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gnupg/g10/keyedit.c

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/* keyedit.c - Edit properties of a key
* Copyright (C) 1998-2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998-2015 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
2007-07-04 19:49:40 +00:00
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
2007-07-04 19:49:40 +00:00
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
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# define GNUPG_LIBREADLINE_H_INCLUDED
# include <readline/readline.h>
#endif
#include "gpg.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "photoid.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "filter.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "keyserver-internal.h"
#include "call-agent.h"
#include "host2net.h"
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static void show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig,
int verbose);
static void show_names (estream_t fp, KBNODE keyblock, PKT_public_key * pk,
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unsigned int flag, int with_prefs);
static void show_key_with_all_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked,
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int with_revoker, int with_fpr,
int with_subkeys, int with_prefs,
int nowarn);
static void show_key_and_fingerprint (kbnode_t keyblock, int with_subkeys);
static void show_key_and_grip (kbnode_t keyblock);
static void subkey_expire_warning (kbnode_t keyblock);
static int menu_adduid (KBNODE keyblock, int photo, const char *photo_name,
const char *uidstr);
static void menu_deluid (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
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static int menu_delsig (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_clean (KBNODE keyblock, int self_only);
static void menu_delkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_addrevoker (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int sensitive);
static int menu_expire (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_backsign (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_set_primary_uid (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_set_preferences (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_set_keyserver_url (const char *url, KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_set_notation (const char *string, KBNODE pub_keyblock);
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static int menu_select_uid (KBNODE keyblock, int idx);
static int menu_select_uid_namehash (KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash);
static int menu_select_key (KBNODE keyblock, int idx);
static int count_uids (KBNODE keyblock);
static int count_uids_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag);
static int count_keys_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag);
static int count_selected_uids (KBNODE keyblock);
static int real_uids_left (KBNODE keyblock);
static int count_selected_keys (KBNODE keyblock);
static int menu_revsig (KBNODE keyblock);
static int menu_revuid (KBNODE keyblock);
static int menu_revkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_revsubkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
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#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
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static int enable_disable_key (KBNODE keyblock, int disable);
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
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#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
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static void menu_showphoto (KBNODE keyblock);
static int update_trust = 0;
#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
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#define NODFLG_BADSIG (1<<0) /* Bad signature. */
#define NODFLG_NOKEY (1<<1) /* No public key. */
#define NODFLG_SIGERR (1<<2) /* Other sig error. */
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#define NODFLG_MARK_A (1<<4) /* Temporary mark. */
#define NODFLG_DELSIG (1<<5) /* To be deleted. */
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#define NODFLG_SELUID (1<<8) /* Indicate the selected userid. */
#define NODFLG_SELKEY (1<<9) /* Indicate the selected key. */
#define NODFLG_SELSIG (1<<10) /* Indicate a selected signature. */
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struct sign_attrib
{
int non_exportable, non_revocable;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
byte trust_depth, trust_value;
char *trust_regexp;
};
/* TODO: Fix duplicated code between here and the check-sigs/list-sigs
code in keylist.c. */
static int
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print_and_check_one_sig_colon (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err,
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int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int rc, sigrc;
/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that
issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */
rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, is_selfsig);
switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
{
case 0:
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node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG | NODFLG_NOKEY | NODFLG_SIGERR);
sigrc = '!';
break;
case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG;
sigrc = '-';
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if (inv_sigs)
++ * inv_sigs;
break;
case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY:
node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY;
sigrc = '?';
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if (no_key)
++ * no_key;
break;
default:
node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR;
sigrc = '%';
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if (oth_err)
++ * oth_err;
break;
}
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if (sigrc != '?' || print_without_key)
{
es_printf ("sig:%c::%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu:",
sigrc, sig->pubkey_algo, (ulong) sig->keyid[0],
(ulong) sig->keyid[1], (ulong) sig->timestamp,
(ulong) sig->expiredate);
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if (sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
es_printf ("%d %d", sig->trust_depth, sig->trust_value);
es_printf (":");
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if (sig->trust_regexp)
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout,
sig->trust_regexp, strlen (sig->trust_regexp),
":", NULL);
es_printf ("::%02x%c\n", sig->sig_class,
sig->flags.exportable ? 'x' : 'l');
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if (opt.show_subpackets)
print_subpackets_colon (sig);
}
return (sigrc == '!');
}
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/*
* Print information about a signature, check it and return true if
* the signature is okay. NODE must be a signature packet. With
* EXTENDED set all possible signature list options will always be
* printed.
*/
static int
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print_and_check_one_sig (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err,
int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key, int extended)
{
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PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int rc, sigrc;
int is_rev = sig->sig_class == 0x30;
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/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that
issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */
rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, is_selfsig);
switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
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{
case 0:
node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG | NODFLG_NOKEY | NODFLG_SIGERR);
sigrc = '!';
break;
case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
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node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG;
sigrc = '-';
if (inv_sigs)
++ * inv_sigs;
break;
case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY:
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node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY;
sigrc = '?';
if (no_key)
++ * no_key;
break;
default:
node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR;
sigrc = '%';
if (oth_err)
++ * oth_err;
break;
}
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if (sigrc != '?' || print_without_key)
{
tty_printf ("%s%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c %s %s",
is_rev ? "rev" : "sig", sigrc,
(sig->sig_class - 0x10 > 0 &&
sig->sig_class - 0x10 <
4) ? '0' + sig->sig_class - 0x10 : ' ',
sig->flags.exportable ? ' ' : 'L',
sig->flags.revocable ? ' ' : 'R',
sig->flags.policy_url ? 'P' : ' ',
sig->flags.notation ? 'N' : ' ',
sig->flags.expired ? 'X' : ' ',
(sig->trust_depth > 9) ? 'T' : (sig->trust_depth >
0) ? '0' +
sig->trust_depth : ' ',
keystr (sig->keyid),
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datestr_from_sig (sig));
if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE) || extended )
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tty_printf (" %s", expirestr_from_sig (sig));
tty_printf (" ");
if (sigrc == '%')
tty_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc));
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else if (sigrc == '?')
;
else if (*is_selfsig)
{
tty_printf (is_rev ? _("[revocation]") : _("[self-signature]"));
if (extended && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
tty_printf ("*");
}
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else
{
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n);
tty_print_utf8_string2 (NULL, p, n,
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opt.screen_columns - keystrlen () - 26 -
((opt.
list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE) ? 11
: 0));
xfree (p);
}
tty_printf ("\n");
if (sig->flags.policy_url
&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS) || extended))
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show_policy_url (sig, 3, 0);
if (sig->flags.notation
&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS) || extended))
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show_notation (sig, 3, 0,
((opt.
list_options & LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS) ? 1 : 0) +
((opt.
list_options & LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS) ? 2 : 0));
if (sig->flags.pref_ks
&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS) || extended))
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show_keyserver_url (sig, 3, 0);
if (extended)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
const unsigned char *s;
s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
if (s && *s)
tty_printf (" [primary]\n");
s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
if (s && buf32_to_u32 (s))
tty_printf (" [expires: %s]\n",
isotimestamp (pk->timestamp + buf32_to_u32 (s)));
}
}
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return (sigrc == '!');
}
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/*
* Check the keysigs and set the flags to indicate errors.
* Returns true if error found.
*/
static int
check_all_keysigs (KBNODE keyblock, int only_selected, int only_selfsigs)
{
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KBNODE kbctx;
KBNODE node;
int inv_sigs = 0;
int no_key = 0;
int oth_err = 0;
int has_selfsig = 0;
int mis_selfsig = 0;
int selected = !only_selected;
int anyuid = 0;
u32 keyid[2];
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for (kbctx = NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0));)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
if (only_selfsigs)
keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
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{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if (only_selected)
selected = (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
if (selected)
{
tty_printf ("uid ");
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
tty_printf ("\n");
if (anyuid && !has_selfsig)
mis_selfsig++;
has_selfsig = 0;
anyuid = 1;
}
}
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else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& ((node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10
|| node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x30))
{
int selfsig;
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
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if (only_selfsigs
&& !(keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]))
; /* Not a selfsig but we want only selfsigs - skip. */
else if (print_and_check_one_sig (keyblock, node, &inv_sigs,
&no_key, &oth_err, &selfsig,
0, only_selfsigs))
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{
if (selfsig)
has_selfsig = 1;
}
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/* Hmmm: should we update the trustdb here? */
}
}
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if (!has_selfsig)
mis_selfsig++;
if (inv_sigs == 1)
tty_printf (_("1 bad signature\n"));
else if (inv_sigs)
tty_printf (_("%d bad signatures\n"), inv_sigs);
if (no_key == 1)
tty_printf (_("1 signature not checked due to a missing key\n"));
else if (no_key)
tty_printf (_("%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n"), no_key);
if (oth_err == 1)
tty_printf (_("1 signature not checked due to an error\n"));
else if (oth_err)
tty_printf (_("%d signatures not checked due to errors\n"), oth_err);
if (mis_selfsig == 1)
tty_printf (_("1 user ID without valid self-signature detected\n"));
else if (mis_selfsig)
tty_printf (_("%d user IDs without valid self-signatures detected\n"),
mis_selfsig);
return inv_sigs || no_key || oth_err || mis_selfsig;
}
static int
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sign_mk_attrib (PKT_signature * sig, void *opaque)
{
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struct sign_attrib *attrib = opaque;
byte buf[8];
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if (attrib->non_exportable)
{
buf[0] = 0; /* not exportable */
build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE, buf, 1);
}
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if (attrib->non_revocable)
{
buf[0] = 0; /* not revocable */
build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, buf, 1);
}
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if (attrib->reason)
revocation_reason_build_cb (sig, attrib->reason);
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if (attrib->trust_depth)
{
/* Not critical. If someone doesn't understand trust sigs,
this can still be a valid regular signature. */
buf[0] = attrib->trust_depth;
buf[1] = attrib->trust_value;
build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_TRUST, buf, 2);
/* Critical. If someone doesn't understands regexps, this
whole sig should be invalid. Note the +1 for the length -
regexps are null terminated. */
if (attrib->trust_regexp)
build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL | SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP,
attrib->trust_regexp,
strlen (attrib->trust_regexp) + 1);
}
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return 0;
}
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static void
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trustsig_prompt (byte * trust_value, byte * trust_depth, char **regexp)
{
char *p;
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*trust_value = 0;
*trust_depth = 0;
*regexp = NULL;
/* Same string as pkclist.c:do_edit_ownertrust */
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tty_printf (_
("Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify"
" other users' keys\n(by looking at passports, checking"
" fingerprints from different sources, etc.)\n"));
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tty_printf ("\n");
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust marginally\n"), 1);
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 2);
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tty_printf ("\n");
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while (*trust_value == 0)
{
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p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_value", _("Your selection? "));
trim_spaces (p);
cpr_kill_prompt ();
/* 60 and 120 are as per RFC2440 */
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if (p[0] == '1' && !p[1])
*trust_value = 60;
else if (p[0] == '2' && !p[1])
*trust_value = 120;
xfree (p);
}
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tty_printf ("\n");
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tty_printf (_("Please enter the depth of this trust signature.\n"
"A depth greater than 1 allows the key you are signing to make\n"
"trust signatures on your behalf.\n"));
tty_printf ("\n");
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while (*trust_depth == 0)
{
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p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_depth", _("Your selection? "));
trim_spaces (p);
cpr_kill_prompt ();
*trust_depth = atoi (p);
xfree (p);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("Please enter a domain to restrict this signature, "
"or enter for none.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_regexp", _("Your selection? "));
trim_spaces (p);
cpr_kill_prompt ();
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (strlen (p) > 0)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
char *q = p;
int regexplen = 100, ind;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
*regexp = xmalloc (regexplen);
/* Now mangle the domain the user entered into a regexp. To do
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
this, \-escape everything that isn't alphanumeric, and attach
"<[^>]+[@.]" to the front, and ">$" to the end. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
strcpy (*regexp, "<[^>]+[@.]");
ind = strlen (*regexp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
while (*q)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!((*q >= 'A' && *q <= 'Z')
|| (*q >= 'a' && *q <= 'z') || (*q >= '0' && *q <= '9')))
(*regexp)[ind++] = '\\';
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
(*regexp)[ind++] = *q;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if ((regexplen - ind) < 3)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
regexplen += 100;
*regexp = xrealloc (*regexp, regexplen);
}
q++;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
(*regexp)[ind] = '\0';
strcat (*regexp, ">$");
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (p);
tty_printf ("\n");
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/*
* Loop over all LOCUSR and and sign the uids after asking. If no
* user id is marked, all user ids will be signed; if some user_ids
* are marked only those will be signed. If QUICK is true the
* function won't ask the user and use sensible defaults.
*/
static int
sign_uids (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
kbnode_t keyblock, strlist_t locusr, int *ret_modified,
int local, int nonrevocable, int trust, int interactive,
int quick)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int rc = 0;
SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
KBNODE node, uidnode;
PKT_public_key *primary_pk = NULL;
int select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock) || interactive;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Build a list of all signators.
*
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
* We use the CERT flag to request the primary which must always
* be one which is capable of signing keys. I can't see a reason
* why to sign keys using a subkey. Implementation of USAGE_CERT
* is just a hack in getkey.c and does not mean that a subkey
* marked as certification capable will be used. */
rc = build_sk_list (locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* Loop over all signators. */
for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
{
u32 sk_keyid[2], pk_keyid[2];
char *p, *trust_regexp = NULL;
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
int class = 0, selfsig = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
u32 duration = 0, timestamp = 0;
byte trust_depth = 0, trust_value = 0;
pk = sk_rover->pk;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
keyid_from_pk (pk, sk_keyid);
/* Set mark A for all selected user ids. */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
node->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
else
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Reset mark for uids which are already signed. */
uidnode = NULL;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (primary_pk, pk_keyid);
/* Is this a self-sig? */
if (pk_keyid[0] == sk_keyid[0] && pk_keyid[1] == sk_keyid[1])
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
selfsig = 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uidnode = (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) ? node : NULL;
if (uidnode)
{
int yesreally = 0;
char *user;
user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is revoked."), user);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (selfsig)
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
else if (opt.expert && !quick)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.revoke_okay",
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
}
else if (interactive)
yesreally = 1;
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
}
else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is expired."), user);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (selfsig)
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
else if (opt.expert && !quick)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.expire_okay",
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
}
else if (interactive)
yesreally = 1;
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
}
else if (!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->created && !selfsig)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is not self-signed."),
user);
if (opt.expert && !quick)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.nosig_okay",
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
}
else if (interactive)
yesreally = 1;
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
}
if (uidnode && interactive && !yesreally && !quick)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("User ID \"%s\" is signable. "), user);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.sign_okay",
_("Sign it? (y/N) ")))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (user);
}
}
else if (uidnode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
{
if (sk_keyid[0] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
&& sk_keyid[1] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1])
{
char buf[50];
char *user;
user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* It's a v3 self-sig. Make it into a v4 self-sig? */
if (node->pkt->pkt.signature->version < 4
&& selfsig && !quick)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("The self-signature on \"%s\"\n"
"is a PGP 2.x-style signature.\n"), user);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Note that the regular PGP2 warning below
still applies if there are no v4 sigs on
this key at all. */
if (opt.expert)
if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.v4_promote_okay",
_("Do you want to promote "
"it to an OpenPGP self-"
"signature? (y/N) ")))
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
node->flag |= NODFLG_DELSIG;
xfree (user);
continue;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Is the current signature expired? */
if (node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.expired)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
"has expired.\n"), user);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (quick || cpr_get_answer_is_yes
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
("sign_uid.replace_expired_okay",
_("Do you want to issue a "
"new signature to replace "
"the expired one? (y/N) ")))
{
/* Mark these for later deletion. We
don't want to delete them here, just in
case the replacement signature doesn't
happen for some reason. We only delete
these after the replacement is already
in place. */
node->flag |= NODFLG_DELSIG;
xfree (user);
continue;
}
}
if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && !local)
{
/* It's a local sig, and we want to make a
exportable sig. */
tty_fprintf (fp, _("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
"is a local signature.\n"), user);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (quick || cpr_get_answer_is_yes
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
("sign_uid.local_promote_okay",
_("Do you want to promote "
"it to a full exportable " "signature? (y/N) ")))
{
/* Mark these for later deletion. We
don't want to delete them here, just in
case the replacement signature doesn't
happen for some reason. We only delete
these after the replacement is already
in place. */
node->flag |= NODFLG_DELSIG;
xfree (user);
continue;
}
}
/* Fixme: see whether there is a revocation in which
* case we should allow to sign it again. */
if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && local)
tty_fprintf ( fp,
_("\"%s\" was already locally signed by key %s\n"),
user, keystr_from_pk (pk));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("\"%s\" was already signed by key %s\n"),
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
user, keystr_from_pk (pk));
if (opt.expert && !quick
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
&& cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.dupe_okay",
_("Do you want to sign it "
"again anyway? (y/N) ")))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
/* Don't delete the old sig here since this is
an --expert thing. */
xfree (user);
continue;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
(ulong) pk->keyid[0], (ulong) pk->keyid[1]);
write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf);
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; /* remove mark */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (user);
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Check whether any uids are left for signing. */
if (!count_uids_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_MARK_A))
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("Nothing to sign with key %s\n"),
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
keystr_from_pk (pk));
continue;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Ask whether we really should sign these user id(s). */
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, fp, keyblock, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (primary_pk->expiredate && !selfsig)
{
u32 now = make_timestamp ();
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (primary_pk->expiredate <= now)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key has expired!"));
if (opt.expert && !quick)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.expired_okay",
_("Are you sure you still "
"want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
continue;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
else
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
continue;
}
}
else
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key is due to expire on %s.\n"),
expirestr_from_pk (primary_pk));
if (opt.ask_cert_expire && !quick)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
char *answer = cpr_get ("sign_uid.expire",
_("Do you want your signature to "
"expire at the same time? (Y/n) "));
if (answer_is_yes_no_default (answer, 1))
{
/* This fixes the signature timestamp we're
going to make as now. This is so the
expiration date is exactly correct, and not
a few seconds off (due to the time it takes
to answer the questions, enter the
passphrase, etc). */
timestamp = now;
duration = primary_pk->expiredate - now;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
cpr_kill_prompt ();
xfree (answer);
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Only ask for duration if we haven't already set it to match
the expiration of the pk */
if (!duration && !selfsig)
{
if (opt.ask_cert_expire && !quick)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
duration = ask_expire_interval (1, opt.def_cert_expire);
else
duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_cert_expire);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (selfsig)
;
else
{
if (opt.batch || !opt.ask_cert_level || quick)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
class = 0x10 + opt.def_cert_level;
else
{
char *answer;
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("How carefully have you verified the key you are "
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
"about to sign actually belongs\nto the person "
"named above? If you don't know what to "
"answer, enter \"0\".\n"));
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (0) I will not answer.%s\n"),
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
opt.def_cert_level == 0 ? " (default)" : "");
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (1) I have not checked at all.%s\n"),
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
opt.def_cert_level == 1 ? " (default)" : "");
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (2) I have done casual checking.%s\n"),
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
opt.def_cert_level == 2 ? " (default)" : "");
tty_fprintf (fp,
_(" (3) I have done very careful checking.%s\n"),
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
opt.def_cert_level == 3 ? " (default)" : "");
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
while (class == 0)
{
answer = cpr_get ("sign_uid.class",
_("Your selection? "
"(enter '?' for more information): "));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (answer[0] == '\0')
class = 0x10 + opt.def_cert_level; /* Default */
else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "0") == 0)
class = 0x10; /* Generic */
else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "1") == 0)
class = 0x11; /* Persona */
else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "2") == 0)
class = 0x12; /* Casual */
else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "3") == 0)
class = 0x13; /* Positive */
else
tty_fprintf (fp, _("Invalid selection.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (answer);
}
}
if (trust && !quick)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
trustsig_prompt (&trust_value, &trust_depth, &trust_regexp);
}
if (!quick)
{
p = get_user_id_native (sk_keyid);
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("Are you sure that you want to sign this key with your\n"
"key \"%s\" (%s)\n"), p, keystr_from_pk (pk));
xfree (p);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (selfsig)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("This will be a self-signature.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (local)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked "
"as non-exportable.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (nonrevocable)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked "
"as non-revocable.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
}
else
{
if (local)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("The signature will be marked as non-exportable.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (nonrevocable)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("The signature will be marked as non-revocable.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
switch (class)
{
case 0x11:
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have not checked this key at all.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case 0x12:
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have checked this key casually.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
case 0x13:
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have checked this key very carefully.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
}
}
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (opt.batch && opt.answer_yes)
;
else if (quick)
;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.okay",
_("Really sign? (y/N) ")))
continue;
/* Now we can sign the user ids. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
reloop: /* (Must use this, because we are modifing the list.) */
primary_pk = NULL;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
{
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
assert (primary_pk);
memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
attrib.non_exportable = local;
attrib.non_revocable = nonrevocable;
attrib.trust_depth = trust_depth;
attrib.trust_value = trust_value;
attrib.trust_regexp = trust_regexp;
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
/* We force creation of a v4 signature for local
* signatures, otherwise we would not generate the
* subpacket with v3 keys and the signature becomes
* exportable. */
if (selfsig)
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
NULL,
pk,
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
0x13, 0, 0, 0,
2010-09-01 12:49:05 +00:00
keygen_add_std_prefs, primary_pk,
NULL);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
NULL,
pk,
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
class, 0,
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
timestamp, duration,
2010-09-01 12:49:05 +00:00
sign_mk_attrib, &attrib,
NULL);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
goto leave;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
*ret_modified = 1; /* We changed the keyblock. */
update_trust = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE);
goto reloop;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Delete any sigs that got promoted */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->flag & NODFLG_DELSIG)
delete_kbnode (node);
} /* End loop over signators. */
leave:
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
release_sk_list (sk_list);
return rc;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/*
* Change the passphrase of the primary and all secondary keys. Note
* that it is common to use only one passphrase for the primary and
* all subkeys. However, this is now (since GnuPG 2.1) all up to the
* gpg-agent. Returns 0 on success or an error code.
*/
static gpg_error_t
change_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
{
gpg_error_t err;
kbnode_t node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int any;
u32 keyid[2], subid[2];
char *hexgrip = NULL;
char *cache_nonce = NULL;
char *passwd_nonce = NULL;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!node)
{
log_error ("Oops; public key missing!\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
goto leave;
}
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Check whether it is likely that we will be able to change the
passphrase for any subkey. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (any = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
char *serialno;
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (pk, subid);
xfree (hexgrip);
err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl, hexgrip, &serialno);
if (!err && serialno)
; /* Key on card. */
else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
; /* Maybe stub key. */
else if (!err)
any = 1; /* Key is known. */
else
log_error ("key %s: error getting keyinfo from agent: %s\n",
keystr_with_sub (keyid, subid), gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (serialno);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
}
err = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!any)
{
tty_printf (_("Key has only stub or on-card key items - "
"no passphrase to change.\n"));
goto leave;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Change the passphrase for all keys. */
for (any = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
char *desc;
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (pk, subid);
xfree (hexgrip);
err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
if (err)
goto leave;
desc = gpg_format_keydesc (pk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL, 1);
err = agent_passwd (ctrl, hexgrip, desc, &cache_nonce, &passwd_nonce);
xfree (desc);
if (err)
log_log ((gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
|| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
? GPGRT_LOG_INFO : GPGRT_LOG_ERROR,
_("key %s: error changing passphrase: %s\n"),
keystr_with_sub (keyid, subid),
gpg_strerror (err));
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
break;
}
}
leave:
xfree (hexgrip);
xfree (cache_nonce);
xfree (passwd_nonce);
return err;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/*
* There are some keys out (due to a bug in gnupg), where the sequence
* of the packets is wrong. This function fixes that.
* Returns: true if the keyblock has been fixed.
*
* Note: This function does not work if there is more than one user ID.
*/
static int
fix_key_signature_order (KBNODE keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
KBNODE node, last, subkey;
int fixed = 0;
/* Locate key signatures of class 0x10..0x13 behind sub key packets. */
for (subkey = last = NULL, node = keyblock; node;
last = node, node = node->next)
{
switch (node->pkt->pkttype)
{
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
if (!subkey)
subkey = last; /* Actually it is the one before the subkey. */
break;
case PKT_SIGNATURE:
if (subkey)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (sig->sig_class >= 0x10 && sig->sig_class <= 0x13)
{
log_info (_("moving a key signature to the correct place\n"));
last->next = node->next;
node->next = subkey->next;
subkey->next = node;
node = last;
fixed = 1;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
default:
break;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return fixed;
}
/* Fix various problems in the keyblock. Returns true if the keyblock
was changed. Note that a pointer to the keyblock must be given and
the function may change it (i.e. replacing the first node). */
static int
fix_keyblock (kbnode_t *keyblockp)
{
int changed = 0;
if (fix_key_signature_order (*keyblockp))
changed++;
if (collapse_uids (keyblockp))
changed++;
reorder_keyblock (*keyblockp);
/* If we modified the keyblock, make sure the flags are right. */
if (changed)
merge_keys_and_selfsig (*keyblockp);
return changed;
}
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
parse_sign_type (const char *str, int *localsig, int *nonrevokesig,
int *trustsig)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
const char *p = str;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
while (*p)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "l", 1) == 0)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
*localsig = 1;
p++;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "nr", 2) == 0)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
*nonrevokesig = 1;
p += 2;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "t", 1) == 0)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
*trustsig = 1;
p++;
}
else
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/*
* Menu driven key editor. If seckey_check is true, then a secret key
* that matches username will be looked for. If it is false, not all
* commands will be available.
*
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
* Note: to keep track of certain selections we use node->mark MARKBIT_xxxx.
*/
/* Need an SK for this command */
#define KEYEDIT_NEED_SK 1
/* Cannot be viewing the SK for this command */
#define KEYEDIT_NOT_SK 2
/* Must be viewing the SK for this command */
#define KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK 4
/* Match the tail of the string */
#define KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH 8
enum cmdids
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
cmdNONE = 0,
cmdQUIT, cmdHELP, cmdFPR, cmdLIST, cmdSELUID, cmdCHECK, cmdSIGN,
cmdREVSIG, cmdREVKEY, cmdREVUID, cmdDELSIG, cmdPRIMARY, cmdDEBUG,
cmdSAVE, cmdADDUID, cmdADDPHOTO, cmdDELUID, cmdADDKEY, cmdDELKEY,
cmdADDREVOKER, cmdTOGGLE, cmdSELKEY, cmdPASSWD, cmdTRUST, cmdPREF,
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
cmdEXPIRE, cmdBACKSIGN,
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
cmdENABLEKEY, cmdDISABLEKEY,
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
cmdSHOWPREF,
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
cmdSETPREF, cmdPREFKS, cmdNOTATION, cmdINVCMD, cmdSHOWPHOTO, cmdUPDTRUST,
cmdCHKTRUST, cmdADDCARDKEY, cmdKEYTOCARD, cmdBKUPTOCARD, cmdCHECKBKUPKEY,
cmdCLEAN, cmdMINIMIZE, cmdGRIP, cmdNOP
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
};
static struct
{
const char *name;
enum cmdids id;
int flags;
const char *desc;
} cmds[] =
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
{ "quit", cmdQUIT, 0, N_("quit this menu")},
{ "q", cmdQUIT, 0, NULL},
{ "save", cmdSAVE, 0, N_("save and quit")},
{ "help", cmdHELP, 0, N_("show this help")},
{ "?", cmdHELP, 0, NULL},
{ "fpr", cmdFPR, 0, N_("show key fingerprint")},
{ "grip", cmdGRIP, 0, N_("show the keygrip")},
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{ "list", cmdLIST, 0, N_("list key and user IDs")},
{ "l", cmdLIST, 0, NULL},
{ "uid", cmdSELUID, 0, N_("select user ID N")},
{ "key", cmdSELKEY, 0, N_("select subkey N")},
{ "check", cmdCHECK, 0, N_("check signatures")},
{ "c", cmdCHECK, 0, NULL},
{ "cross-certify", cmdBACKSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
{ "backsign", cmdBACKSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
{ "sign", cmdSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH,
N_("sign selected user IDs [* see below for related commands]")},
{ "s", cmdSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, NULL},
/* "lsign" and friends will never match since "sign" comes first
and it is a tail match. They are just here so they show up in
the help menu. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{ "lsign", cmdNOP, 0, N_("sign selected user IDs locally")},
{ "tsign", cmdNOP, 0, N_("sign selected user IDs with a trust signature")},
{ "nrsign", cmdNOP, 0,
N_("sign selected user IDs with a non-revocable signature")},
{ "debug", cmdDEBUG, 0, NULL},
{ "adduid", cmdADDUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a user ID")},
{ "addphoto", cmdADDPHOTO, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("add a photo ID")},
{ "deluid", cmdDELUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("delete selected user IDs")},
/* delphoto is really deluid in disguise */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{ "delphoto", cmdDELUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, NULL},
{ "addkey", cmdADDKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a subkey")},
#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{ "addcardkey", cmdADDCARDKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("add a key to a smartcard")},
{ "keytocard", cmdKEYTOCARD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK | KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK,
N_("move a key to a smartcard")},
{ "bkuptocard", cmdBKUPTOCARD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK | KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK,
N_("move a backup key to a smartcard")},
{ "checkbkupkey", cmdCHECKBKUPKEY, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK | KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK, NULL},
#endif /*ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */
{ "delkey", cmdDELKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("delete selected subkeys")},
{ "addrevoker", cmdADDREVOKER, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("add a revocation key")},
{ "delsig", cmdDELSIG, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
N_("delete signatures from the selected user IDs")},
{ "expire", cmdEXPIRE, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("change the expiration date for the key or selected subkeys")},
{ "primary", cmdPRIMARY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("flag the selected user ID as primary")},
{ "toggle", cmdTOGGLE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL}, /* Dummy command. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{ "t", cmdTOGGLE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
{ "pref", cmdPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("list preferences (expert)")},
{ "showpref", cmdSHOWPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("list preferences (verbose)")},
{ "setpref", cmdSETPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("set preference list for the selected user IDs")},
{ "updpref", cmdSETPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
{ "keyserver", cmdPREFKS, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("set the preferred keyserver URL for the selected user IDs")},
{ "notation", cmdNOTATION, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("set a notation for the selected user IDs")},
{ "passwd", cmdPASSWD, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("change the passphrase")},
{ "password", cmdPASSWD, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{ "trust", cmdTRUST, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("change the ownertrust")},
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{ "revsig", cmdREVSIG, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
N_("revoke signatures on the selected user IDs")},
{ "revuid", cmdREVUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("revoke selected user IDs")},
{ "revphoto", cmdREVUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
{ "revkey", cmdREVKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("revoke key or selected subkeys")},
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{ "enable", cmdENABLEKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("enable key")},
{ "disable", cmdDISABLEKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("disable key")},
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{ "showphoto", cmdSHOWPHOTO, 0, N_("show selected photo IDs")},
{ "clean", cmdCLEAN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove unusable signatures from key")},
{ "minimize", cmdMINIMIZE, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove all signatures from key")},
{ NULL, cmdNONE, 0, NULL}
};
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/*
These two functions are used by readline for command completion.
*/
static char *
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command_generator (const char *text, int state)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
static int list_index, len;
const char *name;
/* If this is a new word to complete, initialize now. This includes
saving the length of TEXT for efficiency, and initializing the
index variable to 0. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!state)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
list_index = 0;
len = strlen (text);
}
/* Return the next partial match */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
while ((name = cmds[list_index].name))
{
/* Only complete commands that have help text */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (cmds[list_index++].desc && strncmp (name, text, len) == 0)
return strdup (name);
}
return NULL;
}
static char **
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
keyedit_completion (const char *text, int start, int end)
{
/* If we are at the start of a line, we try and command-complete.
If not, just do nothing for now. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
(void) end;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (start == 0)
return rl_completion_matches (text, command_generator);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
rl_attempted_completion_over = 1;
return NULL;
}
#endif /* HAVE_LIBREADLINE */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Main function of the menu driven key editor. */
void
keyedit_menu (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, strlist_t locusr,
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
strlist_t commands, int quiet, int seckey_check)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
enum cmdids cmd = 0;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
int have_seckey = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
char *answer = NULL;
int redisplay = 1;
int modified = 0;
int sec_shadowing = 0;
int run_subkey_warnings = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int have_commands = !!commands;
if (opt.command_fd != -1)
;
else if (opt.batch && !have_commands)
{
log_error (_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
goto leave;
}
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Due to Windows peculiarities we need to make sure that the
trustdb stale check is done before we open another file
(i.e. by searching for a key). In theory we could make sure
that the files are closed after use but the open/close caches
inhibits that and flushing the cache right before the stale
check is not easy to implement. Thus we take the easy way out
and run the stale check as early as possible. Note, that for
non- W32 platforms it is run indirectly trough a call to
get_validity (). */
check_trustdb_stale ();
#endif
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Get the public key */
err = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, NULL, username, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1, 1);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), username, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (fix_keyblock (&keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
modified++;
/* See whether we have a matching secret key. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (seckey_check)
{
2010-10-13 15:57:08 +00:00
have_seckey = !agent_probe_any_secret_key (ctrl, keyblock);
if (have_seckey && !quiet)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("Secret key is available.\n"));
}
/* Main command loop. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (;;)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int i, arg_number, photo;
const char *arg_string = "";
char *p;
PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (redisplay && !quiet)
{
/* Show using flags: with_revoker, with_subkeys. */
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
redisplay = 0;
}
if (run_subkey_warnings)
{
run_subkey_warnings = 0;
if (!count_selected_keys (keyblock))
subkey_expire_warning (keyblock);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
do
{
xfree (answer);
if (have_commands)
{
if (commands)
{
answer = xstrdup (commands->d);
commands = commands->next;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (opt.batch)
{
answer = xstrdup ("quit");
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else
have_commands = 0;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!have_commands)
{
2006-10-10 11:11:04 +00:00
#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_enable_completion (keyedit_completion);
2006-10-10 11:11:04 +00:00
#endif
answer = cpr_get_no_help ("keyedit.prompt", GPG_NAME "> ");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
cpr_kill_prompt ();
tty_disable_completion ();
}
trim_spaces (answer);
}
while (*answer == '#');
arg_number = 0; /* Here is the init which egcc complains about. */
photo = 0; /* Same here. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!*answer)
cmd = cmdLIST;
else if (*answer == CONTROL_D)
cmd = cmdQUIT;
else if (digitp (answer))
{
cmd = cmdSELUID;
arg_number = atoi (answer);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else
{
if ((p = strchr (answer, ' ')))
{
*p++ = 0;
trim_spaces (answer);
trim_spaces (p);
arg_number = atoi (p);
arg_string = p;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (i = 0; cmds[i].name; i++)
{
if (cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH)
{
size_t l = strlen (cmds[i].name);
size_t a = strlen (answer);
if (a >= l)
{
if (!ascii_strcasecmp (&answer[a - l], cmds[i].name))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
answer[a - l] = '\0';
break;
}
}
}
else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (answer, cmds[i].name))
break;
}
if ((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && !have_seckey)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_printf (_("Need the secret key to do this.\n"));
cmd = cmdNOP;
}
else
cmd = cmds[i].id;
}
/* Dispatch the command. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
switch (cmd)
{
case cmdHELP:
for (i = 0; cmds[i].name; i++)
{
if ((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && !have_seckey)
; /* Skip those item if we do not have the secret key. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (cmds[i].desc)
tty_printf ("%-11s %s\n", cmds[i].name, _(cmds[i].desc));
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
tty_printf
(_("* The 'sign' command may be prefixed with an 'l' for local "
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
"signatures (lsign),\n"
" a 't' for trust signatures (tsign), an 'nr' for "
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
"non-revocable signatures\n"
" (nrsign), or any combination thereof (ltsign, "
"tnrsign, etc.).\n"));
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdLIST:
redisplay = 1;
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdFPR:
show_key_and_fingerprint
(keyblock, (*arg_string == '*'
&& (!arg_string[1] || spacep (arg_string + 1))));
break;
case cmdGRIP:
show_key_and_grip (keyblock);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdSELUID:
if (strlen (arg_string) == NAMEHASH_LEN * 2)
redisplay = menu_select_uid_namehash (keyblock, arg_string);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else
{
if (*arg_string == '*'
&& (!arg_string[1] || spacep (arg_string + 1)))
arg_number = -1; /* Select all. */
redisplay = menu_select_uid (keyblock, arg_number);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdSELKEY:
{
if (*arg_string == '*'
&& (!arg_string[1] || spacep (arg_string + 1)))
arg_number = -1; /* Select all. */
if (menu_select_key (keyblock, arg_number))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdCHECK:
check_all_keysigs (keyblock, count_selected_uids (keyblock),
!strcmp (arg_string, "selfsig"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
case cmdSIGN:
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
int localsig = 0, nonrevokesig = 0, trustsig = 0, interactive = 0;
if (pk->flags.revoked)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_printf (_("Key is revoked."));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (opt.expert)
{
tty_printf (" ");
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.sign_revoked.okay",
_("Are you sure you still want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
else
{
tty_printf (_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
break;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (count_uids (keyblock) > 1 && !count_selected_uids (keyblock)
&& !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.sign_all.okay",
_("Really sign all user IDs?"
" (y/N) ")))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
if (opt.interactive)
interactive = 1;
else
{
tty_printf (_("Hint: Select the user IDs to sign\n"));
have_commands = 0;
break;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
/* What sort of signing are we doing? */
if (!parse_sign_type
(answer, &localsig, &nonrevokesig, &trustsig))
{
tty_printf (_("Unknown signature type '%s'\n"), answer);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
}
sign_uids (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, locusr, &modified,
localsig, nonrevokesig, trustsig, interactive, 0);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdDEBUG:
dump_kbnode (keyblock);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
case cmdTOGGLE:
/* The toggle command is a leftover from old gpg versions
where we worked with a secret and a public keyring. It
is not necessary anymore but we keep this command for the
sake of scripts using it. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
redisplay = 1;
break;
case cmdADDPHOTO:
if (RFC2440)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_printf (_("This command is not allowed while in %s mode.\n"),
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
compliance_option_string ());
break;
}
photo = 1;
/* fall through */
case cmdADDUID:
if (menu_adduid (keyblock, photo, arg_string, NULL))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
update_trust = 1;
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdDELUID:
{
int n1;
if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
{
tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
if (!opt.expert)
tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (real_uids_left (keyblock) < 1)
tty_printf (_("You can't delete the last user ID!\n"));
else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.remove.uid.okay",
n1 > 1 ? _("Really remove all selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
: _("Really remove this user ID? (y/N) ")))
{
menu_deluid (keyblock);
redisplay = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
modified = 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdDELSIG:
{
int n1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
{
tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
if (!opt.expert)
tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (menu_delsig (keyblock))
{
/* No redisplay here, because it may scroll away some
* of the status output of this command. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
modified = 1;
}
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdADDKEY:
if (!generate_subkeypair (ctrl, keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdADDCARDKEY:
2010-11-17 13:21:24 +00:00
if (!card_generate_subkey (keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdKEYTOCARD:
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
KBNODE node = NULL;
switch (count_selected_keys (keyblock))
{
case 0:
if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
2009-06-30 11:29:03 +00:00
("keyedit.keytocard.use_primary",
/* TRANSLATORS: Please take care: This is about
moving the key and not about removing it. */
_("Really move the primary key? (y/N) ")))
node = keyblock;
break;
case 1:
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)
break;
}
break;
default:
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("You must select exactly one key.\n"));
break;
}
if (node)
{
2010-11-17 13:21:24 +00:00
PKT_public_key *xxpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (card_store_subkey (node, xxpk ? xxpk->pubkey_usage : 0))
{
redisplay = 1;
sec_shadowing = 1;
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdBKUPTOCARD:
case cmdCHECKBKUPKEY:
log_debug ("FIXME: This needs to be changed\n");
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Ask for a filename, check whether this is really a
backup key as generated by the card generation, parse
that key and store it on card. */
KBNODE node;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
const char *fname;
PACKET *pkt;
IOBUF a;
fname = arg_string;
if (!*fname)
{
tty_printf (_("Command expects a filename argument\n"));
break;
}
/* Open that file. */
a = iobuf_open (fname);
if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
{
iobuf_close (a);
a = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
}
if (!a)
{
tty_printf (_("Can't open '%s': %s\n"),
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
fname, strerror (errno));
break;
}
/* Parse and check that file. */
pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
init_packet (pkt);
err = parse_packet (a, pkt);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
iobuf_close (a);
iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char *) fname);
if (!err && pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
&& pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
err = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
if (err)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_printf (_("Error reading backup key from '%s': %s\n"),
fname, gpg_strerror (err));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
free_packet (pkt);
xfree (pkt);
break;
}
node = new_kbnode (pkt);
if (cmd == cmdCHECKBKUPKEY)
{
2010-11-17 13:21:24 +00:00
/* PKT_public_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key; */
/* switch (is_secret_key_protected (sk)) */
/* { */
/* case 0: /\* Not protected. *\/ */
/* tty_printf (_("This key is not protected.\n")); */
/* break; */
/* case -1: */
/* log_error (_("unknown key protection algorithm\n")); */
/* break; */
/* default: */
/* if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001) */
/* tty_printf (_("Secret parts of key" */
/* " are not available.\n")); */
/* if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) */
/* tty_printf (_("Secret parts of key" */
/* " are stored on-card.\n")); */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* else */
/* check_secret_key (sk, 0); */
2010-11-17 13:21:24 +00:00
/* } */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
else /* Store it. */
{
if (card_store_subkey (node, 0))
{
redisplay = 1;
sec_shadowing = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
}
release_kbnode (node);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdDELKEY:
{
int n1;
if (!(n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock)))
{
tty_printf (_("You must select at least one key.\n"));
if (!opt.expert)
tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "key");
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.remove.subkey.okay",
n1 > 1 ? _("Do you really want to delete the "
"selected keys? (y/N) ")
: _("Do you really want to delete this key? (y/N) ")))
;
else
{
menu_delkey (keyblock);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
}
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdADDREVOKER:
{
int sensitive = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (ascii_strcasecmp (arg_string, "sensitive") == 0)
sensitive = 1;
if (menu_addrevoker (ctrl, keyblock, sensitive))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdREVUID:
{
int n1;
if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
{
tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
if (!opt.expert)
tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
}
else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
("keyedit.revoke.uid.okay",
n1 > 1 ? _("Really revoke all selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
: _("Really revoke this user ID? (y/N) ")))
{
if (menu_revuid (keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
}
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdREVKEY:
{
int n1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!(n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock)))
{
if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay",
_("Do you really want to revoke"
" the entire key? (y/N) ")))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
if (menu_revkey (keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
modified = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
redisplay = 1;
}
}
else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay",
n1 > 1 ?
_("Do you really want to revoke"
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
" the selected subkeys? (y/N) ")
: _("Do you really want to revoke"
" this subkey? (y/N) ")))
{
if (menu_revsubkey (keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (modified)
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
}
break;
case cmdEXPIRE:
if (menu_expire (keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
run_subkey_warnings = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdBACKSIGN:
if (menu_backsign (keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdPRIMARY:
if (menu_set_primary_uid (keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdPASSWD:
change_passphrase (ctrl, keyblock);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdTRUST:
if (opt.trust_model == TM_EXTERNAL)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("Owner trust may not be set while "
"using a user provided trust database\n"));
break;
}
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
if (edit_ownertrust (find_kbnode (keyblock,
PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.
public_key, 1))
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
redisplay = 1;
/* No real need to set update_trust here as
edit_ownertrust() calls revalidation_mark()
anyway. */
update_trust = 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdPREF:
{
int count = count_selected_uids (keyblock);
assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
show_names (NULL, keyblock, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
count ? NODFLG_SELUID : 0, 1);
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdSHOWPREF:
{
int count = count_selected_uids (keyblock);
assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
show_names (NULL, keyblock, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
count ? NODFLG_SELUID : 0, 2);
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdSETPREF:
{
PKT_user_id *tempuid;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
keygen_set_std_prefs (!*arg_string ? "default" : arg_string, 0);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tempuid = keygen_get_std_prefs ();
tty_printf (_("Set preference list to:\n"));
show_prefs (tempuid, NULL, 1);
free_user_id (tempuid);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.setpref.okay",
count_selected_uids (keyblock) ?
_("Really update the preferences"
" for the selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
: _("Really update the preferences? (y/N) ")))
{
if (menu_set_preferences (keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdPREFKS:
if (menu_set_keyserver_url (*arg_string ? arg_string : NULL,
keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdNOTATION:
if (menu_set_notation (*arg_string ? arg_string : NULL,
keyblock))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdNOP:
break;
case cmdREVSIG:
if (menu_revsig (keyblock))
{
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdENABLEKEY:
case cmdDISABLEKEY:
if (enable_disable_key (keyblock, cmd == cmdDISABLEKEY))
{
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
}
break;
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdSHOWPHOTO:
menu_showphoto (keyblock);
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdCLEAN:
if (menu_clean (keyblock, 0))
redisplay = modified = 1;
break;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdMINIMIZE:
if (menu_clean (keyblock, 1))
redisplay = modified = 1;
break;
case cmdQUIT:
if (have_commands)
goto leave;
if (!modified && !sec_shadowing)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
goto leave;
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.save.okay",
_("Save changes? (y/N) ")))
{
if (cpr_enabled ()
|| cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.cancel.okay",
_("Quit without saving? (y/N) ")))
goto leave;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
break;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* fall thru */
case cmdSAVE:
if (modified)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
break;
}
}
if (sec_shadowing)
{
err = agent_scd_learn (NULL, 1);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
break;
}
}
if (!modified && !sec_shadowing)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (update_trust)
{
revalidation_mark ();
update_trust = 0;
}
goto leave;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
case cmdINVCMD:
default:
tty_printf ("\n");
tty_printf (_("Invalid command (try \"help\")\n"));
break;
}
} /* End of the main command loop. */
leave:
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (kdbhd);
xfree (answer);
}
/* Change the passphrase of the secret key identified by USERNAME. */
void
keyedit_passwd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username)
{
gpg_error_t err;
PKT_public_key *pk;
kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
if (!pk)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
err = getkey_byname (NULL, pk, username, 1, &keyblock);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = change_passphrase (ctrl, keyblock);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
2011-09-20 19:24:52 +02:00
free_public_key (pk);
if (err)
{
log_info ("error changing the passphrase for '%s': %s\n",
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
username, gpg_strerror (err));
write_status_error ("keyedit.passwd", err);
}
else
write_status_text (STATUS_SUCCESS, "keyedit.passwd");
}
/* Unattended adding of a new keyid. USERNAME specifies the
key. NEWUID is the new user id to add to the key. */
void
keyedit_quick_adduid (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, const char *newuid)
{
gpg_error_t err;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
kbnode_t node;
char *uidstring = NULL;
uidstring = xstrdup (newuid);
trim_spaces (uidstring);
if (!*uidstring)
{
log_error ("%s\n", gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID));
goto leave;
}
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
check_trustdb_stale ();
#endif
/* Search the key; we don't want the whole getkey stuff here. */
kdbhd = keydb_new ();
err = classify_user_id (username, &desc, 1);
if (!err)
err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
if (!err)
{
err = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Now with the keyblock retrieved, search again to detect an
ambiguous specification. We need to save the found state so
that we can do an update later. */
keydb_push_found_state (kdbhd);
err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
if (!err)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME);
else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
err = 0;
keydb_pop_found_state (kdbhd);
if (!err)
{
/* We require the secret primary key to add a UID. */
node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
if (!node)
BUG ();
err = agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, node->pkt->pkt.public_key);
}
}
if (err)
{
log_error (_("secret key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
username, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
fix_keyblock (&keyblock);
if (menu_adduid (keyblock, 0, NULL, uidstring))
{
err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (update_trust)
revalidation_mark ();
}
leave:
xfree (uidstring);
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (kdbhd);
}
/* Unattended key signing function. If the key specifified by FPR is
availabale and FPR is the primary fingerprint all user ids of the
user ids of the key are signed using the default signing key. If
UIDS is an empty list all usable UIDs are signed, if it is not
empty, only those user ids matching one of the entries of the loist
are signed. With LOCAL being true kthe signatures are marked as
non-exportable. */
void
keyedit_quick_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, strlist_t uids,
strlist_t locusr, int local)
{
gpg_error_t err;
kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
int modified = 0;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
PKT_public_key *pk;
kbnode_t node;
strlist_t sl;
int any;
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
check_trustdb_stale ();
#endif
/* We require a fingerprint because only this uniquely identifies a
key and may thus be used to select a key for unattended key
signing. */
if (classify_user_id (fpr, &desc, 1)
|| !(desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20))
{
log_error (_("\"%s\" is not a fingerprint\n"), fpr);
goto leave;
}
err = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, NULL, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1, 1);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), fpr, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Check that the primary fingerprint has been given. */
{
byte fprbin[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t fprlen;
fingerprint_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, fprbin, &fprlen);
if (fprlen == 16 && desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 16))
;
else if (fprlen == 16 && desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 16)
&& !desc.u.fpr[16]
&& !desc.u.fpr[17]
&& !desc.u.fpr[18]
&& !desc.u.fpr[19])
;
else if (fprlen == 20 && (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR)
&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 20))
;
else
{
log_error (_("\"%s\" is not the primary fingerprint\n"), fpr);
goto leave;
}
}
if (fix_keyblock (&keyblock))
modified++;
/* Give some info in verbose. */
if (opt.verbose)
{
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0,
1/*with_revoker*/, 1/*with_fingerprint*/,
0, 0, 1);
es_fflush (es_stdout);
}
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (pk->flags.revoked)
{
if (!opt.verbose)
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
log_error ("%s%s", _("Key is revoked."), _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
goto leave;
}
/* Set the flags according to the UIDS list. Fixme: We may want to
use classify_user_id along with dedicated compare functions so
that we match the same way as in the key lookup. */
any = 0;
menu_select_uid (keyblock, 0); /* Better clear the flags first. */
for (sl=uids; sl; sl = sl->next)
{
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if (!uid->attrib_data
&& ascii_memistr (uid->name, uid->len, sl->d))
{
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
any = 1;
}
}
}
}
if (uids && !any)
{
if (!opt.verbose)
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
es_fflush (es_stdout);
log_error ("%s %s", _("No matching user IDs."), _("Nothing to sign.\n"));
goto leave;
}
/* Sign. */
sign_uids (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, locusr, &modified, local, 0, 0, 0, 1);
es_fflush (es_stdout);
if (modified)
{
err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
}
else
log_info (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));
if (update_trust)
revalidation_mark ();
leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (kdbhd);
}
static void
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_print_notations (int indent, PKT_signature * sig)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int first = 1;
struct notation *notation, *nd;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (indent < 0)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
first = 0;
indent = -indent;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
notation = sig_to_notation (sig);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (nd = notation; nd; nd = nd->next)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!first)
tty_printf ("%*s", indent, "");
else
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
first = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_print_utf8_string (nd->name, strlen (nd->name));
tty_printf ("=");
tty_print_utf8_string (nd->value, strlen (nd->value));
tty_printf ("\n");
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
free_notation (notation);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/*
* Show preferences of a public keyblock.
*/
static void
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig, int verbose)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
const prefitem_t fake = { 0, 0 };
const prefitem_t *prefs;
int i;
if (!uid)
return;
if (uid->prefs)
prefs = uid->prefs;
else if (verbose)
prefs = &fake;
else
return;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (verbose)
{
int any, des_seen = 0, sha1_seen = 0, uncomp_seen = 0;
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("Cipher: "));
for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
any = 1;
/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs[i].value)
&& prefs[i].value < 100)
tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (prefs[i].value));
else
tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
if (prefs[i].value == CIPHER_ALGO_3DES)
des_seen = 1;
}
}
if (!des_seen)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (CIPHER_ALGO_3DES));
}
tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("Digest: "));
for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
any = 1;
/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (prefs[i].value) && prefs[i].value < 100)
tty_printf ("%s", gcry_md_algo_name (prefs[i].value));
else
tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
if (prefs[i].value == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1)
sha1_seen = 1;
}
}
if (!sha1_seen)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
tty_printf ("%s", gcry_md_algo_name (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1));
}
tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("Compression: "));
for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP)
{
const char *s = compress_algo_to_string (prefs[i].value);
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
any = 1;
/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
if (s && prefs[i].value < 100)
tty_printf ("%s", s);
else
tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
if (prefs[i].value == COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE)
uncomp_seen = 1;
}
}
if (!uncomp_seen)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
else
{
tty_printf ("%s", compress_algo_to_string (COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP));
tty_printf (", ");
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("%s", compress_algo_to_string (COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE));
}
if (uid->flags.mdc || !uid->flags.ks_modify)
{
tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("Features: "));
any = 0;
if (uid->flags.mdc)
{
tty_printf ("MDC");
any = 1;
}
if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
tty_printf (_("Keyserver no-modify"));
}
}
tty_printf ("\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (selfsig)
{
const byte *pref_ks;
size_t pref_ks_len;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
pref_ks = parse_sig_subpkt (selfsig->hashed,
SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &pref_ks_len);
if (pref_ks && pref_ks_len)
{
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("Preferred keyserver: "));
tty_print_utf8_string (pref_ks, pref_ks_len);
tty_printf ("\n");
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (selfsig->flags.notation)
{
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("Notations: "));
tty_print_notations (5 + strlen (_("Notations: ")), selfsig);
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else
{
tty_printf (" ");
for (i = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
tty_printf (" %c%d", prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?',
prefs[i].value);
}
if (uid->flags.mdc)
tty_printf (" [mdc]");
if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
tty_printf (" [no-ks-modify]");
tty_printf ("\n");
}
}
/* This is the version of show_key_with_all_names used when
opt.with_colons is used. It prints all available data in a easy to
parse format and does not translate utf8 */
static void
show_key_with_all_names_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, kbnode_t keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int i, j, ulti_hack = 0;
byte pk_version = 0;
PKT_public_key *primary = NULL;
int have_seckey;
if (!fp)
fp = es_stdout;
/* the keys */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
|| (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY))
{
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
u32 keyid[2];
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
pk_version = pk->version;
primary = pk;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
have_seckey = !agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, pk);
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
es_fputs (have_seckey? "sec:" : "pub:", fp);
else
es_fputs (have_seckey? "ssb:" : "sub:", fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!pk->flags.valid)
es_putc ('i', fp);
else if (pk->flags.revoked)
es_putc ('r', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (pk->has_expired)
es_putc ('e', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (!(opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks))
{
int trust = get_validity_info (pk, NULL);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (trust == 'u')
ulti_hack = 1;
es_putc (trust, fp);
}
es_fprintf (fp, ":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu::",
nbits_from_pk (pk),
pk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1],
(ulong) pk->timestamp, (ulong) pk->expiredate);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
&& !(opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks))
es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (pk), fp);
es_putc (':', fp);
es_putc (':', fp);
es_putc (':', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Print capabilities. */
if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
es_putc ('e', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG))
es_putc ('s', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT))
es_putc ('c', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH))
es_putc ('a', fp);
es_putc ('\n', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
print_fingerprint (fp, pk, 0);
print_revokers (fp, pk);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* the user ids */
i = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
++i;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uid->attrib_data)
es_fputs ("uat:", fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else
es_fputs ("uid:", fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uid->is_revoked)
es_fputs ("r::::::::", fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (uid->is_expired)
es_fputs ("e::::::::", fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks)
es_fputs ("::::::::", fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else
{
int uid_validity;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (primary && !ulti_hack)
uid_validity = get_validity_info (primary, uid);
else
uid_validity = 'u';
es_fprintf (fp, "%c::::::::", uid_validity);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
if (uid->attrib_data)
es_fprintf (fp, "%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else
es_write_sanitized (fp, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
es_putc (':', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* signature class */
es_putc (':', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* capabilities */
es_putc (':', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* preferences */
if (pk_version > 3 || uid->selfsigversion > 3)
{
const prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs;
for (j = 0; prefs && prefs[j].type; j++)
{
if (j)
es_putc (' ', fp);
es_fprintf (fp,
"%c%d", prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?',
prefs[j].value);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
if (uid->flags.mdc)
es_fputs (",mdc", fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
es_fputs (",no-ks-modify", fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
es_putc (':', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* flags */
es_fprintf (fp, "%d,", i);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uid->is_primary)
es_putc ('p', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uid->is_revoked)
es_putc ('r', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uid->is_expired)
es_putc ('e', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
es_putc ('s', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if ((node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
es_putc ('m', fp);
es_putc (':', fp);
es_putc ('\n', fp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
}
}
static void
show_names (estream_t fp,
KBNODE keyblock, PKT_public_key * pk, unsigned int flag,
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int with_prefs)
{
KBNODE node;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int i = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !is_deleted_kbnode (node))
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
++i;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!flag || (flag && (node->flag & flag)))
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!(flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) && pk)
tty_fprintf (fp, "%s ", uid_trust_string_fixed (pk, uid));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d)* ", i);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (uid->is_primary)
tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d). ", i);
else
tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d) ", i);
tty_print_utf8_string2 (fp, uid->name, uid->len, 0);
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
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if (with_prefs && pk)
{
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if (pk->version > 3 || uid->selfsigversion > 3)
{
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PKT_signature *selfsig = NULL;
KBNODE signode;
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for (signode = node->next;
signode && signode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE;
signode = signode->next)
{
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if (signode->pkt->pkt.signature->
flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
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selfsig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
break;
}
}
show_prefs (uid, selfsig, with_prefs == 2);
}
else
tty_fprintf (fp, _("There are no preferences on a"
" PGP 2.x-style user ID.\n"));
}
}
}
}
}
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/*
* Display the key a the user ids, if only_marked is true, do only so
* for user ids with mark A flag set and do not display the index
* number. If FP is not NULL print to the given stream and not to the
* tty (ignored in with-colons mode).
*/
static void
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked, int with_revoker,
int with_fpr, int with_subkeys, int with_prefs,
int nowarn)
{
gpg_error_t err;
kbnode_t node;
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int i;
int do_warn = 0;
int have_seckey = 0;
char *serialno = NULL;
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PKT_public_key *primary = NULL;
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
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if (opt.with_colons)
{
show_key_with_all_names_colon (ctrl, fp, keyblock);
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return;
}
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/* the keys */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| (with_subkeys && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& !is_deleted_kbnode (node)))
{
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
const char *otrust = "err";
const char *trust = "err";
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
/* do it here, so that debug messages don't clutter the
* output */
static int did_warn = 0;
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trust = get_validity_string (pk, NULL);
otrust = get_ownertrust_string (pk);
/* Show a warning once */
if (!did_warn
&& (get_validity (pk, NULL) & TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK))
{
did_warn = 1;
do_warn = 1;
}
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primary = pk;
}
if (pk->flags.revoked)
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{
char *user = get_user_id_string_native (pk->revoked.keyid);
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("The following key was revoked on"
" %s by %s key %s\n"),
revokestr_from_pk (pk),
gcry_pk_algo_name (pk->revoked.algo), user);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (user);
}
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if (with_revoker)
{
if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
BUG ();
else
for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
{
u32 r_keyid[2];
char *user;
const char *algo;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
algo = gcry_pk_algo_name (pk->revkey[i].algid);
keyid_from_fingerprint (pk->revkey[i].fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN, r_keyid);
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user = get_user_id_string_native (r_keyid);
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("This key may be revoked by %s key %s"),
algo ? algo : "?", user);
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if (pk->revkey[i].class & 0x40)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("(sensitive)"));
}
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tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
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xfree (user);
}
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}
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keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);
xfree (serialno);
serialno = NULL;
{
char *hexgrip;
err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
have_seckey = 0;
}
else
have_seckey = !agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl, hexgrip, &serialno);
xfree (hexgrip);
}
tty_fprintf
(fp, "%s%c %s/%s",
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY && have_seckey? "sec" :
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "pub" :
have_seckey ? "ssb" :
"sub",
(node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) ? '*' : ' ',
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr (pk->keyid));
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if (opt.legacy_list_mode)
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
else
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n ");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk));
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
if (pk->flags.revoked)
tty_fprintf (fp, _("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk));
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else if (pk->has_expired)
tty_fprintf (fp, _("expired: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
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else
tty_fprintf (fp, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("usage: %s"), usagestr_from_pk (pk, 1));
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
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if (serialno)
{
/* The agent told us that a secret key is available and
that it has been stored on a card. */
tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", opt.legacy_list_mode? 21:5, "",
_("card-no: "));
if (strlen (serialno) == 32
&& !strncmp (serialno, "D27600012401", 12))
{
/* This is an OpenPGP card. Print the relevant part. */
/* Example: D2760001240101010001000003470000 */
/* xxxxyyyyyyyy */
tty_fprintf (fp, "%.*s %.*s\n",
4, serialno+16, 8, serialno+20);
}
else
tty_fprintf (fp, "%s\n", serialno);
}
else if (pk->seckey_info
&& pk->seckey_info->is_protected
&& pk->seckey_info->s2k.mode == 1002)
{
/* FIXME: Check wether this code path is still used. */
tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", opt.legacy_list_mode? 21:5, "",
_("card-no: "));
if (pk->seckey_info->ivlen == 16
&& !memcmp (pk->seckey_info->iv,
"\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24\x01", 6))
{
/* This is an OpenPGP card. */
for (i = 8; i < 14; i++)
{
if (i == 10)
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", pk->seckey_info->iv[i]);
}
}
else
{
/* Unknown card: Print all. */
for (i = 0; i < pk->seckey_info->ivlen; i++)
tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", pk->seckey_info->iv[i]);
}
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
}
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
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{
if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s",
opt.legacy_list_mode?
((int) keystrlen () + 13):5, "");
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/* Ownertrust is only meaningful for the PGP or
classic trust models */
if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP
|| opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC)
{
int width = 14 - strlen (otrust);
if (width <= 0)
width = 1;
tty_fprintf (fp, _("trust: %s"), otrust);
tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s", width, "");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
tty_fprintf (fp, _("validity: %s"), trust);
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
&& (get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "*** ");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key has been disabled"));
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
}
if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) && with_fpr)
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{
print_fingerprint (fp, pk, 2);
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
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}
}
}
show_names (fp,
keyblock, primary, only_marked ? NODFLG_MARK_A : 0, with_prefs);
if (do_warn && !nowarn)
tty_fprintf (fp, _("Please note that the shown key validity"
" is not necessarily correct\n"
"unless you restart the program.\n"));
xfree (serialno);
}
/* Display basic key information. This function is suitable to show
information on the key without any dependencies on the trustdb or
any other internal GnuPG stuff. KEYBLOCK may either be a public or
a secret key. This function may be called with KEYBLOCK containing
secret keys and thus the printing of "pub" vs. "sec" does only
depend on the packet type and not by checking with gpg-agent. */
void
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
show_basic_key_info (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
int i;
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
/* The primary key */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
/* Note, we use the same format string as in other show
functions to make the translation job easier. */
tty_printf ("%s %s/%s ",
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "pub" :
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ? "sub" :
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ? "sec" :"ssb",
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr_from_pk (pk));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk));
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
tty_printf ("\n");
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 3);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
}
}
/* The user IDs. */
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for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
++i;
tty_printf (" ");
if (uid->is_revoked)
tty_printf ("[%s] ", _("revoked"));
else if (uid->is_expired)
tty_printf ("[%s] ", _("expired"));
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
tty_printf ("\n");
}
}
}
static void
show_key_and_fingerprint (kbnode_t keyblock, int with_subkeys)
{
kbnode_t node;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
tty_printf ("pub %s/%s %s ",
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr_from_pk(pk),
datestr_from_pk (pk));
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
break;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
if (pk)
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 2);
if (with_subkeys)
{
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
tty_printf ("sub %s/%s %s [%s]\n",
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr_from_pk(pk),
datestr_from_pk (pk),
usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0));
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 4);
}
}
}
}
/* Show a listing of the primary and its subkeys along with their
keygrips. */
static void
show_key_and_grip (kbnode_t keyblock)
{
kbnode_t node;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
char *hexgrip;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
tty_printf ("%s %s/%s %s [%s]\n",
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY? "pub":"sub",
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr_from_pk(pk),
datestr_from_pk (pk),
usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0));
if (!hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip))
{
tty_printf (" Keygrip: %s\n", hexgrip);
xfree (hexgrip);
}
}
}
}
/* Show a warning if no uids on the key have the primary uid flag
set. */
static void
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
no_primary_warning (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int have_primary = 0, uid_count = 0;
/* TODO: if we ever start behaving differently with a primary or
non-primary attribute ID, we will need to check for attributes
here as well. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data == NULL)
{
uid_count++;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary == 2)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
have_primary = 1;
break;
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uid_count > 1 && !have_primary)
log_info (_
("WARNING: no user ID has been marked as primary. This command"
" may\n cause a different user ID to become"
" the assumed primary.\n"));
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Print a warning if the latest encryption subkey expires soon. This
function is called after the expire data of the primary key has
been changed. */
static void
subkey_expire_warning (kbnode_t keyblock)
{
u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
kbnode_t node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
/* u32 mainexpire = 0; */
u32 subexpire = 0;
u32 latest_date = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
/* if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) */
/* { */
/* pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; */
/* mainexpire = pk->expiredate; */
/* } */
if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
continue;
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (!pk->flags.valid)
continue;
if (pk->flags.revoked)
continue;
if (pk->timestamp > curtime)
continue; /* Ignore future keys. */
if (!(pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
continue; /* Not an encryption key. */
if (pk->timestamp > latest_date || (!pk->timestamp && !latest_date))
{
latest_date = pk->timestamp;
subexpire = pk->expiredate;
}
}
if (!subexpire)
return; /* No valid subkey with an expiration time. */
if (curtime + (10*86400) > subexpire)
{
log_info (_("WARNING: Your encryption subkey expires soon.\n"));
log_info (_("You may want to change its expiration date too.\n"));
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/*
* Ask for a new user id, add the self-signature, and update the
* keyblock. If UIDSTRING is not NULL the user ID is generated
* unattended using that string. UIDSTRING is expected to be utf-8
* encoded and white space trimmed. Returns true if there is a new
* user id.
*/
static int
menu_adduid (kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int photo, const char *photo_name,
const char *uidstring)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_user_id *uid;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
PACKET *pkt;
KBNODE node;
KBNODE pub_where = NULL;
gpg_error_t err;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (photo && uidstring)
return 0; /* Not allowed. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; pub_where = node, node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break;
}
if (!node) /* No subkey. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
pub_where = NULL;
assert (pk);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (photo)
{
int hasattrib = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
hasattrib = 1;
break;
}
/* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a photo ID to a
v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a photo on a v3 key.
Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a photo - any
damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (pk->version == 3 && !hasattrib)
{
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if (opt.expert)
{
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tty_printf (_("WARNING: This is a PGP2-style key. "
"Adding a photo ID may cause some versions\n"
" of PGP to reject this key.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.v3_photo.okay",
_("Are you sure you still want "
"to add it? (y/N) ")))
return 0;
}
else
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("You may not add a photo ID to "
"a PGP2-style key.\n"));
return 0;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
uid = generate_photo_id (pk, photo_name);
}
else
uid = generate_user_id (pub_keyblock, uidstring);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!uid)
{
if (uidstring)
log_error ("%s", _("Such a user ID already exists on this key!\n"));
return 0;
}
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
err = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x13, 0, 0, 0,
2010-09-01 12:49:05 +00:00
keygen_add_std_prefs, pk, NULL);
if (err)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
write_status_error ("keysig", err);
log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
free_user_id (uid);
return 0;
}
/* Insert/append to public keyblock */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_USER_ID;
pkt->pkt.user_id = uid;
node = new_kbnode (pkt);
if (pub_where)
insert_kbnode (pub_where, node, 0);
else
add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, node);
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature (NULL, sig);
if (pub_where)
insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
else
add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt));
return 1;
}
/*
* Remove all selected userids from the keyring
*/
static void
menu_deluid (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
KBNODE node;
int selected = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
if (selected)
{
/* Only cause a trust update if we delete a
non-revoked user id */
if (!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
update_trust = 1;
delete_kbnode (node);
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
delete_kbnode (node);
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
selected = 0;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
}
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
menu_delsig (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
KBNODE node;
PKT_user_id *uid = NULL;
int changed = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uid = (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) ? node->pkt->pkt.user_id : NULL;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
int okay, valid, selfsig, inv_sig, no_key, other_err;
tty_printf ("uid ");
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
tty_printf ("\n");
okay = inv_sig = no_key = other_err = 0;
if (opt.with_colons)
valid = print_and_check_one_sig_colon (pub_keyblock, node,
&inv_sig, &no_key,
&other_err, &selfsig, 1);
else
valid = print_and_check_one_sig (pub_keyblock, node,
&inv_sig, &no_key, &other_err,
&selfsig, 1, 0);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (valid)
{
okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
("keyedit.delsig.valid",
_("Delete this good signature? (y/N/q)"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Only update trust if we delete a good signature.
The other two cases do not affect trust. */
if (okay)
update_trust = 1;
}
else if (inv_sig || other_err)
okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
("keyedit.delsig.invalid",
_("Delete this invalid signature? (y/N/q)"));
else if (no_key)
okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
("keyedit.delsig.unknown",
_("Delete this unknown signature? (y/N/q)"));
if (okay == -1)
break;
if (okay && selfsig
&& !cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.delsig.selfsig",
_("Really delete this self-signature? (y/N)")))
okay = 0;
if (okay)
{
delete_kbnode (node);
changed++;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
uid = NULL;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (changed)
{
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
tty_printf (changed == 1 ? _("Deleted %d signature.\n")
: _("Deleted %d signatures.\n"), changed);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else
tty_printf (_("Nothing deleted.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return changed;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
menu_clean (KBNODE keyblock, int self_only)
{
KBNODE uidnode;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int modified = 0, select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (uidnode = keyblock->next;
uidnode && uidnode->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
uidnode = uidnode->next)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uidnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& (uidnode->flag & NODFLG_SELUID || select_all))
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int uids = 0, sigs = 0;
char *user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
0);
clean_one_uid (keyblock, uidnode, opt.verbose, self_only, &uids,
&sigs);
if (uids)
{
const char *reason;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
reason = _("revoked");
else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
reason = _("expired");
else
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
reason = _("invalid");
2006-12-06 10:16:50 +00:00
tty_printf (_("User ID \"%s\" compacted: %s\n"), user, reason);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
modified = 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (sigs)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (sigs == 1 ?
_("User ID \"%s\": %d signature removed\n") :
_("User ID \"%s\": %d signatures removed\n"),
user, sigs);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
modified = 1;
}
else
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (self_only == 1 ?
_("User ID \"%s\": already minimized\n") :
_("User ID \"%s\": already clean\n"), user);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (user);
}
}
return modified;
}
/*
* Remove some of the secondary keys
*/
static void
menu_delkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
KBNODE node;
int selected = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY;
if (selected)
delete_kbnode (node);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
delete_kbnode (node);
else
selected = 0;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys are no
longer used to certify other keys, so there is no change in
trust when revoking/removing them. */
}
/*
* Ask for a new revoker, create the self-signature and put it into
* the keyblock. Returns true if there is a new revoker.
*/
static int
menu_addrevoker (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int sensitive)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
PKT_public_key *revoker_pk = NULL;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
PACKET *pkt;
struct revocation_key revkey;
size_t fprlen;
int rc;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
assert (pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (pk->numrevkeys == 0 && pk->version == 3)
{
/* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a revoker to a
v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a revoker on a v3 key.
Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a revoker -
any damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (opt.expert)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("WARNING: This is a PGP 2.x-style key. "
"Adding a designated revoker may cause\n"
" some versions of PGP to reject this key.\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.v3_revoker.okay",
_("Are you sure you still want "
"to add it? (y/N) ")))
return 0;
}
else
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("You may not add a designated revoker to "
"a PGP 2.x-style key.\n"));
return 0;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (;;)
{
char *answer;
2011-09-20 19:24:52 +02:00
free_public_key (revoker_pk);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
revoker_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*revoker_pk));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
answer = cpr_get_utf8
("keyedit.add_revoker",
_("Enter the user ID of the designated revoker: "));
if (answer[0] == '\0' || answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (answer);
goto fail;
}
/* Note that I'm requesting CERT here, which usually implies
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
primary keys only, but some casual testing shows that PGP and
GnuPG both can handle a designated revocation from a subkey. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
revoker_pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT;
rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, revoker_pk, answer, NULL, NULL, 1, 1);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (rc)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), answer,
gpg_strerror (rc));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (answer);
continue;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (answer);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
fingerprint_from_pk (revoker_pk, revkey.fpr, &fprlen);
if (fprlen != 20)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
log_error (_("cannot appoint a PGP 2.x style key as a "
"designated revoker\n"));
continue;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
revkey.class = 0x80;
if (sensitive)
revkey.class |= 0x40;
revkey.algid = revoker_pk->pubkey_algo;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (cmp_public_keys (revoker_pk, pk) == 0)
{
/* This actually causes no harm (after all, a key that
designates itself as a revoker is the same as a
regular key), but it's easy enough to check. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
log_error (_("you cannot appoint a key as its own "
"designated revoker\n"));
continue;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);
/* Does this revkey already exist? */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
BUG ();
else
{
int i;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (memcmp (&pk->revkey[i], &revkey,
sizeof (struct revocation_key)) == 0)
{
char buf[50];
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
log_error (_("this key has already been designated "
"as a revoker\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
sprintf (buf, "%08lX%08lX",
(ulong) pk->keyid[0], (ulong) pk->keyid[1]);
write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf);
break;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (i < pk->numrevkeys)
continue;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
print_pubkey_info (NULL, revoker_pk);
print_fingerprint (NULL, revoker_pk, 2);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("WARNING: appointing a key as a designated revoker "
"cannot be undone!\n"));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.add_revoker.okay",
_("Are you sure you want to appoint this "
"key as a designated revoker? (y/N) ")))
continue;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
free_public_key (revoker_pk);
revoker_pk = NULL;
break;
}
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk, 0x1F, 0, 0, 0,
2010-09-01 12:49:05 +00:00
keygen_add_revkey, &revkey, NULL);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto fail;
}
/* Insert into public keyblock. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
insert_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE);
return 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
fail:
if (sig)
free_seckey_enc (sig);
2011-09-20 19:24:52 +02:00
free_public_key (revoker_pk);
return 0;
}
static int
menu_expire (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int n1, signumber, rc;
u32 expiredate;
int mainkey = 0;
PKT_public_key *main_pk, *sub_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
n1 = count_selected_keys (pub_keyblock);
if (n1 > 1)
{
tty_printf (_("Please select at most one subkey.\n"));
return 0;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (n1)
tty_printf (_("Changing expiration time for a subkey.\n"));
else
{
tty_printf (_("Changing expiration time for the primary key.\n"));
mainkey = 1;
no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);
}
expiredate = ask_expiredate ();
/* Now we can actually change the self-signature(s) */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
main_pk = sub_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
signumber = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
main_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
{
sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sub_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
else if (main_pk && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (mainkey || sub_pk))
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& ((mainkey && uid
&& uid->created && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
|| (!mainkey && sig->sig_class == 0x18))
&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
/* This is a self-signature which is to be replaced. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
signumber++;
if ((mainkey && main_pk->version < 4)
|| (!mainkey && sub_pk->version < 4))
{
log_info
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
(_("You can't change the expiration date of a v3 key\n"));
return 0;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (mainkey)
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL,
main_pk, keygen_add_key_expire,
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
main_pk);
else
rc =
update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk,
main_pk, keygen_add_key_expire, sub_pk);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (rc)
{
log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return 0;
}
/* Replace the packet. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet (node->pkt);
xfree (node->pkt);
node->pkt = newpkt;
sub_pk = NULL;
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
update_trust = 1;
return 1;
}
static int
menu_backsign (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int rc, modified = 0;
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
KBNODE node;
u32 timestamp;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
assert (pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
merge_keys_and_selfsig (pub_keyblock);
main_pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, NULL);
/* We use the same timestamp for all backsigs so that we don't
reveal information about the used machine. */
timestamp = make_timestamp ();
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_public_key *sub_pk = NULL;
KBNODE node2, sig_pk = NULL /*,sig_sk = NULL*/;
/* char *passphrase; */
/* Find a signing subkey with no backsig */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
2006-04-28 14:31:29 +00:00
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
2006-04-28 14:31:29 +00:00
{
if (node->pkt->pkt.public_key->flags.backsig)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_
("signing subkey %s is already cross-certified\n"),
keystr_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key));
2006-04-28 14:31:29 +00:00
else
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
2006-04-28 14:31:29 +00:00
}
else
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("subkey %s does not sign and so does"
" not need to be cross-certified\n"),
keystr_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key));
2006-04-28 14:31:29 +00:00
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!sub_pk)
continue;
/* Find the selected selfsig on this subkey */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node2 = node->next;
node2 && node2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; node2 = node2->next)
if (node2->pkt->pkt.signature->version >= 4
&& node2->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
sig_pk = node2;
break;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!sig_pk)
continue;
/* Find the secret subkey that matches the public subkey */
log_debug ("FIXME: Check whether a secret subkey is available.\n");
/* if (!sub_sk) */
/* { */
/* tty_printf (_("no secret subkey for public subkey %s - ignoring\n"), */
/* keystr_from_pk (sub_pk)); */
/* continue; */
/* } */
/* Now we can get to work. */
rc = make_backsig (sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature, main_pk, sub_pk, sub_pk,
2010-09-01 12:49:05 +00:00
timestamp, NULL);
if (!rc)
{
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature,
main_pk, NULL, sub_pk, main_pk,
NULL, NULL);
if (!rc)
{
/* Put the new sig into place on the pubkey */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*newpkt));
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet (sig_pk->pkt);
xfree (sig_pk->pkt);
sig_pk->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
}
else
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
break;
}
}
else
{
log_error ("make_backsig failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
break;
}
}
return modified;
}
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
change_primary_uid_cb (PKT_signature * sig, void *opaque)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
byte buf[1];
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* first clear all primary uid flags so that we are sure none are
* lingering around */
delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);
delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* if opaque is set,we want to set the primary id */
if (opaque)
{
buf[0] = 1;
build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, buf, 1);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return 0;
}
/*
* Set the primary uid flag for the selected UID. We will also reset
* all other primary uid flags. For this to work with have to update
* all the signature timestamps. If we would do this with the current
* time, we lose quite a lot of information, so we use a a kludge to
* do this: Just increment the timestamp by one second which is
* sufficient to updated a signature during import.
*/
static int
menu_set_primary_uid (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
int selected;
int attribute = 0;
int modified = 0;
if (count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock) != 1)
{
tty_printf (_("Please select exactly one user ID.\n"));
return 0;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
main_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
selected = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* Is our selected uid an attribute packet? */
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
attribute = (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break; /* No more user ids expected - ready. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
}
else if (main_pk && uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
&& attribute == (uid->attrib_data != NULL)
&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
if (sig->version < 4)
{
char *user =
utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
user);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (user);
}
else
{
/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced.
We can just ignore v3 signatures because they are
not able to carry the primary ID flag. We also
ignore self-sigs on user IDs that are not of the
same type that we are making primary. That is, if
we are making a user ID primary, we alter user IDs.
If we are making an attribute packet primary, we
alter attribute packets. */
/* FIXME: We must make sure that we only have one
self-signature per user ID here (not counting
revocations) */
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
const byte *p;
int action;
/* See whether this signature has the primary UID flag. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,
SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
if (!p)
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed,
SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
if (p && *p) /* yes */
action = selected ? 0 : -1;
else /* no */
action = selected ? 1 : 0;
if (action)
{
int rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
main_pk, uid, NULL,
main_pk,
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
change_primary_uid_cb,
action > 0 ? "x" : NULL);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet (node->pkt);
xfree (node->pkt);
node->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
}
}
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return modified;
}
/*
* Set preferences to new values for the selected user IDs
*/
static int
menu_set_preferences (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
int selected, select_all;
int modified = 0;
no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);
select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);
/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
main_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
selected = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break; /* No more user-ids expected - ready. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
}
else if (main_pk && uid && selected
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
if (sig->version < 4)
{
char *user =
utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
user);
xfree (user);
}
else
{
/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
* We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
* not able to carry the preferences. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
int rc;
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
main_pk, uid, NULL, main_pk,
keygen_upd_std_prefs, NULL);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (rc)
{
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet (node->pkt);
xfree (node->pkt);
node->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
}
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return modified;
}
static int
menu_set_keyserver_url (const char *url, KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
int selected, select_all;
int modified = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
char *answer, *uri;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);
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if (url)
answer = xstrdup (url);
else
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
answer = cpr_get_utf8 ("keyedit.add_keyserver",
_("Enter your preferred keyserver URL: "));
if (answer[0] == '\0' || answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (answer);
return 0;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "none") == 0)
uri = NULL;
else
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
struct keyserver_spec *keyserver = NULL;
/* Sanity check the format */
keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (answer, 1);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (answer);
if (!keyserver)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
log_info (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
return 0;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
uri = xstrdup (keyserver->uri);
free_keyserver_spec (keyserver);
}
select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);
/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
main_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
selected = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break; /* ready */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (main_pk && uid && selected
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
if (sig->version < 4)
log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
user);
else
{
/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced
* We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
* not able to carry the subpacket. */
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
int rc;
const byte *p;
size_t plen;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &plen);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (p && plen)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("Current preferred keyserver for user"
" ID \"%s\": ", user);
tty_print_utf8_string (p, plen);
tty_printf ("\n");
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.confirm_keyserver",
uri
? _("Are you sure you want to replace it? (y/N) ")
: _("Are you sure you want to delete it? (y/N) ")))
continue;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (uri == NULL)
{
/* There is no current keyserver URL, so there
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
is no point in trying to un-set it. */
continue;
}
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
main_pk, uid, NULL,
main_pk,
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
keygen_add_keyserver_url, uri);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (uri);
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
free_packet (node->pkt);
xfree (node->pkt);
node->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (user);
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (uri);
return modified;
}
static int
menu_set_notation (const char *string, KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
int selected, select_all;
int modified = 0;
char *answer;
struct notation *notation;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (string)
answer = xstrdup (string);
else
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
answer = cpr_get_utf8 ("keyedit.add_notation",
_("Enter the notation: "));
if (answer[0] == '\0' || answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (answer);
return 0;
}
}
if (!ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "none")
|| !ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "-"))
notation = NULL; /* Delete them all. */
else
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
notation = string_to_notation (answer, 0);
if (!notation)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (answer);
return 0;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (answer);
select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);
/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
main_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
selected = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break; /* ready */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (main_pk && uid && selected
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
if (sig->version < 4)
log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
user);
else
{
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int rc, skip = 0, addonly = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (sig->flags.notation)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("Current notations for user ID \"%s\":\n",
user);
tty_print_notations (-9, sig);
}
else
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("No notations on user ID \"%s\"\n", user);
if (notation == NULL)
{
/* There are no current notations, so there
is no point in trying to un-set them. */
continue;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (notation)
{
struct notation *n;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int deleting = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
notation->next = sig_to_notation (sig);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (n = notation->next; n; n = n->next)
if (strcmp (n->name, notation->name) == 0)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (notation->value)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (strcmp (n->value, notation->value) == 0)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (notation->flags.ignore)
{
/* Value match with a delete
flag. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
n->flags.ignore = 1;
deleting = 1;
}
else
{
/* Adding the same notation
twice, so don't add it at
all. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
skip = 1;
tty_printf ("Skipping notation:"
" %s=%s\n",
notation->name,
notation->value);
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/* No value, so it means delete. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
n->flags.ignore = 1;
deleting = 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (n->flags.ignore)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("Removing notation: %s=%s\n",
n->name, n->value);
addonly = 0;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!notation->flags.ignore && !skip)
tty_printf ("Adding notation: %s=%s\n",
notation->name, notation->value);
/* We tried to delete, but had no matches. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (notation->flags.ignore && !deleting)
continue;
}
else
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("Removing all notations\n");
addonly = 0;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (skip
|| (!addonly
&&
!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.confirm_notation",
_("Proceed? (y/N) "))))
continue;
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
main_pk, uid, NULL,
main_pk,
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
keygen_add_notations, notation);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
free_notation (notation);
xfree (user);
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
free_packet (node->pkt);
xfree (node->pkt);
node->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (notation)
{
/* Snip off the notation list from the sig */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
free_notation (notation->next);
notation->next = NULL;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
xfree (user);
}
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
free_notation (notation);
return modified;
}
/*
* Select one user id or remove all selection if IDX is 0 or select
* all if IDX is -1. Returns: True if the selection changed.
*/
static int
menu_select_uid (KBNODE keyblock, int idx)
{
KBNODE node;
int i;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (idx == -1) /* Select all. */
{
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
return 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (idx) /* Toggle. */
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
if (++i == idx)
break;
}
if (!node)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_printf (_("No user ID with index %d\n"), idx);
return 0;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
if (++i == idx)
{
if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
else
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
}
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else /* Unselect all */
{
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return 1;
}
/* Search in the keyblock for a uid that matches namehash */
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
menu_select_uid_namehash (KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash)
{
byte hash[NAMEHASH_LEN];
KBNODE node;
int i;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
assert (strlen (namehash) == NAMEHASH_LEN * 2);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < NAMEHASH_LEN; i++)
hash[i] = hextobyte (&namehash[i * 2]);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = keyblock->next; node; node = node->next)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
namehash_from_uid (node->pkt->pkt.user_id);
if (memcmp (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->namehash, hash, NAMEHASH_LEN) ==
0)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
else
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
break;
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!node)
{
tty_printf (_("No user ID with hash %s\n"), namehash);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Select secondary keys
* Returns: True if the selection changed.
*/
static int
menu_select_key (KBNODE keyblock, int idx)
{
KBNODE node;
int i;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (idx == -1) /* Select all. */
{
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (idx) /* Toggle selection. */
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
if (++i == idx)
break;
}
if (!node)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_printf (_("No subkey with index %d\n"), idx);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
if (++i == idx)
{
if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
else
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY;
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else /* Unselect all. */
{
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
}
return 1;
}
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
count_uids_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
KBNODE node;
int i = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & flag))
i++;
return i;
}
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
count_keys_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
KBNODE node;
int i = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) && (node->flag & flag))
i++;
return i;
}
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
count_uids (KBNODE keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
KBNODE node;
int i = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
i++;
return i;
}
/*
* Returns true if there is at least one selected user id
*/
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
count_selected_uids (KBNODE keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return count_uids_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_SELUID);
}
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
count_selected_keys (KBNODE keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return count_keys_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_SELKEY);
}
/* Returns how many real (i.e. not attribute) uids are unmarked. */
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
real_uids_left (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int real = 0;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) &&
!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
real++;
return real;
}
/*
* Ask whether the signature should be revoked. If the user commits this,
* flag bit MARK_A is set on the signature and the user ID.
*/
static void
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
ask_revoke_sig (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int doit = 0;
PKT_user_id *uid;
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode (keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID);
if (!unode)
{
log_error ("Oops: no user ID for signature\n");
return;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
uid = unode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (opt.with_colons)
{
if (uid->attrib_data)
printf ("uat:::::::::%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len);
else
{
es_printf ("uid:::::::::");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL);
}
es_printf ("\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
print_and_check_one_sig_colon (keyblock, node, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
1);
}
else
{
char *p = utf8_to_native (unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
tty_printf (_("user ID: \"%s\"\n"), p);
xfree (p);
tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig),
sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"), "");
}
if (sig->flags.expired)
{
tty_printf (_("This signature expired on %s.\n"),
expirestr_from_sig (sig));
/* Use a different question so we can have different help text */
doit = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("ask_revoke_sig.expired",
_("Are you sure you still want to revoke it? (y/N) "));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
}
else
doit = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("ask_revoke_sig.one",
_("Create a revocation certificate for this signature? (y/N) "));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (doit)
{
node->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
unode->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
}
}
/*
* Display all user ids of the current public key together with signatures
* done by one of our keys. Then walk over all this sigs and ask the user
* whether he wants to revoke this signature.
* Return: True when the keyblock has changed.
*/
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
menu_revsig (KBNODE keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_signature *sig;
PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
KBNODE node;
int changed = 0;
int rc, any, skip = 1, all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
/* First check whether we have any signatures at all. */
any = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG | NODFLG_MARK_A);
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID || all)
skip = 0;
else
skip = 1;
2009-08-26 06:46:02 +00:00
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (!skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature),
have_secret_key_with_kid (sig->keyid)))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
{
any = 1;
break;
}
}
}
2009-08-26 06:46:02 +00:00
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!any)
{
tty_printf (_("Not signed by you.\n"));
return 0;
}
/* FIXME: detect duplicates here */
tty_printf (_("You have signed these user IDs on key %s:\n"),
keystr_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key));
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG | NODFLG_MARK_A);
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID || all)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
/* Hmmm: Should we show only UIDs with a signature? */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (" ");
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
tty_printf ("\n");
skip = 0;
}
else
skip = 1;
}
else if (!skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature),
have_secret_key_with_kid (sig->keyid)))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
{
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig),
sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"),
sig->flags.revocable ? "" : _(" (non-revocable)"));
if (sig->flags.revocable)
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELSIG;
}
else if (sig->sig_class == 0x30)
{
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("revoked by your key %s on %s\n"),
keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig));
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf ("\n");
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* ask */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_SELSIG))
continue;
ask_revoke_sig (keyblock, node);
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* present selected */
any = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
continue;
if (!any)
{
any = 1;
tty_printf (_("You are about to revoke these signatures:\n"));
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
tty_printf (" ");
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
tty_printf ("\n");
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig), "",
sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"));
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!any)
return 0; /* none selected */
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("ask_revoke_sig.okay",
_("Really create the revocation certificates? (y/N) ")))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
return 0; /* forget it */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
reason = ask_revocation_reason (0, 1, 0);
if (!reason)
{ /* user decided to cancel */
return 0;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* now we can sign the user ids */
reloop: /* (must use this, because we are modifing the list) */
primary_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
KBNODE unode;
PACKET *pkt;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
PKT_public_key *signerkey;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)
|| node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
continue;
unode = find_prev_kbnode (keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID);
assert (unode); /* we already checked this */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
attrib.reason = reason;
attrib.non_exportable = !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
signerkey = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *signerkey);
if (get_seckey (signerkey, node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid))
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
log_info (_("no secret key\n"));
free_public_key (signerkey);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
continue;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
unode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
NULL, signerkey, 0x30, 0, 0, 0,
2010-09-01 12:49:05 +00:00
sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL);
free_public_key (signerkey);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
update_trust = 1;
/* Are we revoking our own uid? */
if (primary_pk->keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] &&
primary_pk->keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked = 1;
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode (unode, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
goto reloop;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
/* Revoke a user ID (i.e. revoke a user ID selfsig). Return true if
keyblock changed. */
static int
menu_revuid (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
KBNODE node;
int changed = 0;
int rc;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
/* Note that this is correct as per the RFCs, but nevertheless
somewhat meaningless in the real world. 1991 did define the 0x30
sig class, but PGP 2.x did not actually implement it, so it would
probably be safe to use v4 revocations everywhere. -ds */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (pk->version > 3 || (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->selfsigversion > 3))
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if ((reason = ask_revocation_reason (0, 1, 4)))
break;
else
goto leave;
}
reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifing the keyring) */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uid->is_revoked)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, uid->len, 0);
log_info (_("user ID \"%s\" is already revoked\n"), user);
xfree (user);
}
else
{
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
u32 timestamp = make_timestamp ();
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uid->created >= timestamp)
{
/* Okay, this is a problem. The user ID selfsig was
created in the future, so we need to warn the user and
set our revocation timestamp one second after that so
everything comes out clean. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
log_info (_("WARNING: a user ID signature is dated %d"
" seconds in the future\n"),
uid->created - timestamp);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
timestamp = uid->created + 1;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
attrib.reason = reason;
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x30, 0,
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
timestamp, 0,
2010-09-01 12:49:05 +00:00
sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
else
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
/* If the trustdb has an entry for this key+uid then the
trustdb needs an update. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!update_trust
&& (get_validity (pk, uid) & TRUST_MASK) >=
TRUST_UNDEFINED)
update_trust = 1;
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
changed = 1;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked = 1;
goto reloop;
}
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (changed)
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
leave:
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
/*
* Revoke the whole key.
*/
static int
menu_revkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
int rc, changed = 0;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
if (pk->flags.revoked)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("Key %s is already revoked.\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk));
return 0;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 0);
/* user decided to cancel */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (!reason)
return 0;
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk,
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
0x20, 0, 0, 0,
2010-09-01 12:49:05 +00:00
revocation_reason_build_cb, reason, NULL);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
goto scram;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
insert_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
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update_trust = 1;
scram:
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release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
static int
menu_revsubkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_public_key *mainpk;
KBNODE node;
int changed = 0;
int rc;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 0);
if (!reason)
return 0; /* User decided to cancel. */
reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifing the keyring) */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
mainpk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
{
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
PKT_public_key *subpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
if (subpk->flags.revoked)
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
{
tty_printf (_("Subkey %s is already revoked.\n"),
keystr_from_pk (subpk));
continue;
}
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memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
attrib.reason = reason;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, mainpk, NULL, subpk, mainpk,
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
0x28, 0, 0, 0, sign_mk_attrib, &attrib,
2010-09-01 12:49:05 +00:00
NULL);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
goto reloop;
}
}
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
/* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys no longer
are used to certify other keys, so there is no change in trust
when revoking/removing them */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
/* Note that update_ownertrust is going to mark the trustdb dirty when
enabling or disabling a key. This is arguably sub-optimal as
disabled keys are still counted in the web of trust, but perhaps
not worth adding extra complexity to change. -ds */
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
static int
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
enable_disable_key (KBNODE keyblock, int disable)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
PKT_public_key *pk =
find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.public_key;
unsigned int trust, newtrust;
trust = newtrust = get_ownertrust (pk);
newtrust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
if (disable)
newtrust |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
if (trust == newtrust)
return 0; /* already in that state */
update_ownertrust (pk, newtrust);
return 0;
}
gpg: Allow building without any trust model support. * configure.ac: Add option --disable-trust-models (NO_TRUST_MODELS): New ac_define and am_conditional. * g10/Makefile.am (trust_source): New. (gpg2_SOURCES): Factor some files out to above. Add trust.c. * g10/gpg.c [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Disable options --export-ownertrust, --import-ownertrust, --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb, --fix-trustdb, --list-trustdb, --trustdb-name, --auto-check-trustdb, --no-auto-check-trustdb, and --force-ownertrust. (parse_trust_model) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not build. (main) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Set trust_model to always and exclude all trustdb related option code. * g10/keyedit.c (cmds) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Remove menu items "trust", "enable", and "disable". * g10/keylist.c (public_key_list) [NO_TRUST_MODELS]: Do not print "tru" record. * g10/trust.c: New. * g10/trustdb.c (struct key_item): Move to trustdb.h. (register_trusted_keyid): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_keyid. (register_trusted_key): Rename to tdb_register_trusted_key. (trust_letter, uid_trust_string_fixed, trust_value_to_string) (string_to_trust_value, get_ownertrust_with_min, get_ownertrust_info) (get_ownertrust_string, get_validity_info, get_validity_string) (clean_sigs_from_uid, clean_uid_from_key, clean_key): Move to trust.c. (mark_usable_uid_certs): Move to trust.c and make global. (is_in_klist): Move as inline to trustdb.h. (trustdb_check_or_update): Rename to tdb_check_or_update (revalidation_mark): Rename to tdb_revalidation_mark. (get_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_ownertrust. (get_min_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_get_min_ownertrust. (update_ownertrust): Rename to tdb_update_ownertrust. (clear_ownertrusts): Rename to tdb_clear_ownertrusts. (cache_disabled_value): Rename to tdb_cache_disabled_value. (check_trustdb_stale): Rename to tdb_check_trustdb_stale. (get_validity): Rename to tdb_get_validity_core, add arg MAIN_PK and factor some code out to ... * trust.c (get_validity): ...new. (check_or_update_trustdb): New wrapper. (revalidation_mark): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust): New wrapper. (get_ownertrust_with_min): New wrapper. (update_ownertrust): New wrapper. (clear_ownertrusts): New wrapper. (cache_disabled_value): New wrapper. (check_trustdb_stale): New wrapper. * tests/openpgp/defs.inc (opt_always): New. Use in all tests instead of --always-trust.
2014-02-10 17:05:54 +01:00
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
static void
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
menu_showphoto (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
int select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);
int count = 0;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
/* Look for the public key first. We have to be really, really,
explicit as to which photo this is, and what key it is a UID on
since people may want to sign it. */
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
count++;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if ((select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)) &&
uid->attribs != NULL)
{
int i;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < uid->numattribs; i++)
{
byte type;
u32 size;
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
if (uid->attribs[i].type == ATTRIB_IMAGE &&
parse_image_header (&uid->attribs[i], &type, &size))
{
2010-04-20 18:19:19 +00:00
tty_printf (_("Displaying %s photo ID of size %ld for "
"key %s (uid %d)\n"),
image_type_to_string (type, 1),
(ulong) size, keystr_from_pk (pk), count);
show_photos (&uid->attribs[i], 1, pk, uid);
}
}
}
}
}
}