gnupg/doc/faq.raw

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[$sfaqheader=The GnuPG FAQ says:]
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[H body bgcolor=#ffffff text=#000000 link=#1f00ff alink=#ff0000 vlink=#9900dd]
[H H1]GnuPG Frequently Asked Questions[H /H1]


[H p]
Version: 1.5.8[H br]
Last-Modified: Oct 8, 2002[H br]
Maintained-by: [$maintainer]
[H /p]


This is the GnuPG FAQ. The latest HTML version is available
[H a href=[$hGPG]/faq.html]here[H/a].

The index is generated automatically, so there may be errors. Not all
questions may be in the section they belong to. Suggestions about how
to improve the structure of this FAQ are welcome.

Please send additions and corrections to the maintainer. It would be
most convenient if you could provide the answer to be included here
as well. Your help is very much appreciated!

Please, don't send message like "This should be a FAQ - what's the
answer?". If it hasn't been asked before, it isn't a FAQ. In that case
you could search in the mailing list archive.

[H HR]
<C>
[H HR]


<S> GENERAL

<Q> What is GnuPG?

    [H a href=[$hGPG]]GnuPG[H /a] stands for GNU Privacy Guard and
    is GNU's tool for secure communication and data storage. It can be
    used to encrypt data and to create digital signatures. It includes
    an advanced key management facility and is compliant with the
    proposed OpenPGP Internet standard as described in [H a href=http://www.gnupg.org/rfc2440.html]RFC 2440[H/a].
    As such, it is aimed to be compatible with PGP from NAI, Inc.

<Q> Is GnuPG compatible with PGP?

    In general, yes. GnuPG and newer PGP releases should be implementing
    the OpenPGP standard. But there are some interoperability problems.
    See question <Rcompat> for details.

<Q> Is GnuPG free to use for personal or commercial use?

    Yes. GnuPG is part of the GNU family of tools and applications built
    and provided in accordance with the Free Software Foundation (FSF)
    General Public License (GPL). Therefore the software is free to copy,
    use, modify and distribute in accordance with that license. Please
    read the file titled COPYING that accompanies the application for
    more information.


<S> SOURCES of INFORMATION

<Q> Where can I find more information on GnuPG?

    On-line resources:

    [H UL] 
    [H LI]The documentation page is located at [H a href=[$hGPG]/docs.html]<[$hGPG]/docs.html>[H/a].
    Also, have a look at the HOWTOs and the GNU Privacy Handbook (GPH,
    available in English, Spanish and Russian). The latter provides a
    detailed user's guide to GnuPG. You'll also find a document about
    how to convert from PGP 2.x to GnuPG.

    [H LI]At [H a href=http://lists.gnupg.org]<http://lists.gnupg.org>[H/a] you'll find an online archive of the
    GnuPG mailing lists. Most interesting should be gnupg-users for all
    user-related issues and gnupg-devel if you want to get in touch with
    the developers.

    In addition, searchable archives can be found on MARC, e.g.: [H br]
    gnupg-users: [H a href=http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gnupg-users&r=1&w=2]<http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gnupg-users&r=1&w=2>[H/a],[H br]
    gnupg-devel: [H a href=http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gnupg-devel&r=1&w=2]<http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gnupg-devel&r=1&w=2>[H/a].[H br]

    [H B]PLEASE:[H/B]
    Before posting to a list, read this FAQ and the available
    documentation. In addition, search the list archive - maybe your
    question has already been discussed. This way you help people focus
    on topics that have not yet been resolved.

    [H LI]The GnuPG source distribution contains a subdirectory:

    [H PRE]
       ./doc
    [H /PRE]

    where some additional documentation is located (mainly interesting
    for hackers, not the casual user).
    [H /UL]

<Q> Where do I get GnuPG?

    You can download the GNU Privacy Guard from its primary FTP server
    [H a href=ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/pub/gcrypt]<ftp.gnupg.org>[H /a] or from one of the mirrors:

    [H a href=[$hGPG]/mirrors.html]
       <[$hGPG]/mirror.html>
    [H /a]

    The current stable version is 1.2.x. Please upgrade to this version as
    it includes additional features, functions and security fixes that may
    not have existed in prior versions.


<S> INSTALLATION 

<Q> Which OSes does GnuPG run on?

    It should run on most Unices as well as Windows versions (including
    Windows NT/2000) and Macintosh OS/X. A list of OSes reported to be OK
    is presented at:

    [H a href=http://www.gnupg.org/backend.html#supsys]
       <http://www.gnupg.org/gnupg.html#supsys>
    [H /a]

<Q> Which random data gatherer should I use?

    "Good" random numbers are crucial for the security of your encryption.
    Different operating systems provide a variety of more or less quality
    random data. Linux and *BSD provide kernel generated random data
    through /dev/random - this should be the preferred choice on these
    systems. Also Solaris users with the SUNWski package installed have
    a /dev/random. In these cases, use the configure option:

    [H pre]
       --enable-static-rnd=linux
    [H/pre]

    In addition, there's also the kernel random device by Andi Maier
    [H a href= http://www.cosy.sbg.ac.at/~andi/]<http://www.cosy.sbg.ac.at/~andi/>[H /a], but it's still beta. Use at your
    own risk!

    On other systems, the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is a good choice.
    It is a perl-daemon that monitors system activity and hashes it into
    random data. See the download page [H a href=http://www.gnupg.org/download.html]<http://www.gnupg.org/download.html>[H /a]
    to obtain EGD. Use:

    [H pre]
       --enable-static-rnd=egd
    [H/pre]

    here.

    If the above options do not work, you can use the random number
    generator "unix". This is [H B]very[H /B] slow and should be avoided. The
    random quality isn't very good so don't use it on sensitive data.

<Didea>
<Q> How do I include support for RSA and IDEA?

    RSA is included as of GnuPG version 1.0.3.

    The official GnuPG distribution does not contain IDEA due to a patent
    restriction. The patent does not expire before 2007 so don't expect
    official support before then.

    However, there is an unofficial module to include it even in earlier
    versions of GnuPG. It's available from
    [H a href=ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/pub/gcrypt/contrib/]<ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/pub/gcrypt/contrib/>[H /a]. Look for:

    [H pre]
       idea.c
    [H /pre]

    Compilation directives are in the headers of these files. You will
    then need to add the following line to your ~/.gnupg/options file:

    [H pre]
       load-extension idea
    [H /pre]


<S> USAGE

<Q> What is the recommended key size?

    1024 bit for DSA signatures; even for plain ElGamal signatures.
    This is sufficient as the size of the hash is probably the weakest
    link if the key size is larger than 1024 bits. Encryption keys may
    have greater sizes, but you should then check the fingerprint of
    this key:

    [H pre]
       gpg --fingerprint <user ID>
    [H /pre]

    As for the key algorithms, you should stick with the default (i.e.,
    DSA signature and ElGamal encryption). An ElGamal signing key has
    the following disadvantages: the signature is larger, it is hard
    to create such a key useful for signatures which can withstand some
    real world attacks, you don't get any extra security compared to
    DSA, and there might be compatibility problems with certain PGP
    versions. It has only been introduced because at the time it was
    not clear whether there was a patent on DSA.

<Q> Why does it sometimes take so long to create keys?

    The problem here is that we need a lot of random bytes and for that
    we (on Linux the /dev/random device) must collect some random data.
    It is really not easy to fill the Linux internal entropy buffer; I
    talked to Ted Ts'o and he commented that the best way to fill the
    buffer is to play with your keyboard. Good security has its price.
    What I do is to hit several times on the shift, control, alternate,
    and caps lock keys, because these keys do not produce output to the
    screen. This way you get your keys really fast (it's the same thing
    PGP2 does).

    Another problem might be another program which eats up your random
    bytes (a program (look at your daemons) that reads from /dev/random).

<Q> And it really takes long when I work on a remote system. Why?

    Don't do this at all! You should never create keys or even use GnuPG
    on a remote system because you normally have no physical control
    over your secret key ring (which is in most cases vulnerable to
    advanced dictionary attacks) - I strongly encourage everyone to only
    create keys on a local computer (a disconnected laptop is probably
    the best choice) and if you need it on your connected box (I know,
    we all do this) be sure to have a strong password for both your
    account and for your secret key, and that you can trust your system
    administrator.

    When I check GnuPG on a remote system via ssh (I have no Alpha here)
    ;-) I have the same problem. It takes a *very* long time to create
    the keys, so I use a special option, --quick-random, to generate
    insecure keys which are only good for some tests.

<Q> What is the difference between options and commands?

    If you do a 'gpg --help', you will get two separate lists. The first
    is a list of commands. The second is a list of options. Whenever you
    run GPG, you [H B]must[H /B] pick exactly one command (with one exception,
    see below). You [H B]may[H /B] pick one or more options. The command should,
    just by convention, come at the end of the argument list, after all
    the options. If the command takes a file (all the basic ones do),
    the filename comes at the very end. So the basic way to run gpg is:

    [H pre]
       gpg [--option something] [--option2] [--option3 something] --command file
    [H/pre]

    Some options take arguments. For example, the --output option (which
    can be abbreviated as -o) is an option that takes a filename. The
    option's argument must follow immediately after the option itself,
    otherwise gpg doesn't know which option the argument is supposed to
    paired with. As an option, --output and its filename must come before
    the command. The --recipient (-r) option takes a name or keyID to
    encrypt the message to, which must come right after the -r argument.
    The --encrypt (or -e) command comes after all the options and is
    followed by the file you wish to encrypt. Therefore in this example
    the command-line issued would be:

    [H pre]
       gpg -r alice -o secret.txt -e test.txt
    [H/pre]

    If you write the options out in full, it is easier to read:

    [H pre]
       gpg --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt
    [H/pre]

    If you're encrypting to a file with the extension ".txt", then you'd
    probably expect to see ASCII-armored text in the file (not binary),
    so you need to add the --armor (-a) option, which doesn't take any
    arguments:

    [H pre]
       gpg --armor --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt
    [H/pre]

    If you imagine square brackets around the optional parts, it becomes
    a bit clearer:

    [H pre]
       gpg [--armor] [--recipient alice] [--output secret.txt] --encrypt test.txt
    [H/pre]

    The optional parts can be rearranged any way you want:

    [H pre]
       gpg --output secret.txt --recipient alice --armor --encrypt test.txt
    [H/pre]

    If your filename begins with a hyphen (e.g. "-a.txt"), GnuPG assumes
    this is an option and may complain. To avoid this you have to either
    use "./-a.txt", or stop the option and command processing with two
    hyphens: "-- -a.txt".

    [H B]The exception to using only one command:[H /B] signing and encrypting
    at the same time. For this you can combine both commands, such as in:

    [H pre]
       gpg [--options] --sign --encrypt foo.txt
    [H/pre]

<Q> I can't delete a user ID on my secret keyring because it has
    already been deleted on my public keyring. What can I do?

    Because you can only select from the public key ring, there is no
    direct way to do this. However it is not very complicated to do
    anyway. Create a new user ID with exactly the same name and you
    will see that there are now two identical user IDs on the secret
    ring. Now select this user ID and delete it. Both user IDs will be
    removed from the secret ring.

<Q> I can't delete my secret key because the public key disappeared.
    What can I do?

    To select a key a search is always done on the public keyring,
    therefore it is not possible to select a secret key without
    having the public key. Normally it shoud never happen that the
    public key got lost but the secret key is still available. The
    reality is different, so GnuPG implements a special way to deal
    with it: Simply use the long keyID to specify the key to delete,
    which can be obtained by using the --with-colons options (it is
    the fifth field in the lines beginning with "sec").

<Q> What are trust, validity and ownertrust?

    With GnuPG, the term "ownertrust" is used instead of "trust" to
    help clarify that this is the value you have assigned to a key
    to express how much you trust the owner of this key to correctly
    sign (and thereby introduce) other keys. The "validity", or
    calculated trust, is a value which indicates how much GnuPG
    considers a key as being valid (that it really belongs to the
    one who claims to be the owner of the key). For more information
    on trust values see the chapter "The Web of Trust" in The GNU
    Privacy Handbook.

<Q> How do I sign a patch file?

    Use "gpg --clearsign --not-dash-escaped ...". The problem with
    --clearsign is that all lines starting with a dash are quoted with
    "- "; obviously diff produces many lines starting with a dash and
    these are then quoted and that is not good for a patch ;-). To use
    a patch file without removing the cleartext signature, the special
    option --not-dash-escaped may be used to suppress generation of
    these escape sequences. You should not mail such a patch because
    spaces and line endings are also subject to the signature and a
    mailer may not preserve these. If you want to mail a file you can
    simply sign it using your MUA (Mail User Agent).

<Q> Where is the "encrypt-to-self" option?

    Use "--encrypt-to your_keyID". You can use more than one of these
    options. To temporarily override the use of this additional key,
    you can use the option "--no-encrypt-to".

<Q> How can I get rid of the Version and Comment headers in armored
    messages?

    Use "--no-version --comment ''". Note that the left over blank line
    is required by the protocol.

<Q> What does the "You are using the xxxx character set." mean?

    This note is printed when UTF-8 mapping has to be done. Make sure
    that the displayed character set is the one you have activated on
    your system. Since "iso-8859-1" is the character set most used,
    this is the default. You can change the charset with the option
    "--charset". It is important that your active character set matches
    the one displayed - if not, restrict yourself to plain 7 bit ASCII
    and no mapping has to be done.

<Q> How can a get list of key IDs used to encrypt a message?

    [H pre]
       gpg --batch --decrypt --list-only --status-fd 1 2>/dev/null | \
         awk '/^\[GNUPG:\] ENC_TO / { print $3 }'
    [H /pre]

<Q> I can't decrypt my symmetrical-only (-c) encrypted messages with
    a new version of GnuPG.

    There was a bug in GnuPG versions prior to 1.0.1 which affected
    messages only if 3DES or Twofish was used for symmetric-only
    encryption (this has never been the default). The bug has been
    fixed, but to enable decryption of old messages you should run gpg
    with the option "--emulate-3des-s2k-bug", decrypt the message and
    encrypt it again without this option. The option will be removed
    in version 1.1 when released, so please re-encrypt any affected
    messages now.

<Q> How can I use GnuPG in an automated environment?

    You should use the option --batch and don't use passphrases as
    there is usually no way to store it more securely than on the
    secret keyring itself. The suggested way to create keys for an
    automated environment is:

    On a secure machine:
    [H OL]
    [H LI] If you want to do automatic signing, create a signing subkey
           for your key (use the interactive key editing menu by issueing
           the command 'gpg --edit-key keyID', enter "addkey" and select
           the DSA key type).
    [H LI] Make sure that you use a passphrase (needed by the current
           implementation).
    [H LI] gpg --export-secret-subkeys --no-comment foo >secring.auto
    [H LI] Copy secring.auto and the public keyring to a test directory.
    [H LI] Change to this directory.
    [H LI] gpg --homedir . --edit foo and use "passwd" to remove the
           passphrase from the subkeys. You may also want to remove all
           unused subkeys.
    [H LI] Copy secring.auto to a floppy and carry it to the target box.
    [H /OL]

    On the target machine:
    [H OL]
    [H LI] Install secring.auto as the secret keyring.
    [H LI] Now you can start your new service. It's also a good idea to
           install an intrusion detection system so that you hopefully
           get a notice of an successful intrusion, so that you in turn
           can revoke all the subkeys installed on that machine and
           install new subkeys.
    [H /OL]

<Q> Which email-client can I use with GnuPG?

    Using GnuPG to encrypt email is one of the most popular uses.
    Several mail clients or mail user agents (MUAs) support GnuPG to
    varying degrees. Simplifying a bit, there are two ways mail can be
    encrypted with GnuPG: the "old style" ASCII armor (i.e. cleartext
    encryption), and RFC 2015 style (previously PGP/MIME, now OpenPGP).
    The latter has full MIME support. Some MUAs support only one of
    them, so whichever you actually use depends on your needs as well
    as the capabilities of your addressee. As well, support may be
    native to the MUA, or provided via "plug-ins" or external tools.

    The following list is not exhaustive:

    [H pre]
       MUA            OpenPGP  ASCII    How? (N,P,T)
       ---------------------------------------------------------------
       Calypso           N       Y       P (Unixmail)
       Elm               N       Y       T (mailpgp,morepgp)
       Elm ME+           N       Y       N
       Emacs/Gnus        Y       Y       T (Mailcrypt,gpg.el)
       Emacs/Mew         Y       Y       N
       Emacs/VM          N       Y       T (Mailcrypt)
       Evolution         Y       Y       N
       Exmh              Y       Y       N
       GNUMail.app       Y       Y       P (PGPBundle)
       GPGMail           Y       Y       N
       KMail (<=1.4.x)   N       Y       N
       KMail (1.5.x)     Y(P)    Y(N)    P/N
       Mozilla           Y       Y       P (Enigmail)
       Mulberry          Y       Y       P
       Mutt              Y       Y       N
       Sylpheed          Y       Y       N
       Sylpheed-claws    Y       Y       N
       TkRat             Y       Y       N
       XEmacs/Gnus       Y       Y       T (Mailcrypt)
       XEmacs/Mew        Y       Y       N
       XEmacs/VM         N       Y       T (Mailcrypt)
       XFmail            Y       Y       N

       N - Native, P - Plug-in, T - External Tool
    [H /pre]

    The following table lists proprietary MUAs. The GNU Project
    suggests against the use of these programs, but they are listed
    for interoperability reasons for your convenience.

    [H pre]
       MUA            OpenPGP  ASCII    How? (N,P,T)
       ---------------------------------------------------------------
       Apple Mail        Y       Y       P (GPGMail)
       Becky2            Y       Y       P (BkGnuPG)
       Eudora            Y       Y       P (EuroraGPG)
       Eudora Pro        Y       Y       P (EudoraGPG)
       Lotus Notes       N       Y       P
       Netscape 4.x      N       Y       P
       Netscape 7.x      Y       Y       P (Enigmail)
       Novell Groupwise  N       Y       P
       Outlook           N       Y       P (G-Data)
       Outlook Express   N       Y       P (GPGOE)
       Pegasus           N       Y       P (QDPGP,PM-PGP)
       Pine              N       Y       T (pgpenvelope,(gpg|pgp)4pine)
       Postme            N       Y       P (GPGPPL)
       The Bat!          N       Y       P (Ritlabs)
    [H /pre]

    Good overviews of OpenPGP-support can be found at:[H br]
    [H a href=http://cryptorights.org/pgp-users/resources/pgp-mail-clients.html]<http://cryptorights.org/pgp-users/resources/pgp-mail-clients.html>[H /a],[H br]
    [H a href=http://www.geocities.com/openpgp/courrier_en.html]<http://www.geocities.com/openpgp/courrier_en.html>[H /a] and[H br]
    [H a href=http://www.bretschneidernet.de/tips/secmua.html]<http://www.bretschneidernet.de/tips/secmua.html>[H /a].

<Q> Can't we have a gpg library?

    This has been frequently requested. However, the current viewpoint
    of the GnuPG maintainers is that this would lead to several security
    issues and will therefore not be implemented in the foreseeable
    future. However, for some areas of application gpgme could do the
    trick. You'll find it at [H a href=ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gpgme]<ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/gpgme>[H /a].

<Q> I have successfully generated a revocation certificate, but I don't
    understand how to send it to the key servers.

    Most keyservers don't accept a 'bare' revocation certificate. You
    have to import the certificate into gpg first:

    [H pre]
       gpg --import my-revocation.asc
    [H /pre]

    then send the revoked key to the keyservers:

    [H pre]
       gpg --keyserver certserver.pgp.com --send-keys mykeyid
    [H /pre]

    (or use a keyserver web interface for this).

<Q> How do I put my keyring in a different directory?

    GnuPG keeps several files in a special homedir directory. These
    include the options file, pubring.gpg, secring.gpg, trustdb.gpg,
    and others. GnuPG will always create and use these files. On unices,
    the homedir is usually ~/.gnupg; on Windows "C:\gnupg\".

    If you want to put your keyrings somewhere else, use:

    [H pre]
       --homedir /my/path/
    [H /pre]

    to make GnuPG create all its files in that directory. Your keyring
    will be "/my/path/pubring.gpg". This way you can store your secrets
    on a floppy disk. Don't use "--keyring" as its purpose is to specify
    additional keyring files.


<S> COMPATIBILITY ISSUES

<Dcompat>
<Q> How can I encrypt a message with GnuPG so that PGP is able to decrypt it?

    It depends on the PGP version.

    [H UL]
    [H LI]PGP 2.x[H br]
    You can't do that because PGP 2.x normally uses IDEA which is not
    supported by GnuPG as it is patented (see <Ridea>), but if you have a
    modified version of PGP you can try this:

    [H pre]
       gpg --rfc1991 --cipher-algo 3des ...
    [H/pre]

    Please don't pipe the data to encrypt to gpg but provide it using a
    filename; otherwise, PGP 2 will not be able to handle it.

    As for conventional encryption, you can't do this for PGP 2.

    [H LI]PGP 5.x and higher[H br]
    You need to provide two additional options:

    [H pre]
       --compress-algo 1 --cipher-algo cast5
    [H/pre]

    You may also use "3des" instead of "cast5", and "blowfish" does not
    work with all versions of PGP 5. You may also want to put:

    [H pre]
       compress-algo 1
    [H/pre]

    into your ~/.gnupg/options file - this does not affect normal GnuPG
    operation.

    This applies to conventional encryption as well.
    [H /UL]

<Q> How do I migrate from PGP 2.x to GnuPG?

    PGP 2 uses the RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms. Whereas the RSA
    patent has expired and RSA is included as of GnuPG 1.0.3, the IDEA
    algorithm is still patented until 2007. Under certain conditions you
    may use IDEA even today. In that case, you may refer to Question
    <Ridea> about how to add IDEA support to GnuPG and read
    [H a href=http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/pgp2x.html]<http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/pgp2x.html>[H /a] to perform the migration.

<Q> (removed)

    (empty)

<Q> Why is PGP 5.x not able to encrypt messages with some keys?

    PGP, Inc. refuses to accept ElGamal keys of type 20 even for
    encryption. They only support type 16 (which is identical at least
    for decryption). To be more inter-operable, GnuPG (starting with
    version 0.3.3) now also uses type 16 for the ElGamal subkey which is
    created if the default key algorithm is chosen. You may add a type
    16 ElGamal key to your public key, which is easy as your key
    signatures are still valid.

<Q> Why is PGP 5.x not able to verify my messages?

    PGP 5.x does not accept v4 signatures for data material but OpenPGP
    requests generation of v4 signatures for all kind of data, that's why
    GnuPG defaults to them. Use the option "--force-v3-sigs" to generate
    v3 signatures for data.

<Q> How do I transfer owner trust values from PGP to GnuPG?

    There is a script in the tools directory to help you. After you have
    imported the PGP keyring you can give this command:

    [H pre]
       $ lspgpot pgpkeyring | gpg --import-ownertrust
    [H /pre]

    where pgpkeyring is the original keyring and not the GnuPG keyring
    you might have created in the first step.

<Q> PGP does not like my secret key.

    Older PGPs probably bail out on some private comment packets used by
    GnuPG. These packets are fully in compliance with OpenPGP; however
    PGP is not really OpenPGP aware. A workaround is to export the
    secret keys with this command:

    [H pre]
       $ gpg --export-secret-keys --no-comment -a your-key-id
    [H /pre]

    Another possibility is this: by default, GnuPG encrypts your secret
    key using the Blowfish symmetric algorithm. Older PGPs will only
    understand 3DES, CAST5, or IDEA symmetric algorithms. Using the
    following method you can re-encrypt your secret gpg key with a
    different algo:

    [H pre]
       $ gpg --s2k-cipher-algo=CAST5 --s2k-digest-algo=SHA1 \
             --compress-algo=1  --edit-key <username>
    [H /pre]

    Then use passwd to change the password (just change it to the same
    thing, but it will encrypt the key with CAST5 this time).

    Now you can export it and PGP should be able to handle it.

    For PGP 6.x the following options work to export a key:

    [H pre]
       $ gpg --s2k-cipher-algo 3des --compress-algo 1 --rfc1991 \
             --export-secret-keys <key-ID>
    [H /pre]

<Q> I just installed the most recent version of GnuPG and don't have a
    ~/.gnupg/options file. Is this missing from the installation?

    No. The ~/.gnupg/options file has been renamed to ~/.gnupg/conf for
    new installs as of version 1.1.92. If an existing ~/.gnupg/options file
    is found during an upgrade it will still be used, but this change was
    required to have a more consistent naming scheme with forthcoming tools.


<S> PROBLEMS and ERROR MESSAGES

<Q> Why do I get "gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!"

    On many systems this program should be installed as setuid(root).
    This is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents
    the operating system from writing them to disk and thereby keeping your
    secret keys really secret. If you get no warning message about insecure
    memory your operating system supports locking without being root. The
    program drops root privileges as soon as locked memory is allocated.

    To setuid(root) permissions on the gpg binary you can either use:

    [H pre]
       chmod u+s /path/to/gpg
    [H /pre]

    or

    [H pre]
       chmod 4755 /path/to/gpg
    [H /pre]

    Some refrain from using setuid(root) unless absolutely required for
    security reasons. Please check with your system administrator if you
    are not able to make these determinations yourself. 

    On UnixWare 2.x and 7.x you should install GnuPG with the 'plock'
    privilege to get the same effect:

    [H pre]
       filepriv -f plock /path/to/gpg
    [H /pre]

    If you can't or don't want to install GnuPG setuid(root), you can
    use the option "--no-secmem-warning" or put:

    [H pre]
       no-secmem-warning
    [H /pre]

    in your ~/.gnupg/options file (this disables the warning).

    On some systems (e.g., Windows) GnuPG does not lock memory pages
    and older GnuPG versions (<=1.0.4) issue the warning:

    [H pre]
       gpg: Please note that you don't have secure memory
    [H /pre]

    This warning can't be switched off by the above option because it
    was thought to be too serious an issue. However, it confused users
    too much, so the warning was eventually removed.

<Q> Large File Support doesn't work ...

    LFS works correctly in post-1.0.4 versions. If configure doesn't
    detect it, try a different (i.e., better) compiler. egcs 1.1.2 works
    fine, other gccs sometimes don't. BTW, several compilation problems
    of GnuPG 1.0.3 and 1.0.4 on HP-UX and Solaris were due to broken LFS
    support.

<Q> In the edit menu the trust values are not displayed correctly after
    signing uids. Why?

    This happens because some information is stored immediately in
    the trustdb, but the actual trust calculation can be done after the
    save command. This is a "not easy to fix" design bug which will be
    addressed in some future release.

<Q> What does "skipping pubkey 1: already loaded" mean?

    As of GnuPG 1.0.3, the RSA algorithm is included. If you still have
    a "load-extension rsa" in your options file, the above message
    occurs. Just remove the load command from the options file.

<Q> GnuPG 1.0.4 doesn't create ~/.gnupg ...

    That's a known bug, already fixed in newer versions.

<Q> An ElGamal signature does not verify anymore since version 1.0.2 ...

    Use the option --emulate-md-encode-bug.

<Q> Old versions of GnuPG can't verify ElGamal signatures

    Update to GnuPG 1.0.2 or newer.

<Q> When I use --clearsign, the plain text has sometimes extra dashes
    in it - why?

    This is called dash-escaped text and is required by OpenPGP.
    It always happens when a line starts with a dash ("-") and is
    needed to make the lines that structure signature and text
    (i.e., "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----") to be the only lines
    that start with two dashes.

    If you use GnuPG to process those messages, the extra dashes
    are removed. Good mail clients remove those extra dashes when
    displaying such a message.      

<Q> What is the thing with "can't handle multiple signatures"?

    Due to different message formats GnuPG is not always able to split
    a file with multiple signatures unambiguously into its parts. This
    error message informs you that there is something wrong with the input.

    The only way to have multiple signatures in a file is by using the
    OpenPGP format with one-pass-signature packets (which is GnuPG's
    default) or the cleartext signed format.

<Q> If I submit a key to a keyserver, nothing happens ...

    You are most likely using GnuPG 1.0.2 or older on Windows. That's
    feature isn't yet implemented, but it's a bug not to say it. Newer
    versions issue a warning. Upgrade to 1.0.4 or newer.

<Q> I get "gpg: waiting for lock ..."

    A previous instance of gpg has most likely exited abnormally and left
    a lock file. Go to ~/.gnupg and look for .*.lock files and remove them.

<Q> Older gpg binaries (e.g., 1.0) have problems with keys from newer
    gpg binaries ...

    As of 1.0.3, keys generated with gpg are created with preferences to
    TWOFISH (and AES since 1.0.4) and that also means that they have the
    capability to use the new MDC encryption method. This will go into
    OpenPGP soon, and is also suppoted by PGP 7. This new method avoids
    a (not so new) attack on all email encryption systems.

    This in turn means that pre-1.0.3 gpg binaries have problems with
    newer keys. Because of security and bug fixes, you should keep your
    GnuPG installation in a recent state anyway. As a workaround, you can
    force gpg to use a previous default cipher algo by putting:

    [H pre]
       cipher-algo cast5
    [H /pre]

    into your options file.

<Q> With 1.0.4, I get "this cipher algorithm is deprecated ..."

    If you just generated a new key and get this message while
    encrypting, you've witnessed a bug in 1.0.4. It uses the new AES
    cipher Rijndael that is incorrectly being referred as "deprecated".
    Ignore this warning, more recent versions of gpg are corrected.

<Q> Some dates are displayed as ????-??-??. Why?

    Due to constraints in most libc implementations, dates beyond
    2038-01-19 can't be displayed correctly. 64-bit OSes are not
    affected by this problem. To avoid printing wrong dates, GnuPG
    instead prints some question marks. To see the correct value, you
    can use the options --with-colons and --fixed-list-mode.

<Q> I still have a problem. How do I report a bug?

    Are you sure that it's not been mentioned somewhere on the mailing
    lists? Did you have a look at the bug list (you'll find a link to
    the list of reported bugs on the documentation page). If you're not
    sure about it being a bug, you can send mail to the gnupg-devel
    list. Otherwise, use the GUUG bug tracking system 
    [H a href=http://bugs.guug.de/Reporting.html]<http://bugs.guug.de/Reporting.html>[H /a].

<Q> Why doesn't GnuPG support X.509 certificates?

    GnuPG, first and foremost, is an implementation of the OpenPGP
    standard (RFC 2440), which is a competing infrastructure, different
    from X.509.

    They are both public-key cryptosystems, but how the public keys are
    actually handled is different.

<Q> Why do national characters in my user ID look funny?

    According to OpenPGP, GnuPG encodes user ID strings (and other
    things) using UTF-8. In this encoding of Unicode, most national
    characters get encoded as two- or three-byte sequences. For
    example, &aring; (0xE5 in ISO-8859-1) becomes &Atilde;&yen; (0xC3,
    0xA5). This might also be the reason why keyservers can't find
    your key.

<Q> I get 'sed' errors when running ./configure on Mac OS X ...

    This will be fixed after GnuPG has been upgraded to autoconf-2.50.
    Until then, find the line setting CDPATH in the configure script
    and place a:

    [H pre]
       unset CDPATH
    [H /pre]

    statement below it.

<Q> Why does GnuPG 1.0.6 bail out on keyrings used with 1.0.7?

    There is a small bug in 1.0.6 which didn't parse trust packets
    correctly. You may want to apply this patch if you can't upgrade:

    [H pre]
       http://www.gnupg.org/developer/gpg-woody-fix.txt
    [H /pre]

<Q> I've upgraded to GnuPG version 1.0.7 and now it takes longer to load
    my keyrings. What can I do?

    The way signature states are stored has changed so that v3 signatures
    can be supported. You can use the new --rebuild-keydb-caches migration
    command, which was built into this release and increases the speed of
    many operations for existing keyrings.


<S> ADVANCED TOPICS

<Q> How does this whole thing work?

    To generate a secret/public keypair, run:

    [H pre]
       gpg --gen-key
    [H/pre]

    and choose the default values.

    Data that is encrypted with a public key can only be decrypted by
    the matching secret key. The secret key is protected by a password,
    the public key is not.

    So to send your friend a message, you would encrypt your message
    with his public key, and he would only be able to decrypt it by
    having the secret key and putting in the password to use his secret
    key.

    GnuPG is also useful for signing things. Files that are encrypted
    with the secret key can be decrypted with the public key. To sign
    something, a hash is taken of the data, and then the hash is in some
    form encoded with the secret key. If someone has your public key, they
    can verify that it is from you and that it hasn't changed by checking
    the encoded form of the hash with the public key.

    A keyring is just a large file that stores keys. You have a public
    keyring where you store yours and your friend's public keys. You have
    a secret keyring that you keep your secret key on, and should be very
    careful with. Never ever give anyone else access to it and use a *good*
    passphrase to protect the data in it.

    You can 'conventionally' encrypt something by using the option 'gpg -c'.
    It is encrypted using a passphrase, and does not use public and secret
    keys. If the person you send the data to knows that passphrase, they
    can decrypt it. This is usually most useful for encrypting things to
    yourself, although you can encrypt things to your own public key in the
    same way. It should be used for communication with partners you know
    and where it is easy to exchange the passphrases (e.g. with your boy
    friend or your wife). The advantage is that you can change the
    passphrase from time to time and decrease the risk, that many old
    messages may be decrypted by people who accidently got your passphrase.

    You can add and copy keys to and from your keyring with the 'gpg
    --import' and 'gpg --export' option. 'gpg --export-secret-keys' will
    export secret keys. This is normally not useful, but you can generate
    the key on one machine then move it to another machine.

    Keys can be signed under the 'gpg --edit-key' option. When you sign a
    key, you are saying that you are certain that the key belongs to the
    person it says it comes from. You should be very sure that is really
    that person: You should verify the key fingerprint with:

    [H pre]
       gpg --fingerprint user-id
    [H/pre]

    over the phone (if you really know the voice of the other person), at
    a key signing party (which are often held at computer conferences),
    or at a meeting of your local GNU/Linux User Group.

    Hmm, what else. You may use the option "-o filename" to force output
    to this filename (use "-" to force output to stdout). "-r" just lets
    you specify the recipient (which public key you encrypt with) on the
    command line instead of typing it interactively.

    Oh yeah, this is important. By default all data is encrypted in some
    weird binary format. If you want to have things appear in ASCII text
    that is readable, just add the '-a' option. But the preferred method
    is to use a MIME aware mail reader (Mutt, Pine and many more).

    There is a small security glitch in the OpenPGP (and therefore GnuPG)
    system; to avoid this you should always sign and encrypt a message
    instead of only encrypting it.

<Q> Why are some signatures with an ELG-E key valid?

    These are ElGamal keys generated by GnuPG in v3 (RFC 1991) packets.
    The OpenPGP draft later changed the algorithm identifier for ElGamal
    keys which are usable for signatures and encryption from 16 to 20.
    GnuPG now uses 20 when it generates new ElGamal keys but still
    accepts 16 (which is according to OpenPGP "encryption only") if this
    key is in a v3 packet. GnuPG is the only program which had used
    these v3 ElGamal keys - so this assumption is quite safe.

<Q> How does the whole trust thing work?

    It works more or less like PGP. The difference is that the trust is
    computed at the time it is needed. This is one of the reasons for
    the trustdb which holds a list of valid key signatures. If you are
    not running in batch mode you will be asked to assign a trust
    parameter (ownertrust) to a key.

    You can see the validity (calculated trust value) using this
    command.

    [H pre]
       gpg --list-keys --with-colons
    [H/pre] 

    If the first field is "pub" or "uid", the second field shows you the
    trust:

    [H pre]
       o = Unknown (this key is new to the system)
       e = The key has expired
       q = Undefined (no value assigned)
       n = Don't trust this key at all
       m = There is marginal trust in this key
       f = The key is full trusted
       u = The key is ultimately trusted; this is only used
           for keys for which the secret key is also available.
       r = The key has been revoked
       d = The key has been disabled
    [H/pre]

    The value in the "pub" record is the best one of all "uid" records.
    You can get a list of the assigned trust values (how much you trust
    the owner to correctly sign another person's key) with:

    [H pre]
       gpg --list-ownertrust
    [H/pre]

    The first field is the fingerprint of the primary key, the second
    field is the assigned value:

    [H pre]
       - = No ownertrust value yet assigned or calculated.
       n = Never trust this keyholder to correctly verify others signatures.
       m = Have marginal trust in the keyholders capability to sign other
           keys.
       f = Assume that the key holder really knows how to sign keys.
       u = No need to trust ourself because we have the secret key.
    [H/pre]

    Keep these values confidential because they express your opinions
    about others. PGP stores this information with the keyring thus it
    is not a good idea to publish a PGP keyring instead of exporting the
    keyring. GnuPG stores the trust in the trustdb.gpg file so it is okay
    to give a gpg keyring away (but we have a --export command too).

<Q> What kind of output is this: "key C26EE891.298, uid 09FB: ...."?

    This is the internal representation of a user ID in the trustdb.
    "C26EE891" is the keyid, "298" is the local ID (a record number in
    the trustdb) and "09FB" is the last two bytes of a ripe-md-160 hash
    of the user ID for this key.

<Q> How do I interpret some of the informational outputs?

    While checking the validity of a key, GnuPG sometimes prints some
    information which is prefixed with information about the checked
    item.

    [H pre]
       "key 12345678.3456"
    [H/pre]

    This is about the key with key ID 12345678 and the internal number
    3456, which is the record number of the so called directory record
    in the trustdb.

    [H pre]
       "uid 12345678.3456/ACDE"
    [H/pre]

    This is about the user ID for the same key. To identify the user ID
    the last two bytes of a ripe-md-160 over the user ID ring is printed.

    [H pre]
       "sig 12345678.3456/ACDE/9A8B7C6D"
    [H/pre]

    This is about the signature with key ID 9A8B7C6D for the above key
    and user ID, if it is a signature which is direct on a key, the user
    ID part is empty (..//..).

<Q> Are the header lines of a cleartext signature part of the signed
    material?

    No. For example you can add or remove "Comment:" lines. They have
    a purpose like the mail header lines. However a "Hash:" line is
    needed for OpenPGP signatures to tell the parser which hash
    algorithm to use.

<Q> What is the list of preferred algorithms?

    The list of preferred algorithms is a list of cipher, hash and
    compression algorithms stored in the self-signature of a key during
    key generation. When you encrypt a document, GnuPG uses this list
    (which is then part of a public key) to determine which algorithms
    to use. Basically it tells other people what algorithms the
    recipient is able to handle and provides an order of preference.

<Q> How do I change the list of preferred algorithms?

    In version 1.0.7 or later, you can use the edit menu and set the
    new list of preference using the command "setpref"; the format of
    this command resembles the output of the command "pref". The
    preference is not changed immediately but the set preference will
    be used when a new user ID is created. If you want to update the
    preferences for existing user IDs, select those user IDs (or select
    none to update all) and enter the command "updpref". Note that the
    timestamp of the self-signature is increased by one second when
    running this command.


<S> ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

    Many thanks to Nils Ellmenreich for maintaining this FAQ file for
    a long time, Werner Koch for the original FAQ file, and to all
    posters to gnupg-users and gnupg-devel. They all provided most
    of the answers.

    Also thanks to Casper Dik for providing us with a script to generate
    this FAQ (he uses it for the excellent Solaris2 FAQ).

[H HR]

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