1998-02-11 03:25:44 +00:00
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Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.x
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-----------------------------------
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* nearly doubled the speed of the ElGamal signature verification.
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* backup copies of keyrings are created.
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* assembler stuff for Pentium; gives about 15% better perfomance.
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Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.3
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-----------------------------------
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1998-01-12 10:18:17 +00:00
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1998-02-09 17:43:42 +00:00
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* Found a bug in the calculation of ELG fingerprints. This is now
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fixed, but all existing fingerprints and keyids for ELG keys
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are not any more valid.
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* armor should now work; including clear signed text.
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* moved some options to the new program g10maint
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1998-02-04 18:54:31 +00:00
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* It's now 64 bit clean and runs fine on an alpha--linux.
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* Key generation is much faster now. I fixed this by using not
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so strong random number for the primes (this was a bug because the
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ElGamal primes are public parameters and it does not make sense
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to generate them from strong random). The real secret is the x value
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which is still generated from strong (okay: /dev/random) random bits.
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1998-01-30 16:23:16 +00:00
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1998-02-04 18:54:31 +00:00
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* added option "--status-fd": see g10/OPTIONS
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1998-01-30 16:23:16 +00:00
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1998-01-28 16:09:43 +00:00
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* We have secure memeory on systems which support mlock().
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It is not complete yet, because we do not have signal handler
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which does a cleanup in very case.
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We should also check the ulimit for the user in the case
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that the admin does not have set a limit on locked pages.
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* started with internationalization support.
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1998-01-25 18:56:33 +00:00
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* The logic to handle the web of trust is now implemented. It is
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has some bugs; but I'm going to change the algorithm anyway.
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It works by calculating the trustlevel on the fly. It may ask
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you to provide trust parameters if the calculated trust probability
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is too low. I will write a paper which discusses this new approach.
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* a couple of changes to the configure script.
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1998-01-16 21:15:24 +00:00
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* New option "--quick-random" which uses a much quicker random
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number generator. Keys generated while this option is in effect
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are flags with "INSECURE!" in the user-id. This is a development
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only option.
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* Read support for new version packets (OpenPGP).
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1998-01-28 16:09:43 +00:00
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* Comment packets are now of correct OpenPGP type 16. Old comment
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packets written by G10 are detected because they always start with
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1998-01-16 21:15:24 +00:00
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a hash which is an invalid version byte.
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1998-01-12 10:18:17 +00:00
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* The string "(INSECURE!)" is appended to a new user-id if this
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is generated on a system without a good random number generator.
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