1
0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2024-12-22 10:19:57 +01:00
gnupg/g10/parse-packet.c

3150 lines
84 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/* parse-packet.c - read packets
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
* 2007, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2014 Werner Koch
* Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
2007-07-04 19:49:40 +00:00
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "gpg.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "filter.h"
#include "photoid.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "host2net.h"
/* Maximum length of packets to avoid excessive memory allocation. */
#define MAX_KEY_PACKET_LENGTH (256 * 1024)
#define MAX_UID_PACKET_LENGTH ( 2 * 1024)
#define MAX_COMMENT_PACKET_LENGTH ( 64 * 1024)
#define MAX_ATTR_PACKET_LENGTH ( 16 * 1024*1024)
static int mpi_print_mode;
static int list_mode;
static estream_t listfp;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
static int parse (IOBUF inp, PACKET * pkt, int onlykeypkts,
off_t * retpos, int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
, const char *dbg_w, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l
#endif
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
);
static int copy_packet (IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, int pkttype,
unsigned long pktlen, int partial);
static void skip_packet (IOBUF inp, int pkttype,
unsigned long pktlen, int partial);
static void *read_rest (IOBUF inp, size_t pktlen);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
static int parse_marker (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen);
static int parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet);
static int parse_pubkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet);
static int parse_onepass_sig (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PKT_onepass_sig * ops);
static int parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
byte * hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET * packet);
static int parse_user_id (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet);
static int parse_attribute (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet);
static int parse_comment (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet);
static void parse_trust (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet);
static int parse_plaintext (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet, int new_ctb, int partial);
static int parse_compressed (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet, int new_ctb);
static int parse_encrypted (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet, int new_ctb, int partial);
static int parse_mdc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet, int new_ctb);
static int parse_gpg_control (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet, int partial);
/* Read a 16-bit value in MSB order (big endian) from an iobuf. */
static unsigned short
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
read_16 (IOBUF inp)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
unsigned short a;
a = (unsigned short)iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 8;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
a |= iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
return a;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Read a 32-bit value in MSB order (big endian) from an iobuf. */
static unsigned long
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
read_32 (IOBUF inp)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
unsigned long a;
a = (unsigned long)iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 24;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
a |= iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 16;
a |= iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 8;
a |= iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
return a;
}
/* Read an external representation of an MPI and return the MPI. The
external format is a 16-bit unsigned value stored in network byte
order giving the number of bits for the following integer. The
integer is stored MSB first and is left padded with zero bits to
align on a byte boundary.
The caller must set *RET_NREAD to the maximum number of bytes to
read from the pipeline INP. This function sets *RET_NREAD to be
the number of bytes actually read from the pipeline.
If SECURE is true, the integer is stored in secure memory
(allocated using gcry_xmalloc_secure). */
static gcry_mpi_t
mpi_read (iobuf_t inp, unsigned int *ret_nread, int secure)
{
int c, c1, c2, i;
unsigned int nmax = *ret_nread;
2006-11-10 11:32:00 +00:00
unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
size_t nread = 0;
gcry_mpi_t a = NULL;
byte *buf = NULL;
byte *p;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (!nmax)
goto overflow;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if ((c = c1 = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
goto leave;
if (++nread == nmax)
goto overflow;
nbits = c << 8;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if ((c = c2 = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
goto leave;
++nread;
nbits |= c;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (nbits > MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
log_error ("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
nbytes = (nbits + 7) / 8;
2006-11-10 11:32:00 +00:00
buf = secure ? gcry_xmalloc_secure (nbytes + 2) : gcry_xmalloc (nbytes + 2);
p = buf;
p[0] = c1;
p[1] = c2;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++)
{
if (nread == nmax)
goto overflow;
c = iobuf_get (inp);
if (c == -1)
goto leave;
p[i + 2] = c;
nread ++;
}
gpg: Rework ECC support and add experimental support for Ed25519. * agent/findkey.c (key_parms_from_sexp): Add algo name "ecc". (agent_is_dsa_key): Ditto. (agent_is_eddsa_key): New. Not finished, though. * agent/pksign.c (do_encode_eddsa): New. (agent_pksign_do): Use gcry_log_debug functions. * agent/protect.c (agent_protect): Parse a flags parameter. * g10/keygen.c (gpg_curve_to_oid): Move to ... * common/openpgp-oid.c (openpgp_curve_to_oid): here and rename. (oid_ed25519): New. (openpgp_oid_is_ed25519): New. (openpgp_oid_to_curve): New. * common/t-openpgp-oid.c (test_openpgp_oid_is_ed25519): New. * g10/build-packet.c (gpg_mpi_write): Write the length header also for opaque MPIs. (gpg_mpi_write_nohdr): New. (do_key): Use gpg_mpi_write_nohdr depending on algorithm. (do_pubkey_enc): Ditto. * g10/ecdh.c (pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point): Use gpg_mpi_write_nohdr. * g10/export.c (transfer_format_to_openpgp): * g10/keygen.c (ecckey_from_sexp): Return the error. (gen_ecc): Repalce arg NBITS by CURVE. (read_parameter_file): Add keywords "Key-Curve" and "Subkey-Curve". (ask_curve): New. (generate_keypair, generate_subkeypair): Use ask_curve. (do_generate_keypair): Also pass curve name. * g10/keylist.c (list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon): Print curve name. * g10/parse-packet.c (mpi_read): Remove workaround for Libcgrypt < 1.5. (parse_key): Fix ECC case. Print the curve name. * g10/pkglue.c (mpi_from_sexp): Rename to get_mpi_from_sexp. (pk_verify, pk_check_secret_key): Add special case for Ed25519. * g10/seskey.c (encode_md_value): Ditto. * g10/sign.c (do_sign, hash_for, sign_file): Ditto. -- Be warned that this code is subject to further changes and that the format will very likely change before a release. There are also known bugs and missing code. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2013-11-15 08:59:45 +01:00
if (gcry_mpi_scan (&a, GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, buf, nread, &nread))
a = NULL;
*ret_nread = nread;
gcry_free(buf);
return a;
overflow:
log_error ("mpi larger than indicated length (%u bits)\n", 8*nmax);
leave:
*ret_nread = nread;
gcry_free(buf);
return a;
}
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
set_packet_list_mode (int mode)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int old = list_mode;
list_mode = mode;
/* We use stdout only if invoked by the --list-packets command
but switch to stderr in all other cases. This breaks the
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
previous behaviour but that seems to be more of a bug than
intentional. I don't believe that any application makes use of
this long standing annoying way of printing to stdout except when
doing a --list-packets. If this assumption fails, it will be easy
to add an option for the listing stream. Note that we initialize
it only once; mainly because there is code which switches
opt.list_mode back to 1 and we want to have all output to the
same stream. The MPI_PRINT_MODE will be enabled if the
corresponding debug flag is set or if we are in --list-packets
and --verbose is given.
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
Using stderr is not actually very clean because it bypasses the
logging code but it is a special thing anyway. I am not sure
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
whether using log_stream() would be better. Perhaps we should
enable the list mode only with a special option. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (!listfp)
{
if (opt.list_packets)
{
listfp = es_stdout;
if (opt.verbose)
mpi_print_mode = 1;
}
else
listfp = es_stderr;
if (DBG_MPI)
mpi_print_mode = 1;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return old;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* If OPT.VERBOSE is set, print a warning that the algorithm ALGO is
not suitable for signing and encryption. */
static void
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
unknown_pubkey_warning (int algo)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
static byte unknown_pubkey_algos[256];
/* First check whether the algorithm is usable but not suitable for
encryption/signing. */
if (pubkey_get_npkey (algo))
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
if (opt.verbose)
{
if (!pubkey_get_nsig (algo))
log_info ("public key algorithm %s not suitable for %s\n",
openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo), "signing");
if (!pubkey_get_nenc (algo))
log_info ("public key algorithm %s not suitable for %s\n",
openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo), "encryption");
}
}
else
{
algo &= 0xff;
if (!unknown_pubkey_algos[algo])
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("can't handle public key algorithm %d\n"), algo);
unknown_pubkey_algos[algo] = 1;
}
}
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
dbg_parse_packet (IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int skip, rc;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
do
{
rc = parse (inp, pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 0, "parse", dbg_f, dbg_l);
}
while (skip && ! rc);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
#else /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_packet (IOBUF inp, PACKET * pkt)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int skip, rc;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
do
{
rc = parse (inp, pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 0);
}
while (skip && ! rc);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
#endif /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/*
* Like parse packet, but only return secret or public (sub)key
* packets.
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
dbg_search_packet (IOBUF inp, PACKET * pkt, off_t * retpos, int with_uid,
const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int skip, rc;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
do
{
rc =
parse (inp, pkt, with_uid ? 2 : 1, retpos, &skip, NULL, 0, "search",
dbg_f, dbg_l);
}
while (skip && ! rc);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
#else /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
search_packet (IOBUF inp, PACKET * pkt, off_t * retpos, int with_uid)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int skip, rc;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
do
{
rc = parse (inp, pkt, with_uid ? 2 : 1, retpos, &skip, NULL, 0);
}
while (skip && ! rc);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
#endif /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/*
* Copy all packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces.
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
dbg_copy_all_packets (IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
PACKET pkt;
int skip, rc = 0;
if (! out)
log_bug ("copy_all_packets: OUT may not be NULL.\n");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
do
{
init_packet (&pkt);
}
while (!
(rc =
parse (inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0, "copy", dbg_f, dbg_l)));
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
#else /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
copy_all_packets (IOBUF inp, IOBUF out)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
PACKET pkt;
int skip, rc = 0;
if (! out)
log_bug ("copy_all_packets: OUT may not be NULL.\n");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
do
{
init_packet (&pkt);
}
while (!(rc = parse (inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0)));
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
#endif /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/*
* Copy some packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces.
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
* Stop at offset STOPoff (i.e. don't copy packets at this or later
* offsets)
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
dbg_copy_some_packets (IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, off_t stopoff,
const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
PACKET pkt;
int skip, rc = 0;
do
{
if (iobuf_tell (inp) >= stopoff)
return 0;
init_packet (&pkt);
}
while (!(rc = parse (inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0,
"some", dbg_f, dbg_l)));
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
#else /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
copy_some_packets (IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, off_t stopoff)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
PACKET pkt;
int skip, rc = 0;
do
{
if (iobuf_tell (inp) >= stopoff)
return 0;
init_packet (&pkt);
}
while (!(rc = parse (inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0)));
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
#endif /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/*
* Skip over N packets
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
dbg_skip_some_packets (IOBUF inp, unsigned n, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int skip, rc = 0;
PACKET pkt;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (; n && !rc; n--)
{
init_packet (&pkt);
rc = parse (inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 1, "skip", dbg_f, dbg_l);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
#else /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
skip_some_packets (IOBUF inp, unsigned n)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int skip, rc = 0;
PACKET pkt;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (; n && !rc; n--)
{
init_packet (&pkt);
rc = parse (inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 1);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
#endif /*!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET*/
/* Parse a packet and save it in *PKT.
If OUT is not NULL and the packet is valid (its type is not 0),
then the header, the initial length field and the packet's contents
are written to OUT. In this case, the packet is not saved in *PKT.
ONLYKEYPKTS is a simple packet filter. If ONLYKEYPKTS is set to 1,
then only public subkey packets, public key packets, private subkey
packets and private key packets are parsed. The rest are skipped
(i.e., the header and the contents are read from the pipeline and
discarded). If ONLYKEYPKTS is set to 2, then in addition to the
above 4 types of packets, user id packets are also accepted.
DO_SKIP is a more coarse grained filter. Unless ONLYKEYPKTS is set
to 2 and the packet is a user id packet, all packets are skipped.
Finally, if a packet is invalid (it's type is 0), it is skipped.
If a packet is skipped and SKIP is not NULL, then *SKIP is set to
1.
Note: ONLYKEYPKTS and DO_SKIP are only respected if OUT is NULL,
i.e., the packets are not simply being copied.
If RETPOS is not NULL, then the position of INP (as returned by
iobuf_tell) is saved there before any data is read from INP.
*/
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse (IOBUF inp, PACKET * pkt, int onlykeypkts, off_t * retpos,
int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
, const char *dbg_w, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l
#endif
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int rc = 0, c, ctb, pkttype, lenbytes;
unsigned long pktlen;
byte hdr[8];
int hdrlen;
int new_ctb = 0, partial = 0;
int with_uid = (onlykeypkts == 2);
off_t pos;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
*skip = 0;
log_assert (!pkt->pkt.generic);
if (retpos || list_mode)
{
pos = iobuf_tell (inp);
if (retpos)
*retpos = pos;
}
else
pos = 0; /* (silence compiler warning) */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* The first byte of a packet is the so-called tag. The highest bit
must be set. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if ((ctb = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
{
rc = -1;
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
hdrlen = 0;
hdr[hdrlen++] = ctb;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (!(ctb & 0x80))
{
log_error ("%s: invalid packet (ctb=%02x)\n", iobuf_where (inp), ctb);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
/* Immediately following the header is the length. There are two
formats: the old format and the new format. If bit 6 (where the
least significant bit is bit 0) is set in the tag, then we are
dealing with a new format packet. Otherwise, it is an old format
packet. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen = 0;
new_ctb = !!(ctb & 0x40);
if (new_ctb)
{
/* Get the packet's type. This is encoded in the 6 least
significant bits of the tag. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pkttype = ctb & 0x3f;
/* Extract the packet's length. New format packets have 4 ways
to encode the packet length. The value of the first byte
determines the encoding and partially determines the length.
See section 4.2.2 of RFC 4880 for details. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
{
log_error ("%s: 1st length byte missing\n", iobuf_where (inp));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2008-09-25 12:55:50 +00:00
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
if (c < 192)
pktlen = c;
else if (c < 224)
{
pktlen = (c - 192) * 256;
if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
{
log_error ("%s: 2nd length byte missing\n",
iobuf_where (inp));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
pktlen += c + 192;
}
else if (c == 255)
{
int i;
char value[4];
for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
{
log_error ("%s: 4 byte length invalid\n", iobuf_where (inp));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
value[i] = hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
pktlen = buf32_to_ulong (value);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
else /* Partial body length. */
2008-09-25 12:55:50 +00:00
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
switch (pkttype)
{
case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
case PKT_COMPRESSED:
iobuf_set_partial_body_length_mode (inp, c & 0xff);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen = 0; /* To indicate partial length. */
partial = 1;
break;
default:
log_error ("%s: partial length invalid for"
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
" packet type %d\n", iobuf_where (inp), pkttype);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
}
}
else
/* This is an old format packet. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
/* Extract the packet's type. This is encoded in bits 2-5. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pkttype = (ctb >> 2) & 0xf;
/* The type of length encoding is encoded in bits 0-1 of the
tag. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
lenbytes = ((ctb & 3) == 3) ? 0 : (1 << (ctb & 3));
if (!lenbytes)
{
pktlen = 0; /* Don't know the value. */
/* This isn't really partial, but we can treat it the same
in a "read until the end" sort of way. */
partial = 1;
if (pkttype != PKT_ENCRYPTED && pkttype != PKT_PLAINTEXT
&& pkttype != PKT_COMPRESSED)
{
log_error ("%s: indeterminate length for invalid"
" packet type %d\n", iobuf_where (inp), pkttype);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
}
else
{
for (; lenbytes; lenbytes--)
{
pktlen <<= 8;
c = iobuf_get (inp);
if (c == -1)
{
log_error ("%s: length invalid\n", iobuf_where (inp));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
pktlen |= hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
}
}
/* Sometimes the decompressing layer enters an error state in which
it simply outputs 0xff for every byte read. If we have a stream
of 0xff bytes, then it will be detected as a new format packet
with type 63 and a 4-byte encoded length that is 4G-1. Since
packets with type 63 are private and we use them as a control
packet, which won't be 4 GB, we reject such packets as
invalid. */
if (pkttype == 63 && pktlen == 0xFFFFFFFF)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
/* With some probability this is caused by a problem in the
* the uncompressing layer - in some error cases it just loops
* and spits out 0xff bytes. */
log_error ("%s: garbled packet detected\n", iobuf_where (inp));
g10_exit (2);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (out && pkttype)
{
/* This type of copying won't work if the packet uses a partial
body length. (In other words, this only works if HDR is
actually the length.) Currently, no callers require this
functionality so we just log this as an error. */
if (partial)
{
log_error ("parse: Can't copy partial packet. Aborting.\n");
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
rc = iobuf_write (out, hdr, hdrlen);
if (!rc)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = copy_packet (inp, out, pkttype, pktlen, partial);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (with_uid && pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
/* If ONLYKEYPKTS is set to 2, then we never skip user id packets,
even if DO_SKIP is set. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
;
else if (do_skip
/* type==0 is not allowed. This is an invalid packet. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
|| !pkttype
/* When ONLYKEYPKTS is set, we don't skip keys. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
|| (onlykeypkts && pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
&& pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY && pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY))
{
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial);
*skip = 1;
rc = 0;
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (DBG_PACKET)
{
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
log_debug ("parse_packet(iob=%d): type=%d length=%lu%s (%s.%s.%d)\n",
iobuf_id (inp), pkttype, pktlen, new_ctb ? " (new_ctb)" : "",
dbg_w, dbg_f, dbg_l);
#else
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
log_debug ("parse_packet(iob=%d): type=%d length=%lu%s\n",
iobuf_id (inp), pkttype, pktlen,
new_ctb ? " (new_ctb)" : "");
#endif
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "# off=%lu ctb=%02x tag=%d hlen=%d plen=%lu%s%s\n",
(unsigned long)pos, ctb, pkttype, hdrlen, pktlen,
partial? (new_ctb ? " partial" : " indeterminate") :"",
new_ctb? " new-ctb":"");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pkt->pkttype = pkttype;
rc = GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET; /* default error */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
switch (pkttype)
{
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
pkt->pkt.public_key = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt->pkt.public_key);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = parse_key (inp, pkttype, pktlen, hdr, hdrlen, pkt);
break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
rc = parse_symkeyenc (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
break;
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
rc = parse_pubkeyenc (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
break;
case PKT_SIGNATURE:
pkt->pkt.signature = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt->pkt.signature);
rc = parse_signature (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt->pkt.signature);
break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG:
pkt->pkt.onepass_sig = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt->pkt.onepass_sig);
rc = parse_onepass_sig (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt->pkt.onepass_sig);
break;
case PKT_USER_ID:
rc = parse_user_id (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
break;
case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
pkt->pkttype = pkttype = PKT_USER_ID; /* we store it in the userID */
rc = parse_attribute (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
break;
case PKT_OLD_COMMENT:
case PKT_COMMENT:
rc = parse_comment (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
break;
case PKT_RING_TRUST:
parse_trust (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
rc = 0;
break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
rc = parse_plaintext (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb, partial);
break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED:
rc = parse_compressed (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb);
break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
rc = parse_encrypted (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb, partial);
break;
case PKT_MDC:
rc = parse_mdc (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb);
break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL:
rc = parse_gpg_control (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, partial);
break;
case PKT_MARKER:
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = parse_marker (inp, pkttype, pktlen);
break;
default:
/* Unknown packet. Skip it. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
skip_packet (inp, pkttype, pktlen, partial);
break;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
leave:
/* FIXME: We leak in case of an error (see the xmalloc's above). */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (!rc && iobuf_error (inp))
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING;
/* FIXME: We use only the error code for now to avoid problems with
callers which have not been checked to always use gpg_err_code()
when comparing error codes. */
return rc == -1? -1 : gpg_err_code (rc);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
static void
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
dump_hex_line (int c, int *i)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (*i && !(*i % 8))
{
if (*i && !(*i % 24))
es_fprintf (listfp, "\n%4d:", *i);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
es_putc (' ', listfp);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (c == -1)
es_fprintf (listfp, " EOF");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
es_fprintf (listfp, " %02x", c);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
++*i;
}
/* Copy the contents of a packet from the pipeline IN to the pipeline
OUT.
The header and length have already been read from INP and the
decoded values are given as PKGTYPE and PKTLEN.
If the packet is a partial body length packet (RFC 4880, Section
2016-11-29 14:41:22 +01:00
4.2.2.4), then iobuf_set_partial_block_modeiobuf_set_partial_block_mode
should already have been called on INP and PARTIAL should be set.
If PARTIAL is set or PKTLEN is 0 and PKTTYPE is PKT_COMPRESSED,
copy until the first EOF is encountered on INP.
Returns 0 on success and an error code if an error occurs. */
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
copy_packet (IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, int pkttype,
unsigned long pktlen, int partial)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int rc;
int n;
char buf[100];
if (partial)
{
while ((n = iobuf_read (inp, buf, sizeof (buf))) != -1)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, buf, n)))
return rc; /* write error */
}
else if (!pktlen && pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED)
{
log_debug ("copy_packet: compressed!\n");
/* compressed packet, copy till EOF */
while ((n = iobuf_read (inp, buf, sizeof (buf))) != -1)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, buf, n)))
return rc; /* write error */
}
else
{
for (; pktlen; pktlen -= n)
{
n = pktlen > sizeof (buf) ? sizeof (buf) : pktlen;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
n = iobuf_read (inp, buf, n);
if (n == -1)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, buf, n)))
return rc; /* write error */
}
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return 0;
}
/* Skip an unknown packet. PKTTYPE is the packet's type, PKTLEN is
the length of the packet's content and PARTIAL is whether partial
body length encoding in used (in this case PKTLEN is ignored). */
static void
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
skip_packet (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, int partial)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, ":unknown packet: type %2d, length %lu\n",
pkttype, pktlen);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (pkttype)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int c, i = 0;
es_fputs ("dump:", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (partial)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
while ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) != -1)
dump_hex_line (c, &i);
}
else
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (; pktlen; pktlen--)
{
dump_hex_line ((c = iobuf_get (inp)), &i);
if (c == -1)
break;
}
}
es_putc ('\n', listfp);
return;
}
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Read PKTLEN bytes form INP and return them in a newly allocated
buffer. In case of an error (including reading fewer than PKTLEN
bytes from INP before EOF is returned), NULL is returned and an
error message is logged. */
static void *
read_rest (IOBUF inp, size_t pktlen)
{
int c;
byte *buf, *p;
buf = xtrymalloc (pktlen);
if (!buf)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
gpg_error_t err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error reading rest of packet: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
return NULL;
}
for (p = buf; pktlen; pktlen--)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
c = iobuf_get (inp);
if (c == -1)
{
log_error ("premature eof while reading rest of packet\n");
xfree (buf);
return NULL;
}
*p++ = c;
}
return buf;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Read a special size+body from INP. On success store an opaque MPI
with it at R_DATA. On error return an error code and store NULL at
R_DATA. Even in the error case store the number of read bytes at
R_NREAD. The caller shall pass the remaining size of the packet in
PKTLEN. */
static gpg_error_t
read_size_body (iobuf_t inp, int pktlen, size_t *r_nread,
gcry_mpi_t *r_data)
{
char buffer[256];
char *tmpbuf;
int i, c, nbytes;
*r_nread = 0;
*r_data = NULL;
if (!pktlen)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
c = iobuf_readbyte (inp);
if (c < 0)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
pktlen--;
++*r_nread;
nbytes = c;
if (nbytes < 2 || nbytes > 254)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
if (nbytes > pktlen)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
buffer[0] = nbytes;
for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++)
{
c = iobuf_get (inp);
if (c < 0)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
++*r_nread;
buffer[1+i] = c;
}
tmpbuf = xtrymalloc (1 + nbytes);
if (!tmpbuf)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
memcpy (tmpbuf, buffer, 1 + nbytes);
*r_data = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, tmpbuf, 8 * (1 + nbytes));
if (!*r_data)
{
xfree (tmpbuf);
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
return 0;
}
/* Parse a marker packet. */
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_marker (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
(void) pkttype;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (pktlen != 3)
goto fail;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (iobuf_get (inp) != 'P')
{
pktlen--;
goto fail;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (iobuf_get (inp) != 'G')
{
pktlen--;
goto fail;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (iobuf_get (inp) != 'P')
{
pktlen--;
goto fail;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":marker packet: PGP\n", listfp);
return 0;
fail:
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
log_error ("invalid marker packet\n");
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":marker packet: [invalid]\n", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
PKT_symkey_enc *k;
int rc = 0;
int i, version, s2kmode, cipher_algo, hash_algo, seskeylen, minlen;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (pktlen < 4)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [too short]\n");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
if (version != 4)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [unknown version]\n");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (pktlen > 200)
{ /* (we encode the seskeylen in a byte) */
log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [too large]\n");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
cipher_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
s2kmode = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
switch (s2kmode)
{
case 0: /* Simple S2K. */
minlen = 0;
break;
case 1: /* Salted S2K. */
minlen = 8;
break;
case 3: /* Iterated+salted S2K. */
minlen = 9;
break;
default:
log_error ("unknown S2K mode %d\n", s2kmode);
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [unknown S2K mode]\n");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (minlen > pktlen)
{
log_error ("packet with S2K %d too short\n", s2kmode);
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [too short]\n");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
seskeylen = pktlen - minlen;
k = packet->pkt.symkey_enc = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.symkey_enc
+ seskeylen - 1);
k->version = version;
k->cipher_algo = cipher_algo;
k->s2k.mode = s2kmode;
k->s2k.hash_algo = hash_algo;
if (s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3)
{
for (i = 0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen--)
k->s2k.salt[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
}
if (s2kmode == 3)
{
k->s2k.count = iobuf_get (inp);
pktlen--;
}
k->seskeylen = seskeylen;
if (k->seskeylen)
{
for (i = 0; i < seskeylen && pktlen; i++, pktlen--)
k->seskey[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
/* What we're watching out for here is a session key decryptor
with no salt. The RFC says that using salt for this is a
MUST. */
if (s2kmode != 1 && s2kmode != 3)
log_info (_("WARNING: potentially insecure symmetrically"
" encrypted session key\n"));
}
log_assert (!pktlen);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp,
":symkey enc packet: version %d, cipher %d, s2k %d, hash %d",
version, cipher_algo, s2kmode, hash_algo);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (seskeylen)
es_fprintf (listfp, ", seskey %d bits", (seskeylen - 1) * 8);
es_fprintf (listfp, "\n");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tsalt ");
es_write_hexstring (listfp, k->s2k.salt, 8, 0, NULL);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (s2kmode == 3)
es_fprintf (listfp, ", count %lu (%lu)",
S2K_DECODE_COUNT ((ulong) k->s2k.count),
(ulong) k->s2k.count);
es_fprintf (listfp, "\n");
}
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
leave:
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_pubkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int rc = 0;
int i, ndata;
PKT_pubkey_enc *k;
k = packet->pkt.pubkey_enc = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.pubkey_enc);
if (pktlen < 12)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":pubkey enc packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
k->version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
if (k->version != 2 && k->version != 3)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, k->version);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":pubkey enc packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
k->keyid[0] = read_32 (inp);
pktlen -= 4;
k->keyid[1] = read_32 (inp);
pktlen -= 4;
k->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
k->throw_keyid = 0; /* Only used as flag for build_packet. */
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp,
":pubkey enc packet: version %d, algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n",
k->version, k->pubkey_algo, (ulong) k->keyid[0],
(ulong) k->keyid[1]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
ndata = pubkey_get_nenc (k->pubkey_algo);
if (!ndata)
{
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunsupported algorithm %d\n", k->pubkey_algo);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
unknown_pubkey_warning (k->pubkey_algo);
k->data[0] = NULL; /* No need to store the encrypted data. */
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < ndata; i++)
{
if (k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH && i == 1)
{
2011-06-01 21:43:30 +02:00
size_t n;
rc = read_size_body (inp, pktlen, &n, k->data+i);
pktlen -= n;
}
else
{
2011-06-01 21:43:30 +02:00
int n = pktlen;
k->data[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0);
pktlen -= n;
if (!k->data[i])
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
}
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tdata: ");
mpi_print (listfp, k->data[i], mpi_print_mode);
es_putc ('\n', listfp);
}
}
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
leave:
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return rc;
}
/* Dump a subpacket to LISTFP. BUFFER contains the subpacket in
question and points to the type field in the subpacket header (not
the start of the header). TYPE is the subpacket's type with the
critical bit cleared. CRITICAL is the value of the CRITICAL bit.
BUFLEN is the length of the buffer and LENGTH is the length of the
subpacket according to the subpacket's header. */
static void
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
dump_sig_subpkt (int hashed, int type, int critical,
const byte * buffer, size_t buflen, size_t length)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
const char *p = NULL;
int i;
/* The CERT has warning out with explains how to use GNUPG to detect
* the ARRs - we print our old message here when it is a faked ARR
* and add an additional notice. */
if (type == SIGSUBPKT_ARR && !hashed)
{
es_fprintf (listfp,
"\tsubpkt %d len %u (additional recipient request)\n"
"WARNING: PGP versions > 5.0 and < 6.5.8 will automagically "
"encrypt to this key and thereby reveal the plaintext to "
"the owner of this ARR key. Detailed info follows:\n",
type, (unsigned) length);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
buffer++;
length--;
es_fprintf (listfp, "\t%s%ssubpkt %d len %u (", /*) */
critical ? "critical " : "",
hashed ? "hashed " : "", type, (unsigned) length);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (length > buflen)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "too short: buffer is only %u)\n", (unsigned) buflen);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return;
}
switch (type)
{
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
if (length >= 4)
es_fprintf (listfp, "sig created %s",
strtimestamp (buf32_to_u32 (buffer)));
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
if (length >= 4)
{
if (buf32_to_u32 (buffer))
es_fprintf (listfp, "sig expires after %s",
strtimevalue (buf32_to_u32 (buffer)));
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
es_fprintf (listfp, "sig does not expire");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
if (length)
es_fprintf (listfp, "%sexportable", *buffer ? "" : "not ");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
if (length != 2)
p = "[invalid trust subpacket]";
else
es_fprintf (listfp, "trust signature of depth %d, value %d", buffer[0],
buffer[1]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
if (!length)
p = "[invalid regexp subpacket]";
else
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "regular expression: \"");
es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer, length, "\"", NULL);
p = "\"";
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
if (length)
es_fprintf (listfp, "%srevocable", *buffer ? "" : "not ");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
if (length >= 4)
{
if (buf32_to_u32 (buffer))
es_fprintf (listfp, "key expires after %s",
strtimevalue (buf32_to_u32 (buffer)));
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
es_fprintf (listfp, "key does not expire");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
es_fputs ("pref-sym-algos:", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
es_fputs ("revocation key: ", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (length < 22)
p = "[too short]";
else
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "c=%02x a=%d f=", buffer[0], buffer[1]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (i = 2; i < length; i++)
es_fprintf (listfp, "%02X", buffer[i]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:
if (length >= 8)
es_fprintf (listfp, "issuer key ID %08lX%08lX",
(ulong) buf32_to_u32 (buffer),
(ulong) buf32_to_u32 (buffer + 4));
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR:
if (length >= 21)
{
char *tmp;
es_fprintf (listfp, "issuer fpr v%d ", buffer[0]);
tmp = bin2hex (buffer+1, length-1, NULL);
if (tmp)
{
es_fputs (tmp, listfp);
xfree (tmp);
}
}
break;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
{
es_fputs ("notation: ", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (length < 8)
p = "[too short]";
else
2006-06-27 14:30:59 +00:00
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
const byte *s = buffer;
size_t n1, n2;
n1 = (s[4] << 8) | s[5];
n2 = (s[6] << 8) | s[7];
s += 8;
if (8 + n1 + n2 != length)
p = "[error]";
2006-06-27 14:30:59 +00:00
else
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
es_write_sanitized (listfp, s, n1, ")", NULL);
es_putc ('=', listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (*buffer & 0x80)
es_write_sanitized (listfp, s + n1, n2, ")", NULL);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
p = "[not human readable]";
}
2006-06-27 14:30:59 +00:00
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
es_fputs ("pref-hash-algos:", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
es_fputs ("pref-zip-algos:", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS:
es_fputs ("keyserver preferences:", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
es_fprintf (listfp, " %02X", buffer[i]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
es_fputs ("preferred keyserver: ", listfp);
es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer, length, ")", NULL);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
p = "primary user ID";
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
es_fputs ("policy: ", listfp);
es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer, length, ")", NULL);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
es_fputs ("key flags:", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
es_fprintf (listfp, " %02X", buffer[i]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID:
p = "signer's user ID";
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON:
if (length)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "revocation reason 0x%02x (", *buffer);
es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer + 1, length - 1, ")", NULL);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
p = ")";
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_ARR:
es_fputs ("Big Brother's key (ignored): ", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (length < 22)
p = "[too short]";
else
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "c=%02x a=%d f=", buffer[0], buffer[1]);
if (length > 2)
es_write_hexstring (listfp, buffer+2, length-2, 0, NULL);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
es_fputs ("features:", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
es_fprintf (listfp, " %02x", buffer[i]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
es_fputs ("signature: ", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (length < 17)
p = "[too short]";
else
es_fprintf (listfp, "v%d, class 0x%02X, algo %d, digest algo %d",
buffer[0],
buffer[0] == 3 ? buffer[2] : buffer[1],
buffer[0] == 3 ? buffer[15] : buffer[2],
buffer[0] == 3 ? buffer[16] : buffer[3]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
default:
if (type >= 100 && type <= 110)
p = "experimental / private subpacket";
else
p = "?";
break;
}
es_fprintf (listfp, "%s)\n", p ? p : "");
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/*
* Returns: >= 0 use this offset into buffer
* -1 explicitly reject returning this type
* -2 subpacket too short
*/
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_one_sig_subpkt (const byte * buffer, size_t n, int type)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
switch (type)
{
case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (n < 22)
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (n < 4)
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON:
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (!n)
break;
return 0;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER: /* issuer key ID */
if (n < 8)
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR: /* issuer key ID */
if (n < 21)
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
/* minimum length needed, and the subpacket must be well-formed
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
where the name length and value length all fit inside the
packet. */
if (n < 8
|| 8 + ((buffer[4] << 8) | buffer[5]) +
((buffer[6] << 8) | buffer[7]) != n)
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (n != 1)
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (n != 2)
break;
return 0;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
default:
return 0;
}
return -2;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Return true if we understand the critical notation. */
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
can_handle_critical_notation (const byte * name, size_t len)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (len == 32 && memcmp (name, "preferred-email-encoding@pgp.com", 32) == 0)
return 1;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (len == 21 && memcmp (name, "pka-address@gnupg.org", 21) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
can_handle_critical (const byte * buffer, size_t n, int type)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
switch (type)
{
case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (n >= 8)
{
size_t notation_len = ((buffer[4] << 8) | buffer[5]);
if (n - 8 >= notation_len)
return can_handle_critical_notation (buffer + 8, notation_len);
}
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER: /* issuer key ID */
case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR: /* issuer fingerprint */
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
/* Is it enough to show the policy or keyserver? */
case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
const byte *
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
enum_sig_subpkt (const subpktarea_t * pktbuf, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
size_t * ret_n, int *start, int *critical)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
const byte *buffer;
int buflen;
int type;
int critical_dummy;
int offset;
size_t n;
int seq = 0;
int reqseq = start ? *start : 0;
if (!critical)
critical = &critical_dummy;
if (!pktbuf || reqseq == -1)
{
static char dummy[] = "x";
/* Return a value different from NULL to indicate that
* there is no critical bit we do not understand. */
return reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL ? dummy : NULL;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
buffer = pktbuf->data;
buflen = pktbuf->len;
while (buflen)
{
n = *buffer++;
buflen--;
if (n == 255) /* 4 byte length header. */
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (buflen < 4)
goto too_short;
n = buf32_to_size_t (buffer);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
buffer += 4;
buflen -= 4;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else if (n >= 192) /* 4 byte special encoded length header. */
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (buflen < 2)
goto too_short;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
n = ((n - 192) << 8) + *buffer + 192;
buffer++;
buflen--;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (buflen < n)
goto too_short;
type = *buffer;
if (type & 0x80)
{
type &= 0x7f;
*critical = 1;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
*critical = 0;
if (!(++seq > reqseq))
;
else if (reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL)
{
if (*critical)
{
if (n - 1 > buflen + 1)
goto too_short;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (!can_handle_critical (buffer + 1, n - 1, type))
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("subpacket of type %d has "
"critical bit set\n"), type);
if (start)
*start = seq;
return NULL; /* This is an error. */
}
}
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else if (reqtype < 0) /* List packets. */
dump_sig_subpkt (reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED,
type, *critical, buffer, buflen, n);
else if (type == reqtype) /* Found. */
{
buffer++;
n--;
if (n > buflen)
goto too_short;
if (ret_n)
*ret_n = n;
offset = parse_one_sig_subpkt (buffer, n, type);
switch (offset)
{
case -2:
log_error ("subpacket of type %d too short\n", type);
return NULL;
case -1:
return NULL;
default:
break;
}
if (start)
*start = seq;
return buffer + offset;
}
buffer += n;
buflen -= n;
}
if (reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL)
/* Returning NULL means we found a subpacket with the critical bit
set that we don't grok. We've iterated over all the subpackets
and haven't found such a packet so we need to return a non-NULL
value. */
return buffer;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Critical bit we don't understand. */
if (start)
*start = -1;
return NULL; /* End of packets; not found. */
too_short:
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("buffer shorter than subpacket\n");
if (start)
*start = -1;
return NULL;
}
const byte *
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_sig_subpkt (const subpktarea_t * buffer, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
size_t * ret_n)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return enum_sig_subpkt (buffer, reqtype, ret_n, NULL, NULL);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
const byte *
parse_sig_subpkt2 (PKT_signature * sig, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
const byte *p;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, reqtype, NULL);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (!p)
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, reqtype, NULL);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return p;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Find all revocation keys. Look in hashed area only. */
void
parse_revkeys (PKT_signature * sig)
{
const byte *revkey;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int seq = 0;
size_t len;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (sig->sig_class != 0x1F)
return;
while ((revkey = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY,
&len, &seq, NULL)))
{
if (/* The only valid length is 22 bytes. See RFC 4880
5.2.3.15. */
len == 22
/* 0x80 bit must be set on the class. */
&& (revkey[0] & 0x80))
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
sig->revkey = xrealloc (sig->revkey,
sizeof (struct revocation_key) *
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
(sig->numrevkeys + 1));
/* Copy the individual fields. */
sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].class = revkey[0];
sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].algid = revkey[1];
memcpy (sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].fpr, &revkey[2], 20);
sig->numrevkeys++;
}
}
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_signature (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PKT_signature * sig)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int md5_len = 0;
unsigned n;
int is_v4 = 0;
int rc = 0;
int i, ndata;
if (pktlen < 16)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":signature packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
sig->version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
if (sig->version == 4)
is_v4 = 1;
else if (sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n",
pkttype, sig->version);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":signature packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (!is_v4)
{
if (pktlen == 0)
goto underflow;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
md5_len = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
}
if (pktlen == 0)
goto underflow;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
sig->sig_class = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
if (!is_v4)
{
if (pktlen < 12)
goto underflow;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
sig->timestamp = read_32 (inp);
pktlen -= 4;
sig->keyid[0] = read_32 (inp);
pktlen -= 4;
sig->keyid[1] = read_32 (inp);
pktlen -= 4;
}
if (pktlen < 2)
goto underflow;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
sig->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
sig->digest_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
sig->flags.exportable = 1;
sig->flags.revocable = 1;
if (is_v4) /* Read subpackets. */
{
if (pktlen < 2)
goto underflow;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
n = read_16 (inp);
pktlen -= 2; /* Length of hashed data. */
if (pktlen < n)
goto underflow;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (n > 10000)
{
log_error ("signature packet: hashed data too long\n");
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":signature packet: [hashed data too long]\n", listfp);
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (n)
{
sig->hashed = xmalloc (sizeof (*sig->hashed) + n - 1);
sig->hashed->size = n;
sig->hashed->len = n;
if (iobuf_read (inp, sig->hashed->data, n) != n)
{
log_error ("premature eof while reading "
"hashed signature data\n");
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":signature packet: [premature eof]\n", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = -1;
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen -= n;
}
if (pktlen < 2)
goto underflow;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
n = read_16 (inp);
pktlen -= 2; /* Length of unhashed data. */
if (pktlen < n)
goto underflow;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (n > 10000)
{
log_error ("signature packet: unhashed data too long\n");
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":signature packet: [unhashed data too long]\n", listfp);
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (n)
{
sig->unhashed = xmalloc (sizeof (*sig->unhashed) + n - 1);
sig->unhashed->size = n;
sig->unhashed->len = n;
if (iobuf_read (inp, sig->unhashed->data, n) != n)
{
log_error ("premature eof while reading "
"unhashed signature data\n");
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":signature packet: [premature eof]\n", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = -1;
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen -= n;
}
}
if (pktlen < 2)
goto underflow;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
sig->digest_start[0] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
sig->digest_start[1] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (is_v4 && sig->pubkey_algo) /* Extract required information. */
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
const byte *p;
size_t len;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Set sig->flags.unknown_critical if there is a critical bit
* set for packets which we do not understand. */
if (!parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL, NULL)
|| !parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL, NULL))
sig->flags.unknown_critical = 1;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED, NULL);
if (p)
sig->timestamp = buf32_to_u32 (p);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else if (!(sig->pubkey_algo >= 100 && sig->pubkey_algo <= 110)
&& opt.verbose)
log_info ("signature packet without timestamp\n");
p = parse_sig_subpkt2 (sig, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (p)
{
sig->keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (p);
sig->keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (p + 4);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
else if (!(sig->pubkey_algo >= 100 && sig->pubkey_algo <= 110)
&& opt.verbose)
log_info ("signature packet without keyid\n");
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL);
if (p && buf32_to_u32 (p))
sig->expiredate = sig->timestamp + buf32_to_u32 (p);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (sig->expiredate && sig->expiredate <= make_timestamp ())
sig->flags.expired = 1;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_POLICY, NULL);
if (p)
sig->flags.policy_url = 1;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, NULL);
if (p)
sig->flags.pref_ks = 1;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID, &len);
if (p && len)
{
sig->signers_uid = try_make_printable_string (p, len, 0);
if (!sig->signers_uid)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION, NULL);
if (p)
sig->flags.notation = 1;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, NULL);
if (p && *p == 0)
sig->flags.revocable = 0;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_TRUST, &len);
if (p && len == 2)
{
sig->trust_depth = p[0];
sig->trust_value = p[1];
/* Only look for a regexp if there is also a trust
subpacket. */
sig->trust_regexp =
parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP, &len);
/* If the regular expression is of 0 length, there is no
regular expression. */
if (len == 0)
sig->trust_regexp = NULL;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* We accept the exportable subpacket from either the hashed or
unhashed areas as older versions of gpg put it in the
unhashed area. In theory, anyway, we should never see this
packet off of a local keyring. */
p = parse_sig_subpkt2 (sig, SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (p && *p == 0)
sig->flags.exportable = 0;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Find all revocation keys. */
if (sig->sig_class == 0x1F)
parse_revkeys (sig);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, ":signature packet: algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n"
"\tversion %d, created %lu, md5len %d, sigclass 0x%02x\n"
"\tdigest algo %d, begin of digest %02x %02x\n",
sig->pubkey_algo,
(ulong) sig->keyid[0], (ulong) sig->keyid[1],
sig->version, (ulong) sig->timestamp, md5_len, sig->sig_class,
sig->digest_algo, sig->digest_start[0], sig->digest_start[1]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (is_v4)
{
parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED, NULL);
parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_LIST_UNHASHED, NULL);
}
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
ndata = pubkey_get_nsig (sig->pubkey_algo);
if (!ndata)
{
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown algorithm %d\n", sig->pubkey_algo);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
unknown_pubkey_warning (sig->pubkey_algo);
/* We store the plain material in data[0], so that we are able
* to write it back with build_packet(). */
if (pktlen > (5 * MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS / 8))
{
/* We include a limit to avoid too trivial DoS attacks by
having gpg allocate too much memory. */
log_error ("signature packet: too much data\n");
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
else
{
sig->data[0] =
gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, read_rest (inp, pktlen), pktlen * 8);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen = 0;
}
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < ndata; i++)
{
n = pktlen;
sig->data[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0);
pktlen -= n;
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tdata: ");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
mpi_print (listfp, sig->data[i], mpi_print_mode);
es_putc ('\n', listfp);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (!sig->data[i])
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
}
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
leave:
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return rc;
underflow:
log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":signature packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
}
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_onepass_sig (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PKT_onepass_sig * ops)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int version;
int rc = 0;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (pktlen < 13)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":onepass_sig packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
if (version != 3)
{
log_error ("onepass_sig with unknown version %d\n", version);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":onepass_sig packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
ops->sig_class = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
ops->digest_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
ops->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
ops->keyid[0] = read_32 (inp);
pktlen -= 4;
ops->keyid[1] = read_32 (inp);
pktlen -= 4;
ops->last = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp,
":onepass_sig packet: keyid %08lX%08lX\n"
"\tversion %d, sigclass 0x%02x, digest %d, pubkey %d, "
"last=%d\n",
(ulong) ops->keyid[0], (ulong) ops->keyid[1],
version, ops->sig_class,
ops->digest_algo, ops->pubkey_algo, ops->last);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
leave:
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return rc;
}
static int
parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
byte * hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET * pkt)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int i, version, algorithm;
unsigned long timestamp, expiredate, max_expiredate;
int npkey, nskey;
u32 keyid[2];
PKT_public_key *pk;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
(void) hdr;
pk = pkt->pkt.public_key; /* PK has been cleared. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && version == '#')
{
/* Early versions of G10 used the old PGP comments packets;
* luckily all those comments are started by a hash. */
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, ":rfc1991 comment packet: \"");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (; pktlen; pktlen--)
{
int c;
c = iobuf_get (inp);
if (c == -1)
break; /* Ooops: shorter than indicated. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (c >= ' ' && c <= 'z')
es_putc (c, listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", c);
}
es_fprintf (listfp, "\"\n");
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return 0;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else if (version == 4)
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
{
/* The only supported version. Use an older gpg
version (i.e. gpg 1.4) to parse v3 packets. */
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
}
else if (version == 2 || version == 3)
{
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info ("packet(%d) with obsolete version %d\n", pkttype, version);
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":key packet: [obsolete version %d]\n", version);
pk->version = version;
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY);
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
goto leave;
}
else
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":key packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (pktlen < 11)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":key packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
else if (pktlen > MAX_KEY_PACKET_LENGTH)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":key packet: [too larget]\n", listfp);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
timestamp = read_32 (inp);
pktlen -= 4;
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
expiredate = 0; /* have to get it from the selfsignature */
max_expiredate = 0;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":%s key packet:\n"
"\tversion %d, algo %d, created %lu, expires %lu\n",
pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "public" :
pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ? "secret" :
pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ? "public sub" :
pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ? "secret sub" : "??",
version, algorithm, timestamp, expiredate);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pk->timestamp = timestamp;
pk->expiredate = expiredate;
pk->max_expiredate = max_expiredate;
pk->hdrbytes = hdrlen;
pk->version = version;
pk->flags.primary = (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
pk->pubkey_algo = algorithm;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
nskey = pubkey_get_nskey (algorithm);
npkey = pubkey_get_npkey (algorithm);
if (!npkey)
{
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown algorithm %d\n", algorithm);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
unknown_pubkey_warning (algorithm);
}
if (!npkey)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
/* Unknown algorithm - put data into an opaque MPI. */
pk->pkey[0] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL,
read_rest (inp, pktlen), pktlen * 8);
pktlen = 0;
goto leave;
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < npkey; i++)
{
gpg: Use only OpenPGP public key algo ids and add the EdDSA algo id. * common/sexputil.c (get_pk_algo_from_canon_sexp): Change to return a string. * g10/keygen.c (check_keygrip): Adjust for change. * sm/certreqgen-ui.c (check_keygrip): Likewise. * agent/pksign.c (do_encode_dsa): Remove bogus map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry. * g10/misc.c (map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry): Remove. (openpgp_pk_test_algo): Change to a wrapper for openpgp_pk_test_algo2. (openpgp_pk_test_algo2): Rewrite. (openpgp_pk_algo_usage, pubkey_nbits): Add support for EdDSA. (openpgp_pk_algo_name): Rewrite to remove need for gcry calls. (pubkey_get_npkey, pubkey_get_nskey): Ditto. (pubkey_get_nsig, pubkey_get_nenc): Ditto. * g10/keygen.c(do_create_from_keygrip): Support EdDSA. (common_gen, gen_ecc, ask_keysize, generate_keypair): Ditto. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Ditto. * g10/export.c (transfer_format_to_openpgp): Ditto. * g10/getkey.c (cache_public_key): Ditto. * g10/import.c (transfer_secret_keys): Ditto. * g10/keylist.c (list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon): Ditto. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Ditto. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_key): Ditto, * g10/sign.c (hash_for, sign_file, make_keysig_packet): Ditto. * g10/keyserver.c (print_keyrec): Use openpgp_pk_algo_name. * g10/pkglue.c (pk_verify, pk_encrypt, pk_check_secret_key): Use only OpenPGP algo ids and support EdDSA. * g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Use only OpenPGP algo ids. * g10/seskey.c (encode_md_value): Ditto. -- This patch separates Libgcrypt and OpenPGP public key algorithms ids and in most cases completely removes the Libgcrypt ones. This is useful because for Libgcrypt we specify the algorithm in the S-expressions and the public key ids are not anymore needed. This patch also adds some support for PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA which will eventually be used instead of merging EdDSA with ECDSA. As of now an experimental algorithm id is used but the plan is to write an I-D so that we can get a new id from the IETF. Note that EdDSA (Ed25519) does not yet work and that more changes are required. The ECC support is still broken right now. Needs to be fixed. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-01-30 18:48:37 +01:00
if ( (algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA && (i == 0))
|| (algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA && (i == 0))
|| (algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH && (i == 0 || i == 2)))
{
gpg: Use only OpenPGP public key algo ids and add the EdDSA algo id. * common/sexputil.c (get_pk_algo_from_canon_sexp): Change to return a string. * g10/keygen.c (check_keygrip): Adjust for change. * sm/certreqgen-ui.c (check_keygrip): Likewise. * agent/pksign.c (do_encode_dsa): Remove bogus map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry. * g10/misc.c (map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry): Remove. (openpgp_pk_test_algo): Change to a wrapper for openpgp_pk_test_algo2. (openpgp_pk_test_algo2): Rewrite. (openpgp_pk_algo_usage, pubkey_nbits): Add support for EdDSA. (openpgp_pk_algo_name): Rewrite to remove need for gcry calls. (pubkey_get_npkey, pubkey_get_nskey): Ditto. (pubkey_get_nsig, pubkey_get_nenc): Ditto. * g10/keygen.c(do_create_from_keygrip): Support EdDSA. (common_gen, gen_ecc, ask_keysize, generate_keypair): Ditto. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Ditto. * g10/export.c (transfer_format_to_openpgp): Ditto. * g10/getkey.c (cache_public_key): Ditto. * g10/import.c (transfer_secret_keys): Ditto. * g10/keylist.c (list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon): Ditto. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Ditto. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_key): Ditto, * g10/sign.c (hash_for, sign_file, make_keysig_packet): Ditto. * g10/keyserver.c (print_keyrec): Use openpgp_pk_algo_name. * g10/pkglue.c (pk_verify, pk_encrypt, pk_check_secret_key): Use only OpenPGP algo ids and support EdDSA. * g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Use only OpenPGP algo ids. * g10/seskey.c (encode_md_value): Ditto. -- This patch separates Libgcrypt and OpenPGP public key algorithms ids and in most cases completely removes the Libgcrypt ones. This is useful because for Libgcrypt we specify the algorithm in the S-expressions and the public key ids are not anymore needed. This patch also adds some support for PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA which will eventually be used instead of merging EdDSA with ECDSA. As of now an experimental algorithm id is used but the plan is to write an I-D so that we can get a new id from the IETF. Note that EdDSA (Ed25519) does not yet work and that more changes are required. The ECC support is still broken right now. Needs to be fixed. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-01-30 18:48:37 +01:00
/* Read the OID (i==1) or the KDF params (i==2). */
2011-06-01 21:43:30 +02:00
size_t n;
err = read_size_body (inp, pktlen, &n, pk->pkey+i);
pktlen -= n;
}
else
{
2011-06-01 21:43:30 +02:00
unsigned int n = pktlen;
pk->pkey[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0);
pktlen -= n;
if (!pk->pkey[i])
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
}
if (err)
goto leave;
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tpkey[%d]: ", i);
mpi_print (listfp, pk->pkey[i], mpi_print_mode);
gpg: Rework ECC support and add experimental support for Ed25519. * agent/findkey.c (key_parms_from_sexp): Add algo name "ecc". (agent_is_dsa_key): Ditto. (agent_is_eddsa_key): New. Not finished, though. * agent/pksign.c (do_encode_eddsa): New. (agent_pksign_do): Use gcry_log_debug functions. * agent/protect.c (agent_protect): Parse a flags parameter. * g10/keygen.c (gpg_curve_to_oid): Move to ... * common/openpgp-oid.c (openpgp_curve_to_oid): here and rename. (oid_ed25519): New. (openpgp_oid_is_ed25519): New. (openpgp_oid_to_curve): New. * common/t-openpgp-oid.c (test_openpgp_oid_is_ed25519): New. * g10/build-packet.c (gpg_mpi_write): Write the length header also for opaque MPIs. (gpg_mpi_write_nohdr): New. (do_key): Use gpg_mpi_write_nohdr depending on algorithm. (do_pubkey_enc): Ditto. * g10/ecdh.c (pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point): Use gpg_mpi_write_nohdr. * g10/export.c (transfer_format_to_openpgp): * g10/keygen.c (ecckey_from_sexp): Return the error. (gen_ecc): Repalce arg NBITS by CURVE. (read_parameter_file): Add keywords "Key-Curve" and "Subkey-Curve". (ask_curve): New. (generate_keypair, generate_subkeypair): Use ask_curve. (do_generate_keypair): Also pass curve name. * g10/keylist.c (list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon): Print curve name. * g10/parse-packet.c (mpi_read): Remove workaround for Libcgrypt < 1.5. (parse_key): Fix ECC case. Print the curve name. * g10/pkglue.c (mpi_from_sexp): Rename to get_mpi_from_sexp. (pk_verify, pk_check_secret_key): Add special case for Ed25519. * g10/seskey.c (encode_md_value): Ditto. * g10/sign.c (do_sign, hash_for, sign_file): Ditto. -- Be warned that this code is subject to further changes and that the format will very likely change before a release. There are also known bugs and missing code. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2013-11-15 08:59:45 +01:00
if ((algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
gpg: Use only OpenPGP public key algo ids and add the EdDSA algo id. * common/sexputil.c (get_pk_algo_from_canon_sexp): Change to return a string. * g10/keygen.c (check_keygrip): Adjust for change. * sm/certreqgen-ui.c (check_keygrip): Likewise. * agent/pksign.c (do_encode_dsa): Remove bogus map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry. * g10/misc.c (map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry): Remove. (openpgp_pk_test_algo): Change to a wrapper for openpgp_pk_test_algo2. (openpgp_pk_test_algo2): Rewrite. (openpgp_pk_algo_usage, pubkey_nbits): Add support for EdDSA. (openpgp_pk_algo_name): Rewrite to remove need for gcry calls. (pubkey_get_npkey, pubkey_get_nskey): Ditto. (pubkey_get_nsig, pubkey_get_nenc): Ditto. * g10/keygen.c(do_create_from_keygrip): Support EdDSA. (common_gen, gen_ecc, ask_keysize, generate_keypair): Ditto. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Ditto. * g10/export.c (transfer_format_to_openpgp): Ditto. * g10/getkey.c (cache_public_key): Ditto. * g10/import.c (transfer_secret_keys): Ditto. * g10/keylist.c (list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon): Ditto. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Ditto. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_key): Ditto, * g10/sign.c (hash_for, sign_file, make_keysig_packet): Ditto. * g10/keyserver.c (print_keyrec): Use openpgp_pk_algo_name. * g10/pkglue.c (pk_verify, pk_encrypt, pk_check_secret_key): Use only OpenPGP algo ids and support EdDSA. * g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Use only OpenPGP algo ids. * g10/seskey.c (encode_md_value): Ditto. -- This patch separates Libgcrypt and OpenPGP public key algorithms ids and in most cases completely removes the Libgcrypt ones. This is useful because for Libgcrypt we specify the algorithm in the S-expressions and the public key ids are not anymore needed. This patch also adds some support for PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA which will eventually be used instead of merging EdDSA with ECDSA. As of now an experimental algorithm id is used but the plan is to write an I-D so that we can get a new id from the IETF. Note that EdDSA (Ed25519) does not yet work and that more changes are required. The ECC support is still broken right now. Needs to be fixed. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-01-30 18:48:37 +01:00
|| algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA
gpg: Rework ECC support and add experimental support for Ed25519. * agent/findkey.c (key_parms_from_sexp): Add algo name "ecc". (agent_is_dsa_key): Ditto. (agent_is_eddsa_key): New. Not finished, though. * agent/pksign.c (do_encode_eddsa): New. (agent_pksign_do): Use gcry_log_debug functions. * agent/protect.c (agent_protect): Parse a flags parameter. * g10/keygen.c (gpg_curve_to_oid): Move to ... * common/openpgp-oid.c (openpgp_curve_to_oid): here and rename. (oid_ed25519): New. (openpgp_oid_is_ed25519): New. (openpgp_oid_to_curve): New. * common/t-openpgp-oid.c (test_openpgp_oid_is_ed25519): New. * g10/build-packet.c (gpg_mpi_write): Write the length header also for opaque MPIs. (gpg_mpi_write_nohdr): New. (do_key): Use gpg_mpi_write_nohdr depending on algorithm. (do_pubkey_enc): Ditto. * g10/ecdh.c (pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point): Use gpg_mpi_write_nohdr. * g10/export.c (transfer_format_to_openpgp): * g10/keygen.c (ecckey_from_sexp): Return the error. (gen_ecc): Repalce arg NBITS by CURVE. (read_parameter_file): Add keywords "Key-Curve" and "Subkey-Curve". (ask_curve): New. (generate_keypair, generate_subkeypair): Use ask_curve. (do_generate_keypair): Also pass curve name. * g10/keylist.c (list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon): Print curve name. * g10/parse-packet.c (mpi_read): Remove workaround for Libcgrypt < 1.5. (parse_key): Fix ECC case. Print the curve name. * g10/pkglue.c (mpi_from_sexp): Rename to get_mpi_from_sexp. (pk_verify, pk_check_secret_key): Add special case for Ed25519. * g10/seskey.c (encode_md_value): Ditto. * g10/sign.c (do_sign, hash_for, sign_file): Ditto. -- Be warned that this code is subject to further changes and that the format will very likely change before a release. There are also known bugs and missing code. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2013-11-15 08:59:45 +01:00
|| algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) && i==0)
{
char *curve = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]);
const char *name = openpgp_oid_to_curve (curve, 0);
es_fprintf (listfp, " %s (%s)", name?name:"", curve);
gpg: Rework ECC support and add experimental support for Ed25519. * agent/findkey.c (key_parms_from_sexp): Add algo name "ecc". (agent_is_dsa_key): Ditto. (agent_is_eddsa_key): New. Not finished, though. * agent/pksign.c (do_encode_eddsa): New. (agent_pksign_do): Use gcry_log_debug functions. * agent/protect.c (agent_protect): Parse a flags parameter. * g10/keygen.c (gpg_curve_to_oid): Move to ... * common/openpgp-oid.c (openpgp_curve_to_oid): here and rename. (oid_ed25519): New. (openpgp_oid_is_ed25519): New. (openpgp_oid_to_curve): New. * common/t-openpgp-oid.c (test_openpgp_oid_is_ed25519): New. * g10/build-packet.c (gpg_mpi_write): Write the length header also for opaque MPIs. (gpg_mpi_write_nohdr): New. (do_key): Use gpg_mpi_write_nohdr depending on algorithm. (do_pubkey_enc): Ditto. * g10/ecdh.c (pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point): Use gpg_mpi_write_nohdr. * g10/export.c (transfer_format_to_openpgp): * g10/keygen.c (ecckey_from_sexp): Return the error. (gen_ecc): Repalce arg NBITS by CURVE. (read_parameter_file): Add keywords "Key-Curve" and "Subkey-Curve". (ask_curve): New. (generate_keypair, generate_subkeypair): Use ask_curve. (do_generate_keypair): Also pass curve name. * g10/keylist.c (list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon): Print curve name. * g10/parse-packet.c (mpi_read): Remove workaround for Libcgrypt < 1.5. (parse_key): Fix ECC case. Print the curve name. * g10/pkglue.c (mpi_from_sexp): Rename to get_mpi_from_sexp. (pk_verify, pk_check_secret_key): Add special case for Ed25519. * g10/seskey.c (encode_md_value): Ditto. * g10/sign.c (do_sign, hash_for, sign_file): Ditto. -- Be warned that this code is subject to further changes and that the format will very likely change before a release. There are also known bugs and missing code. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2013-11-15 08:59:45 +01:00
xfree (curve);
}
es_putc ('\n', listfp);
}
}
}
if (list_mode)
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
if (pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
{
struct seckey_info *ski;
byte temp[16];
size_t snlen = 0;
if (pktlen < 1)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
pk->seckey_info = ski = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ski);
if (!pk->seckey_info)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
ski->algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen--;
if (ski->algo)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
ski->is_protected = 1;
ski->s2k.count = 0;
if (ski->algo == 254 || ski->algo == 255)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
if (pktlen < 3)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
ski->sha1chk = (ski->algo == 254);
ski->algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen--;
/* Note that a ski->algo > 110 is illegal, but I'm not
erroring on it here as otherwise there would be no
way to delete such a key. */
ski->s2k.mode = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen--;
ski->s2k.hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen--;
/* Check for the special GNU extension. */
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
if (ski->s2k.mode == 101)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
for (i = 0; i < 4 && pktlen; i++, pktlen--)
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
if (i < 4 || memcmp (temp, "GNU", 3))
{
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown S2K %d\n",
ski->s2k.mode);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Here we know that it is a GNU extension. What
* follows is the GNU protection mode: All values
* have special meanings and they are mapped to MODE
* with a base of 1000. */
ski->s2k.mode = 1000 + temp[3];
}
/* Read the salt. */
switch (ski->s2k.mode)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
case 1:
case 3:
for (i = 0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen--)
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
if (i < 8)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
memcpy (ski->s2k.salt, temp, 8);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
}
/* Check the mode. */
switch (ski->s2k.mode)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
case 0:
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tsimple S2K");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case 1:
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tsalted S2K");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case 3:
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\titer+salt S2K");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case 1001:
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tgnu-dummy S2K");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
case 1002:
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tgnu-divert-to-card S2K");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
break;
default:
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown %sS2K %d\n",
ski->s2k.mode < 1000 ? "" : "GNU ",
ski->s2k.mode);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
/* Print some info. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, ", algo: %d,%s hash: %d",
ski->algo,
ski->sha1chk ? " SHA1 protection,"
: " simple checksum,", ski->s2k.hash_algo);
if (ski->s2k.mode == 1 || ski->s2k.mode == 3)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
es_fprintf (listfp, ", salt: ");
es_write_hexstring (listfp, ski->s2k.salt, 8, 0, NULL);
}
es_putc ('\n', listfp);
}
/* Read remaining protection parameters. */
if (ski->s2k.mode == 3)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
if (pktlen < 1)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
ski->s2k.count = iobuf_get (inp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen--;
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tprotect count: %lu (%lu)\n",
(ulong)S2K_DECODE_COUNT ((ulong)ski->s2k.count),
(ulong) ski->s2k.count);
}
else if (ski->s2k.mode == 1002)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
/* Read the serial number. */
if (pktlen < 1)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
snlen = iobuf_get (inp);
pktlen--;
if (pktlen < snlen || snlen == (size_t)(-1))
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
}
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else /* Old version; no S2K, so we set mode to 0, hash MD5. */
{
/* Note that a ski->algo > 110 is illegal, but I'm not
erroring on it here as otherwise there would be no
way to delete such a key. */
ski->s2k.mode = 0;
ski->s2k.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tprotect algo: %d (hash algo: %d)\n",
ski->algo, ski->s2k.hash_algo);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* It is really ugly that we don't know the size
* of the IV here in cases we are not aware of the algorithm.
* so a
* ski->ivlen = cipher_get_blocksize (ski->algo);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
* won't work. The only solution I see is to hardwire it.
* NOTE: if you change the ivlen above 16, don't forget to
* enlarge temp. */
ski->ivlen = openpgp_cipher_blocklen (ski->algo);
log_assert (ski->ivlen <= sizeof (temp));
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (ski->s2k.mode == 1001)
ski->ivlen = 0;
else if (ski->s2k.mode == 1002)
ski->ivlen = snlen < 16 ? snlen : 16;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (pktlen < ski->ivlen)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
}
for (i = 0; i < ski->ivlen; i++, pktlen--)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp,
ski->s2k.mode == 1002 ? "\tserial-number: "
: "\tprotect IV: ");
for (i = 0; i < ski->ivlen; i++)
es_fprintf (listfp, " %02x", temp[i]);
es_putc ('\n', listfp);
}
memcpy (ski->iv, temp, ski->ivlen);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory.
* If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key,
* we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(.
* So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect it. */
if (ski->s2k.mode == 1001 || ski->s2k.mode == 1002)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
/* Better set some dummy stuff here. */
pk->pkey[npkey] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL,
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
xstrdup ("dummydata"),
10 * 8);
pktlen = 0;
}
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
else if (ski->is_protected)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
if (pktlen < 2) /* At least two bytes for the length. */
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Ugly: The length is encrypted too, so we read all stuff
* up to the end of the packet into the first SKEY
* element. */
pk->pkey[npkey] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL,
read_rest (inp, pktlen),
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen * 8);
/* Mark that MPI as protected - we need this information for
importing a key. The OPAQUE flag can't be used because
we also store public EdDSA values in opaque MPIs. */
if (pk->pkey[npkey])
gcry_mpi_set_flag (pk->pkey[npkey], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen = 0;
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tskey[%d]: [v4 protected]\n", npkey);
}
else
{
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
/* Not encrypted. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (i = npkey; i < nskey; i++)
{
unsigned int n;
if (pktlen < 2) /* At least two bytes for the length. */
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
n = pktlen;
gpg: Remove all support for v3 keys and always create v4-signatures. * g10/build-packet.c (do_key): Remove support for building v3 keys. * g10/parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): Remove. (parse_key): Remove support for v3-keys. Add dedicated warnings for v3-key packets. * g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Remove v3-key support. (keyid_from_pk): Ditto. (fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto. * g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields force_v3_sigs and force_v4_certs. * g10/gpg.c (cmd_and_opt_values): Remove oForceV3Sigs, oNoForceV3Sigs, oForceV4Certs, oNoForceV4Certs. (opts): Turn --force-v3-sigs, --no-force-v3-sigs, --force-v4-certs, --no-force-v4-certs int dummy options. (main): Remove setting of the force_v3_sigs force_v4_certs flags. * g10/revoke.c (gen_revoke, create_revocation): Always create v4 certs. * g10/sign.c (hash_uid): Remove support for v3-signatures (hash_sigversion_to_magic): Ditto. (only_old_style): Remove this v3-key function. (write_signature_packets): Remove support for creating v3-signatures. (sign_file): Ditto. (sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto. (clearsign_file): Ditto. Remove code to emit no Hash armor line if only v3-keys are used. (make_keysig_packet): Remove arg SIGVERSION and force using v4-signatures. Change all callers to not pass a value for this arg. Remove all v3-key related code. (update_keysig_packet): Remove v3-signature support. * g10/keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always create v4-signatures. * g10/textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Remove arg pgp2mode and change caller. -- v3 keys are deprecated for about 15 years and due the severe weaknesses of MD5 it does not make any sense to keep code around to use these old and broken keys. Users who need to decrypt old messages should use gpg 1.4 and best re-encrypt them to modern standards. verification of old (i.e. PGP2) created signatures is thus also not anymore possible but such signatures have no values anyway - MD5 is just too broken. We have also kept support for v3 signatures until now. With the removal of support for v3 keys it is questionable whether it makes any sense to keep support for v3-signatures. What we do now is to keep support for verification of v3-signatures but we force the use of v4-signatures. The latter makes the --pgp6 and --pgp7 switch a bit obsolete because those PGP versions require v3-signatures for messages. These versions of PGP are also really old and not anymore maintained so they have not received any bug fixes and should not be used anyway. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2014-10-12 20:07:12 +02:00
pk->pkey[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0);
pktlen -= n;
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tskey[%d]: ", i);
mpi_print (listfp, pk->pkey[i], mpi_print_mode);
es_putc ('\n', listfp);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (!pk->pkey[i])
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
}
if (err)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
goto leave;
if (pktlen < 2)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
ski->csum = read_16 (inp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pktlen -= 2;
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tchecksum: %04hx\n", ski->csum);
}
}
/* Note that KEYID below has been initialized above in list_mode. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tkeyid: %08lX%08lX\n",
(ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1]);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
leave:
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return err;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Attribute subpackets have the same format as v4 signature
subpackets. This is not part of OpenPGP, but is done in several
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
versions of PGP nevertheless. */
int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_attribute_subpkts (PKT_user_id * uid)
{
size_t n;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int count = 0;
struct user_attribute *attribs = NULL;
const byte *buffer = uid->attrib_data;
int buflen = uid->attrib_len;
byte type;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
xfree (uid->attribs);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
while (buflen)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
n = *buffer++;
buflen--;
if (n == 255) /* 4 byte length header. */
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (buflen < 4)
goto too_short;
n = buf32_to_size_t (buffer);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
buffer += 4;
buflen -= 4;
}
else if (n >= 192) /* 2 byte special encoded length header. */
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (buflen < 2)
goto too_short;
n = ((n - 192) << 8) + *buffer + 192;
buffer++;
buflen--;
}
if (buflen < n)
goto too_short;
if (!n)
{
/* Too short to encode the subpacket type. */
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("attribute subpacket too short\n");
break;
}
attribs = xrealloc (attribs,
(count + 1) * sizeof (struct user_attribute));
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
memset (&attribs[count], 0, sizeof (struct user_attribute));
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
type = *buffer;
buffer++;
buflen--;
n--;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
attribs[count].type = type;
attribs[count].data = buffer;
attribs[count].len = n;
buffer += n;
buflen -= n;
count++;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
uid->attribs = attribs;
uid->numattribs = count;
return count;
too_short:
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("buffer shorter than attribute subpacket\n");
uid->attribs = attribs;
uid->numattribs = count;
return count;
}
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_user_id (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET * packet)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
byte *p;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Cap the size of a user ID at 2k: a value absurdly large enough
that there is no sane user ID string (which is printable text
as of RFC2440bis) that won't fit in it, but yet small enough to
avoid allocation problems. A large pktlen may not be
allocatable, and a very large pktlen could actually cause our
allocation to wrap around in xmalloc to a small number. */
2006-06-27 14:30:59 +00:00
if (pktlen > MAX_UID_PACKET_LENGTH)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":user ID packet: [too large]\n");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id + pktlen);
packet->pkt.user_id->len = pktlen;
packet->pkt.user_id->ref = 1;
p = packet->pkt.user_id->name;
for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++)
*p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
*p = 0;
if (list_mode)
{
int n = packet->pkt.user_id->len;
es_fprintf (listfp, ":user ID packet: \"");
/* fixme: Hey why don't we replace this with es_write_sanitized?? */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (p = packet->pkt.user_id->name; n; p++, n--)
{
if (*p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z')
es_putc (*p, listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p);
}
es_fprintf (listfp, "\"\n");
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return 0;
}
void
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
make_attribute_uidname (PKT_user_id * uid, size_t max_namelen)
{
log_assert (max_namelen > 70);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (uid->numattribs <= 0)
sprintf (uid->name, "[bad attribute packet of size %lu]",
uid->attrib_len);
else if (uid->numattribs > 1)
sprintf (uid->name, "[%d attributes of size %lu]",
uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len);
else
{
/* Only one attribute, so list it as the "user id" */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (uid->attribs->type == ATTRIB_IMAGE)
{
u32 len;
byte type;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (parse_image_header (uid->attribs, &type, &len))
sprintf (uid->name, "[%.20s image of size %lu]",
image_type_to_string (type, 1), (ulong) len);
else
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
sprintf (uid->name, "[invalid image]");
}
else
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
sprintf (uid->name, "[unknown attribute of size %lu]",
(ulong) uid->attribs->len);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
uid->len = strlen (uid->name);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_attribute (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * packet)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
byte *p;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
(void) pkttype;
/* We better cap the size of an attribute packet to make DoS not too
easy. 16MB should be more then enough for one attribute packet
(ie. a photo). */
if (pktlen > MAX_ATTR_PACKET_LENGTH)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":attribute packet: [too large]\n");
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
}
#define EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE 71
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id
+ EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE);
packet->pkt.user_id->ref = 1;
packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_data = xmalloc (pktlen? pktlen:1);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_len = pktlen;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
p = packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_data;
for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++)
*p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Now parse out the individual attribute subpackets. This is
somewhat pointless since there is only one currently defined
attribute type (jpeg), but it is correct by the spec. */
parse_attribute_subpkts (packet->pkt.user_id);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
make_attribute_uidname (packet->pkt.user_id, EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, ":attribute packet: %s\n", packet->pkt.user_id->name);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return 0;
}
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_comment (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET * packet)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
byte *p;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Cap comment packet at a reasonable value to avoid an integer
overflow in the malloc below. Comment packets are actually not
anymore define my OpenPGP and we even stopped to use our
private comment packet. */
if (pktlen > MAX_COMMENT_PACKET_LENGTH)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":%scomment packet: [too large]\n",
pkttype == PKT_OLD_COMMENT ? "OpenPGP draft " : "");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
}
packet->pkt.comment = xmalloc (sizeof *packet->pkt.comment + pktlen - 1);
packet->pkt.comment->len = pktlen;
p = packet->pkt.comment->data;
for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++)
*p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
if (list_mode)
{
int n = packet->pkt.comment->len;
es_fprintf (listfp, ":%scomment packet: \"", pkttype == PKT_OLD_COMMENT ?
"OpenPGP draft " : "");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (p = packet->pkt.comment->data; n; p++, n--)
{
if (*p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z')
es_putc (*p, listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p);
}
es_fprintf (listfp, "\"\n");
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
return 0;
}
static void
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_trust (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET * pkt)
{
int c;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
(void) pkttype;
pkt->pkt.ring_trust = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.ring_trust);
if (pktlen)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
c = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval = c;
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache = 0;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (!c && pktlen == 1)
{
c = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
/* We require that bit 7 of the sigcache is 0 (easier eof
handling). */
if (!(c & 0x80))
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache = c;
}
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: flag=%02x sigcache=%02x\n",
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval,
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache);
}
else
{
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval = 0;
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache = 0;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: empty\n");
}
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
}
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_plaintext (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb, int partial)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int rc = 0;
int mode, namelen;
PKT_plaintext *pt;
byte *p;
int c, i;
if (!partial && pktlen < 6)
{
log_error ("packet(%d) too short (%lu)\n", pkttype, (ulong) pktlen);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":literal data packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
mode = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
if (pktlen)
pktlen--;
namelen = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
if (pktlen)
pktlen--;
/* Note that namelen will never exceed 255 bytes. */
pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext =
xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.plaintext + namelen - 1);
pt->new_ctb = new_ctb;
pt->mode = mode;
pt->namelen = namelen;
pt->is_partial = partial;
if (pktlen)
{
for (i = 0; pktlen > 4 && i < namelen; pktlen--, i++)
pt->name[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++)
if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
break;
else
pt->name[i] = c;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
pt->timestamp = read_32 (inp);
if (pktlen)
pktlen -= 4;
pt->len = pktlen;
pt->buf = inp;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, ":literal data packet:\n"
"\tmode %c (%X), created %lu, name=\"",
mode >= ' ' && mode < 'z' ? mode : '?', mode,
(ulong) pt->timestamp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
for (p = pt->name, i = 0; i < namelen; p++, i++)
{
if (*p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z')
es_putc (*p, listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p);
}
es_fprintf (listfp, "\",\n\traw data: ");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (partial)
es_fprintf (listfp, "unknown length\n");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
es_fprintf (listfp, "%lu bytes\n", (ulong) pt->len);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
leave:
return rc;
}
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_compressed (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb)
{
PKT_compressed *zd;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* PKTLEN is here 0, but data follows (this should be the last
object in a file or the compress algorithm should know the
length). */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
(void) pkttype;
(void) pktlen;
zd = pkt->pkt.compressed = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.compressed);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
zd->algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
zd->len = 0; /* not used */
zd->new_ctb = new_ctb;
zd->buf = inp;
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":compressed packet: algo=%d\n", zd->algorithm);
return 0;
}
static int
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
parse_encrypted (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb, int partial)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
int rc = 0;
PKT_encrypted *ed;
unsigned long orig_pktlen = pktlen;
ed = pkt->pkt.encrypted = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.encrypted);
/* ed->len is set below. */
ed->extralen = 0; /* Unknown here; only used in build_packet. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
ed->buf = NULL;
ed->new_ctb = new_ctb;
ed->is_partial = partial;
if (pkttype == PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC)
{
/* Fixme: add some pktlen sanity checks. */
int version;
version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
if (orig_pktlen)
pktlen--;
if (version != 1)
{
log_error ("encrypted_mdc packet with unknown version %d\n",
version);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":encrypted data packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/*skip_rest(inp, pktlen); should we really do this? */
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
ed->mdc_method = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
}
else
ed->mdc_method = 0;
/* A basic sanity check. We need at least an 8 byte IV plus the 2
detection bytes. Note that we don't known the algorithm and thus
we may only check against the minimum blocksize. */
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (orig_pktlen && pktlen < 10)
{
/* Actually this is blocksize+2. */
log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
if (list_mode)
es_fputs (":encrypted data packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial);
goto leave;
}
/* Store the remaining length of the encrypted data (i.e. without
the MDC version number but with the IV etc.). This value is
required during decryption. */
ed->len = pktlen;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
{
if (orig_pktlen)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: %lu\n",
orig_pktlen);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
else
es_fprintf (listfp, ":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: unknown\n");
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (ed->mdc_method)
es_fprintf (listfp, "\tmdc_method: %d\n", ed->mdc_method);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
ed->buf = inp;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
leave:
return rc;
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Note, that this code is not anymore used in real life because the
MDC checking is now done right after the decryption in
decrypt_data. */
static int
parse_mdc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb)
{
int rc = 0;
PKT_mdc *mdc;
byte *p;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
(void) pkttype;
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
mdc = pkt->pkt.mdc = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.mdc);
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":mdc packet: length=%lu\n", pktlen);
if (!new_ctb || pktlen != 20)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
log_error ("mdc_packet with invalid encoding\n");
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
goto leave;
}
p = mdc->hash;
for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++)
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
*p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
leave:
return rc;
}
/*
* This packet is internally generated by us (in armor.c) to transfer
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
* some information to the lower layer. To make sure that this packet
Fix typos found using codespell. * agent/cache.c: Fix typos. * agent/call-pinentry.c: Likewise. * agent/call-scd.c: Likewise. * agent/command-ssh.c: Likewise. * agent/command.c: Likewise. * agent/divert-scd.c: Likewise. * agent/findkey.c: Likewise. * agent/gpg-agent.c: Likewise. * agent/w32main.c: Likewise. * common/argparse.c: Likewise. * common/audit.c: Likewise. * common/audit.h: Likewise. * common/convert.c: Likewise. * common/dotlock.c: Likewise. * common/exechelp-posix.c: Likewise. * common/exechelp-w32.c: Likewise. * common/exechelp-w32ce.c: Likewise. * common/exechelp.h: Likewise. * common/helpfile.c: Likewise. * common/i18n.h: Likewise. * common/iobuf.c: Likewise. * common/iobuf.h: Likewise. * common/localename.c: Likewise. * common/logging.c: Likewise. * common/openpgp-oid.c: Likewise. * common/session-env.c: Likewise. * common/sexputil.c: Likewise. * common/sysutils.c: Likewise. * common/t-sexputil.c: Likewise. * common/ttyio.c: Likewise. * common/util.h: Likewise. * dirmngr/cdblib.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/certcache.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/crlcache.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/dirmngr-client.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/dirmngr.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/dirmngr_ldap.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/dns-stuff.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/http.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/ks-engine-hkp.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/ks-engine-ldap.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/ldap-wrapper.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/ldap.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/misc.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/ocsp.c: Likewise. * dirmngr/validate.c: Likewise. * g10/encrypt.c: Likewise. * g10/getkey.c: Likewise. * g10/gpg.c: Likewise. * g10/gpgv.c: Likewise. * g10/import.c: Likewise. * g10/keydb.c: Likewise. * g10/keydb.h: Likewise. * g10/keygen.c: Likewise. * g10/keyid.c: Likewise. * g10/keylist.c: Likewise. * g10/keyring.c: Likewise. * g10/mainproc.c: Likewise. * g10/misc.c: Likewise. * g10/options.h: Likewise. * g10/packet.h: Likewise. * g10/parse-packet.c: Likewise. * g10/pkclist.c: Likewise. * g10/pkglue.c: Likewise. * g10/plaintext.c: Likewise. * g10/server.c: Likewise. * g10/sig-check.c: Likewise. * g10/sqlite.c: Likewise. * g10/tdbio.c: Likewise. * g10/test-stubs.c: Likewise. * g10/tofu.c: Likewise. * g10/trust.c: Likewise. * g10/trustdb.c: Likewise. * g13/create.c: Likewise. * g13/mountinfo.c: Likewise. * kbx/keybox-blob.c: Likewise. * kbx/keybox-file.c: Likewise. * kbx/keybox-init.c: Likewise. * kbx/keybox-search-desc.h: Likewise. * kbx/keybox-search.c: Likewise. * kbx/keybox-update.c: Likewise. * scd/apdu.c: Likewise. * scd/app-openpgp.c: Likewise. * scd/app-p15.c: Likewise. * scd/app.c: Likewise. * scd/ccid-driver.c: Likewise. * scd/command.c: Likewise. * scd/iso7816.c: Likewise. * sm/base64.c: Likewise. * sm/call-agent.c: Likewise. * sm/call-dirmngr.c: Likewise. * sm/certchain.c: Likewise. * sm/gpgsm.c: Likewise. * sm/import.c: Likewise. * sm/keydb.c: Likewise. * sm/minip12.c: Likewise. * sm/qualified.c: Likewise. * sm/server.c: Likewise. * tools/gpg-check-pattern.c: Likewise. * tools/gpgconf-comp.c: Likewise. * tools/gpgkey2ssh.c: Likewise. * tools/gpgparsemail.c: Likewise. * tools/gpgtar.c: Likewise. * tools/rfc822parse.c: Likewise. * tools/symcryptrun.c: Likewise. Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <justus@g10code.com>
2015-11-16 12:41:46 +01:00
* is really a GPG faked one and not one coming from outside, we
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
* first check that there is a unique tag in it.
*
* The format of such a control packet is:
* n byte session marker
* 1 byte control type CTRLPKT_xxxxx
* m byte control data
*/
static int
parse_gpg_control (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
PACKET * packet, int partial)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
byte *p;
const byte *sesmark;
size_t sesmarklen;
int i;
(void) pkttype;
if (list_mode)
es_fprintf (listfp, ":packet 63: length %lu ", pktlen);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
sesmark = get_session_marker (&sesmarklen);
if (pktlen < sesmarklen + 1) /* 1 is for the control bytes */
goto skipit;
for (i = 0; i < sesmarklen; i++, pktlen--)
{
if (sesmark[i] != iobuf_get_noeof (inp))
goto skipit;
}
if (pktlen > 4096)
goto skipit; /* Definitely too large. We skip it to avoid an
overflow in the malloc. */
if (list_mode)
es_fputs ("- gpg control packet", listfp);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
packet->pkt.gpg_control = xmalloc (sizeof *packet->pkt.gpg_control
+ pktlen - 1);
packet->pkt.gpg_control->control = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
packet->pkt.gpg_control->datalen = pktlen;
p = packet->pkt.gpg_control->data;
for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++)
*p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
return 0;
skipit:
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (list_mode)
{
int c;
i = 0;
es_fprintf (listfp, "- private (rest length %lu)\n", pktlen);
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
if (partial)
{
while ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) != -1)
dump_hex_line (c, &i);
}
else
{
for (; pktlen; pktlen--)
{
dump_hex_line ((c = iobuf_get (inp)), &i);
if (c == -1)
break;
}
}
es_putc ('\n', listfp);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
}
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
/* Create a GPG control packet to be used internally as a placeholder. */
PACKET *
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
create_gpg_control (ctrlpkttype_t type, const byte * data, size_t datalen)
{
2009-10-02 09:15:10 +00:00
PACKET *packet;
byte *p;
packet = xmalloc (sizeof *packet);
init_packet (packet);
packet->pkttype = PKT_GPG_CONTROL;
packet->pkt.gpg_control = xmalloc (sizeof *packet->pkt.gpg_control
+ datalen - 1);
packet->pkt.gpg_control->control = type;
packet->pkt.gpg_control->datalen = datalen;
p = packet->pkt.gpg_control->data;
for (; datalen; datalen--, p++)
*p = *data++;
return packet;
}