58 +00:00
if (do_compress && cfx.dek->use_mdc && is_file_compressed(filename, &rc2) )
* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression algo 2 and symmetric compressed files. * encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed. This is to help against the chosen ciphertext attack. * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the first found. * cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple, encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use a MDC. We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
2002-08-13 19:00:23 +00:00
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info(_("`%s' already compressed\n"), filename);
do_compress = 0;
}
if (rc2)
{
rc = rc2;
goto leave;
}
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
make_session_key( cfx.dek );
if( DBG_CIPHER )
log_hexdump("DEK is: ", cfx.dek->key, cfx.dek->keylen );
rc = write_pubkey_enc_from_list( pk_list, cfx.dek, out );
if( rc )
goto leave;
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
2003-10-26 03:26:14 +00:00
/* We put the passphrase (if any) after any public keys as this
seems to be the most useful on the recipient side - there is no
point in prompting a user for a passphrase if they have the
secret key needed to decrypt. */
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --sign --encrypt. * main.h, encode.c (setup_symkey): New. Prompt for a passphrase and create a DEK for symmetric encryption. (write_symkey_enc): New. Write out symmetrically encrypted session keys. (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Use them here here when creating a message that can be decrypted with a passphrase or a pk. * sign.c (sign_file): Call setup_symkey if we are doing a --symmetric --sign --encrypt.
2003-11-13 02:54:12 +00:00
if(use_symkey && (rc=write_symkey_enc(symkey_s2k,symkey_dek,cfx.dek,out)))
goto leave;
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
2003-10-26 03:26:14 +00:00
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
if (!opt.no_literal) {
/* setup the inner packet */
if( filename || opt.set_filename ) {
tidied RISC OS filetype support
2002-10-29 14:37:12 +00:00
char *s = make_basename( opt.set_filename ? opt.set_filename
: filename,
iobuf_get_real_fname( inp ) );
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
pt = m_alloc( sizeof *pt + strlen(s) - 1 );
pt->namelen = strlen(s);
memcpy(pt->name, s, pt->namelen );
m_free(s);
}
else { /* no filename */
pt = m_alloc( sizeof *pt - 1 );
pt->namelen = 0;
}
}
* progress.c (handle_progress) * sign.c (write_plaintext_packet) * encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): Make sure that a filename of "-" is considered to be stdin so that iobuf_get_filelength won't get called. This fixes bug 156 reported by Gregery Barton.
2003-05-21 08:48:26 +00:00
if (filename && *filename && !(*filename == '-' && !filename[1])
&& !opt.textmode ) {
* encode.c (encode_simple): Make sure that files larger than about 4G use partial length encoding. This is required because OpenPGP allows only for 32 bit length fields. From Werner on stable branch. * getkey.c (get_pubkey_direct): Renamed to... (get_pubkey_fast): this and made extern. (get_pubkey_byfprint_fast): New. From Werner on stable branch. * keydb.h, import.c (import_one): Use get_pubkey_fast instead of get_pubkey. We don't need a merged key and actually this might lead to recursions. (revocation_present): Likewise for search by fingerprint. From Werner on stable branch. * g10.c (main): Try to create the trustdb even for non-colon-mode list-key operations. This is required because getkey needs to know whether a a key is ultimately trusted. From Werner on stable branch.
2002-11-13 17:43:27 +00:00
off_t tmpsize;
if ( !(tmpsize = iobuf_get_filelength(inp)) )
log_info(_("%s: WARNING: empty file\n"), filename );
/* We can't encode the length of very large files because
OpenPGP uses only 32 bit for file sizes. So if the the
size of a file is larger than 2^32 minus some bytes for
packet headers, we switch to partial length encoding. */
if ( tmpsize < (IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT - 65536) )
filesize = tmpsize;
else
filesize = 0;
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
}
else
filesize = opt.set_filesize ? opt.set_filesize : 0; /* stdin */
if (!opt.no_literal) {
pt->timestamp = make_timestamp();
pt->mode = opt.textmode ? 't' : 'b';
pt->len = filesize;
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c (do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old sig cache subpacket. This wasn't completely harmless as it caused subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export. * options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them. No functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level. * sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference warning. * sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key. * main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string, compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one place. * options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification. Use a single enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.) * g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys, and refresh-keys. * options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules. * keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp mode. * sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of 0.
2003-05-03 04:07:45 +00:00
pt->new_ctb = !pt->len && !RFC1991;
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
pt->buf = inp;
pkt.pkttype = PKT_PLAINTEXT;
pkt.pkt.plaintext = pt;
cfx.datalen = filesize && !do_compress? calc_packet_length( &pkt ) : 0;
}
else
cfx.datalen = filesize && !do_compress ? filesize : 0;
/* register the cipher filter */
iobuf_push_filter( out, cipher_filter, &cfx );
/* register the compress filter */
*** empty log message ***
1998-09-28 19:25:31 +00:00
if( do_compress ) {
* options.h, g10.c (main), compress.c (init_compress), compress-bz2.c (init_compress): Add --compress-level and --bzip2-compress-level. -z sets them both. Change various callers.
2003-11-15 22:31:58 +00:00
int compr_algo = opt.compress_algo;
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
if(compr_algo==-1)
{
if((compr_algo=
select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP,-1,NULL))==-1)
compr_algo=DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO;
* main.h, misc.c (default_cipher_algo, default_compress_algo): New. Return the default algorithm by trying --cipher-algo/--compress-algo, then the first item in the pref list, then s2k-cipher-algo or ZIP. * sign.c (sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file), encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Call default_cipher_algo and default_compress_algo to get algorithms. * g10.c (main): Allow pref selection for compress algo with --openpgp.
2002-11-25 04:24:41 +00:00
/* Theoretically impossible to get here since uncompressed
is implicit. */
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
}
else if(!opt.expert &&
select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP,
compr_algo,NULL)!=compr_algo)
* encode.c, exec.c, g10.c, sign.c: Some translatable string cleanup. Change some "this" to `this'.
2004-08-27 17:32:31 +00:00
log_info(_("WARNING: forcing compression algorithm %s (%d)"
" violates recipient preferences\n"),
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
compress_algo_to_string(compr_algo),compr_algo);
/* algo 0 means no compression */
if( compr_algo )
{
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): Changed the wording of a warning. * encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): Use new style CTB for compressssed packets when using MDC. We need to do this so that concatenated messages are properly decrypted. Old style compression assumes that it is the last packet; given that we can't determine the length in advance, the uncompressor does not know where to start. Actually we should use the new CTB always but this would break PGP 2 compatibility. * parse-packet.c (parse): Special treatment for new style CTB compressed packets. * build-packet.c (do_mdc): Removed. Was not used. (do_encrypted_mdc): Count the version number and the MDC packet.
2002-08-30 16:34:13 +00:00
if (cfx.dek && cfx.dek->use_mdc)
zfx.new_ctb = 1;
* misc.c (compress_algo_to_string, string_to_compress_algo, check_compress_algo): Add bzip2. * compress.c (compress_filter): Make static to help force the use of push_compress_filter. Remove default algorithm setting since that is done in push_compress_filter now. * main.h: Use named algorithm. * filter.h, compress.c (push_compress_filter, push_compress_filter2): New. Figure out which is the appropriate compression filter to use, and push it into place. * compress.c (handle_compressed), encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt), sign.c (sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file), import.c (read_block), export.c (do_export): Use push_compress_filter instead of pushing the compression filter ourselves. * compress-bz2.c: New. Bzlib versions of the compression filter routines. * Makefile.am: Include compress-bz2.c if bz2lib is available.
2003-10-31 05:39:02 +00:00
push_compress_filter(out,&zfx,compr_algo);
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
}
intermediate check in
1998-08-05 16:51:59 +00:00
}
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
/* do the work */
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
if (!opt.no_literal) {
if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
log_error("build_packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
}
else {
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): Changed the wording of a warning. * encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): Use new style CTB for compressssed packets when using MDC. We need to do this so that concatenated messages are properly decrypted. Old style compression assumes that it is the last packet; given that we can't determine the length in advance, the uncompressor does not know where to start. Actually we should use the new CTB always but this would break PGP 2 compatibility. * parse-packet.c (parse): Special treatment for new style CTB compressed packets. * build-packet.c (do_mdc): Removed. Was not used. (do_encrypted_mdc): Count the version number and the MDC packet.
2002-08-30 16:34:13 +00:00
/* user requested not to create a literal packet, so we copy
the plain data */
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
byte copy_buffer[4096];
int bytes_copied;
while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read(inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1)
if (iobuf_write(out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied) == -1) {
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): Changed the wording of a warning. * encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): Use new style CTB for compressssed packets when using MDC. We need to do this so that concatenated messages are properly decrypted. Old style compression assumes that it is the last packet; given that we can't determine the length in advance, the uncompressor does not know where to start. Actually we should use the new CTB always but this would break PGP 2 compatibility. * parse-packet.c (parse): Special treatment for new style CTB compressed packets. * build-packet.c (do_mdc): Removed. Was not used. (do_encrypted_mdc): Count the version number and the MDC packet.
2002-08-30 16:34:13 +00:00
log_error("copying input to output failed: %s\n",
g10_errstr(rc) );
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
break;
}
* build-packet.c (do_plaintext), encode.c (encode_sesskey, encode_simple, encode_crypt), sign.c (write_plaintext_packet): Use wipememory() instead of memset() to wipe sensitive memory as the memset() might be optimized away.
2002-10-31 15:40:42 +00:00
wipememory(copy_buffer, 4096); /* burn buffer */
See ChangeLog: Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-07-26 07:44:46 +00:00
}
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
/* finish the stuff */
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
leave:
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
iobuf_close(inp);
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
if( rc )
iobuf_cancel(out);
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
else {
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
iobuf_close(out); /* fixme: check returncode */
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION );
}
*** empty log message ***
1998-01-13 19:04:23 +00:00
if( pt )
pt->buf = NULL;
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
free_packet(&pkt);
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
m_free(cfx.dek);
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
2003-10-26 03:26:14 +00:00
m_free(symkey_dek);
m_free(symkey_s2k);
textual changes
1998-06-29 12:30:57 +00:00
release_pk_list( pk_list );
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
return rc;
}
See ChangeLog: Mon Apr 26 17:48:15 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-04-26 15:53:01 +00:00
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
/****************
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
* Filter to do a complete public key encryption.
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
*/
int
encrypt_filter( void *opaque, int control,
IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
{
size_t size = *ret_len;
encrypt_filter_context_t *efx = opaque;
int rc=0;
if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) { /* decrypt */
added some trust model stuff
1998-01-16 21:15:24 +00:00
BUG(); /* not used */
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
}
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH ) { /* encrypt */
added more stuff
1998-01-02 20:40:10 +00:00
if( !efx->header_okay ) {
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
efx->cfx.dek = m_alloc_secure_clear( sizeof *efx->cfx.dek );
intermediate check in
1998-08-05 16:51:59 +00:00
if( !opt.def_cipher_algo ) { /* try to get it from the prefs */
efx->cfx.dek->algo =
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
select_algo_from_prefs(efx->pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,-1,NULL);
if( efx->cfx.dek->algo == -1 ) {
/* because 3DES is implicitly in the prefs, this can only
* happen if we do not have any public keys in the list */
intermediate check in
1998-08-05 16:51:59 +00:00
efx->cfx.dek->algo = DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO;
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
}
}
else {
if(!opt.expert &&
select_algo_from_prefs(efx->pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
opt.def_cipher_algo,
NULL)!=opt.def_cipher_algo)
log_info(_("forcing symmetric cipher %s (%d) "
"violates recipient preferences\n"),
cipher_algo_to_string(opt.def_cipher_algo),
opt.def_cipher_algo);
efx->cfx.dek->algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
intermediate check in
1998-08-05 16:51:59 +00:00
}
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression algo 2 and symmetric compressed files. * encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed. This is to help against the chosen ciphertext attack. * pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the first found. * cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple, encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use a MDC. We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
2002-08-13 19:00:23 +00:00
efx->cfx.dek->use_mdc = use_mdc(efx->pk_list,efx->cfx.dek->algo);
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
added more stuff
1998-01-02 20:40:10 +00:00
make_session_key( efx->cfx.dek );
if( DBG_CIPHER )
log_hexdump("DEK is: ",
efx->cfx.dek->key, efx->cfx.dek->keylen );
textual changes
1998-06-29 12:30:57 +00:00
rc = write_pubkey_enc_from_list( efx->pk_list, efx->cfx.dek, a );
added more stuff
1998-01-02 20:40:10 +00:00
if( rc )
return rc;
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --sign --encrypt. * main.h, encode.c (setup_symkey): New. Prompt for a passphrase and create a DEK for symmetric encryption. (write_symkey_enc): New. Write out symmetrically encrypted session keys. (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Use them here here when creating a message that can be decrypted with a passphrase or a pk. * sign.c (sign_file): Call setup_symkey if we are doing a --symmetric --sign --encrypt.
2003-11-13 02:54:12 +00:00
if(efx->symkey_s2k && efx->symkey_dek)
{
rc=write_symkey_enc(efx->symkey_s2k,efx->symkey_dek,
efx->cfx.dek,a);
if(rc)
return rc;
}
added more stuff
1998-01-02 20:40:10 +00:00
iobuf_push_filter( a, cipher_filter, &efx->cfx );
efx->header_okay = 1;
}
rc = iobuf_write( a, buf, size );
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
}
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --sign --encrypt. * main.h, encode.c (setup_symkey): New. Prompt for a passphrase and create a DEK for symmetric encryption. (write_symkey_enc): New. Write out symmetrically encrypted session keys. (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Use them here here when creating a message that can be decrypted with a passphrase or a pk. * sign.c (sign_file): Call setup_symkey if we are doing a --symmetric --sign --encrypt.
2003-11-13 02:54:12 +00:00
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE )
{
m_free(efx->symkey_dek);
m_free(efx->symkey_s2k);
}
Sylvester Version
1997-12-31 12:32:54 +00:00
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC ) {
*(char**)buf = "encrypt_filter";
}
return rc;
}
added more stuff
1998-01-02 20:40:10 +00:00
/****************
textual changes
1998-06-29 12:30:57 +00:00
* Write pubkey-enc packets from the list of PKs to OUT.
added more stuff
1998-01-02 20:40:10 +00:00
*/
static int
textual changes
1998-06-29 12:30:57 +00:00
write_pubkey_enc_from_list( PK_LIST pk_list, DEK *dek, IOBUF out )
added more stuff
1998-01-02 20:40:10 +00:00
{
PACKET pkt;
textual changes
1998-06-29 12:30:57 +00:00
PKT_public_key *pk;
added more stuff
1998-01-02 20:40:10 +00:00
PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
int rc;
textual changes
1998-06-29 12:30:57 +00:00
for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_list->next ) {
a whole bunch of internal cleanups
1998-06-13 06:59:14 +00:00
MPI frame;
added more stuff
1998-01-02 20:40:10 +00:00
textual changes
1998-06-29 12:30:57 +00:00
pk = pk_list->pk;
See ChangeLog: Thu Dec 10 20:15:36 CET 1998 Werner Koch
1998-12-10 19:20:47 +00:00
print_pubkey_algo_note( pk->pubkey_algo );
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
enc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *enc );
textual changes
1998-06-29 12:30:57 +00:00
enc->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo;
keyid_from_pk( pk, enc->keyid );
* g10.c (main): Add --no-throw-keyid. * keydb.h, encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list), g10.c (main), pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Add --hidden-recipient (-R) and --hidden-encrypt-to, which do a single-user variation on --throw-keyid. The "hide this key" flag is carried in bit 0 of the pk_list flags field. * keyserver.c (parse_keyrec): Fix shadowing warning.
2002-11-01 16:15:45 +00:00
enc->throw_keyid = (opt.throw_keyid || (pk_list->flags&1));
See ChangeLog: Tue Jun 15 14:23:10 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-06-15 12:31:07 +00:00
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c (do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old sig cache subpacket. This wasn't completely harmless as it caused subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export. * options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them. No functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level. * sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference warning. * sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key. * main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string, compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one place. * options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification. Use a single enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.) * g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys, and refresh-keys. * options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules. * keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp mode. * sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of 0.
2003-05-03 04:07:45 +00:00
if(opt.throw_keyid && (PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
* encode.c (encode_crypt), g10.c (main), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file): Use the same --pgpX warning string everywhere to ease translations. * encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list): Warn when using --throw-keyid with --pgpX. Noted by Vedaal Nistar.
2002-08-06 17:38:04 +00:00
{
log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c (do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old sig cache subpacket. This wasn't completely harmless as it caused subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export. * options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them. No functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level. * sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference warning. * sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key. * main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string, compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one place. * options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification. Use a single enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.) * g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys, and refresh-keys. * options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules. * keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp mode. * sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of 0.
2003-05-03 04:07:45 +00:00
"--throw-keyid",compliance_option_string());
compliance_failure();
* encode.c (encode_crypt), g10.c (main), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file): Use the same --pgpX warning string everywhere to ease translations. * encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list): Warn when using --throw-keyid with --pgpX. Noted by Vedaal Nistar.
2002-08-06 17:38:04 +00:00
}
See ChangeLog: Tue Jun 15 14:23:10 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-06-15 12:31:07 +00:00
/* Okay, what's going on: We have the session key somewhere in
* the structure DEK and want to encode this session key in
* an integer value of n bits. pubkey_nbits gives us the
* number of bits we have to use. We then encode the session
* key in some way and we get it back in the big intger value
* FRAME. Then we use FRAME, the public key PK->PKEY and the
See ChangeLog: Fri Jul 14 19:38:23 CEST 2000 Werner Koch
2000-07-14 17:34:53 +00:00
* algorithm number PK->PUBKEY_ALGO and pass it to pubkey_encrypt
See ChangeLog: Tue Jun 15 14:23:10 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-06-15 12:31:07 +00:00
* which returns the encrypted value in the array ENC->DATA.
* This array has a size which depends on the used algorithm
* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Allow deleting a public key with a secret present if --expert is set. * plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Make bytecount static so it works with multiple literal packets inside a message. * encode.c, helptext.c (keygen.algo, keygen.algo.elg_se), keygen.c (ask_algo), sig-check.c (do_check_messages), skclist.c (build_sk_list): Rename "ElGamal" to "Elgamal" as that is the proper spelling nowadays. Suggested by Jon Callas.
2004-02-26 02:03:27 +00:00
* (e.g. 2 for Elgamal). We don't need frame anymore because we
See ChangeLog: Tue Jun 15 14:23:10 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
1999-06-15 12:31:07 +00:00
* have everything now in enc->data which is the passed to
* build_packet()
*/
textual changes
1998-06-29 12:30:57 +00:00
frame = encode_session_key( dek, pubkey_nbits( pk->pubkey_algo,
pk->pkey ) );
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
rc = pubkey_encrypt( pk->pubkey_algo, enc->data, frame, pk->pkey );
mpi_free( frame );
a whole bunch of internal cleanups
1998-06-13 06:59:14 +00:00
if( rc )
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
log_error("pubkey_encrypt failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
a whole bunch of internal cleanups
1998-06-13 06:59:14 +00:00
else {
if( opt.verbose ) {
* keydb.h, getkey.c (get_user_id_printable): Rename to get_user_id_native and remove the printable stuff since we're print-ifying valid utf8 characters. Change all callers in import.c, sign.c, keylist.c, and encode.c.
2004-08-23 17:55:49 +00:00
char *ustr = get_user_id_string_native (enc->keyid);
* getkey.c (get_user_id_native): Renamed to .. (get_user_id_printable): this. Filter out all dangerous characters. Checked all usages. (get_user_id_string_native): Renamed to.. (get_user_id_string_printable): this. Filter out all dangerous characters. Checked all usages. * keyedit.c (show_basic_key_info): New. * keylist.c (print_fingerprint): New mode 3. * import.c (import_one): Use new function to display the user ID.
2002-08-19 08:28:00 +00:00
log_info(_("%s/%s encrypted for: \"%s\"\n"),
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
pubkey_algo_to_string(enc->pubkey_algo),
cipher_algo_to_string(dek->algo), ustr );
m_free(ustr);
a whole bunch of internal cleanups
1998-06-13 06:59:14 +00:00
}
/* and write it */
init_packet(&pkt);
pkt.pkttype = PKT_PUBKEY_ENC;
pkt.pkt.pubkey_enc = enc;
rc = build_packet( out, &pkt );
if( rc )
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
log_error("build_packet(pubkey_enc) failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
a whole bunch of internal cleanups
1998-06-13 06:59:14 +00:00
}
added more stuff
1998-01-02 20:40:10 +00:00
free_pubkey_enc(enc);
a whole bunch of internal cleanups
1998-06-13 06:59:14 +00:00
if( rc )
added more stuff
1998-01-02 20:40:10 +00:00
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
initially checkin
1997-11-18 14:06:00 +00:00
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
void
encode_crypt_files(int nfiles, char **files, STRLIST remusr)
{
int rc = 0;
if (opt.outfile)
{
log_error(_("--output doesn't work for this command\n"));
return;
}
if (!nfiles)
{
char line[2048];
unsigned int lno = 0;
while ( fgets(line, DIM(line), stdin) )
{
lno++;
if (!*line || line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n')
{
log_error("input line %u too long or missing LF\n", lno);
return;
}
line[strlen(line)-1] = '\0';
print_file_status(STATUS_FILE_START, line, 2);
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
2003-10-26 03:26:14 +00:00
if ( (rc = encode_crypt(line, remusr, 0)) )
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
log_error("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
print_fname_stdin(line), g10_errstr(rc) );
write_status( STATUS_FILE_DONE );
}
}
else
{
while (nfiles--)
{
print_file_status(STATUS_FILE_START, *files, 2);
* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command. This generates a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key system. * main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an already-created session key dek. (encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a session key for a symmetric message. (encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be decrypted via a passphrase or a pk. Change all callers. * mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
2003-10-26 03:26:14 +00:00
if ( (rc = encode_crypt(*files, remusr, 0)) )
Update head to match stable 1.0
2002-06-29 13:46:34 +00:00
log_error("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
print_fname_stdin(*files), g10_errstr(rc) );
write_status( STATUS_FILE_DONE );
files++;
}
}
}
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