2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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# doc/DETAILS -*- org -*-
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#+TITLE: GnuPG Details
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# Globally disable superscripts and subscripts:
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#+OPTIONS: ^:{}
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#
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# Note: This file uses org-mode; it should be easy to read as plain
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# text but be aware of some markup peculiarities: Verbatim code is
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# enclosed in #+begin-example, #+end-example blocks or marked by a
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# colon as the first non-white-space character, words bracketed with
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# equal signs indicate a monospace font, and the usual /italics/,
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# *bold*, and _underline_ conventions are recognized.
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This is the DETAILS file for GnuPG which specifies some internals and
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parts of the external API for GPG and GPGSM.
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* Format of the colon listings
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Fix more spelling
* NEWS, acinclude.m4, agent/command-ssh.c, agent/command.c,
agent/gpg-agent.c, agent/keyformat.txt, agent/protect-tool.c,
common/asshelp.c, common/b64enc.c, common/recsel.c, doc/DETAILS,
doc/HACKING, doc/Notes, doc/TRANSLATE, doc/dirmngr.texi,
doc/faq.org, doc/gpg-agent.texi, doc/gpg.texi, doc/gpgsm.texi,
doc/instguide.texi, g10/armor.c, g10/gpg.c, g10/keyedit.c,
g10/mainproc.c, g10/pkclist.c, g10/tofu.c, g13/sh-cmd.c,
g13/sh-dmcrypt.c, kbx/keybox-init.c, m4/pkg.m4, sm/call-dirmngr.c,
sm/gpgsm.c, tests/Makefile.am, tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt,
tests/gpgscm/scheme.c, tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm,
tests/openpgp/multisig.test, tests/openpgp/verify.scm,
tests/pkits/README, tools/applygnupgdefaults,
tools/gpg-connect-agent.c, tools/mime-maker.c, tools/mime-parser.c:
minor spelling cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
2016-09-15 20:21:15 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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The format is a based on colon separated record, each recods starts
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with a tag string and extends to the end of the line. Here is an
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example:
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#+begin_example
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2012-05-24 10:13:39 +02:00
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$ gpg --with-colons --list-keys \
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--with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint wk@gnupg.org
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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pub:f:1024:17:6C7EE1B8621CC013:899817715:1055898235::m:::scESC:
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fpr:::::::::ECAF7590EB3443B5C7CF3ACB6C7EE1B8621CC013:
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uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>:
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uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>:
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sub:f:1536:16:06AD222CADF6A6E1:919537416:1036177416:::::e:
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fpr:::::::::CF8BCC4B18DE08FCD8A1615906AD222CADF6A6E1:
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sub:r:1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:899817788:1025961788:::::esc:
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fpr:::::::::AB059359A3B81F410FCFF97F5CE086B5B5A18FF4:
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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#+end_example
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2016-08-18 12:41:55 +02:00
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Note that new version of GnuPG or the use of certain options may add
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new fields to the output. Parsers should not assume a limit on the
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number of fields per line. Some fields are not yet used or only used
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with certain record types; parsers should ignore fields they are not
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2016-09-17 17:34:35 +02:00
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aware of. New versions of GnuPG or the use of certain options may add
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new types of records as well. Parsers should ignore any record whose
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type they do not recognize for forward-compatibility.
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2016-08-18 12:41:55 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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The double =--with-fingerprint= prints the fingerprint for the subkeys
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2015-03-19 11:14:52 +01:00
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too. Old versions of gpg used a slightly different format and required
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2013-11-15 08:59:45 +01:00
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the use of the option =--fixed-list-mode= to conform to the format
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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described here.
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2016-08-18 12:41:55 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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** Description of the fields
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*** Field 1 - Type of record
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- pub :: Public key
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- crt :: X.509 certificate
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- crs :: X.509 certificate and private key available
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- sub :: Subkey (secondary key)
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- sec :: Secret key
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- ssb :: Secret subkey (secondary key)
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2016-08-25 09:26:36 +02:00
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- uid :: User id
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- uat :: User attribute (same as user id except for field 10).
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- sig :: Signature
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- rev :: Revocation signature
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2018-06-21 15:06:30 +02:00
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- rvs :: Recocation signature (standalone) [since 2.2.9]
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- fpr :: Fingerprint (fingerprint is in field 10)
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- pkd :: Public key data [*]
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- grp :: Keygrip
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- rvk :: Revocation key
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2016-08-24 19:56:14 +02:00
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- tfs :: TOFU statistics [*]
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- tru :: Trust database information [*]
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- spk :: Signature subpacket [*]
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- cfg :: Configuration data [*]
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Records marked with an asterisk are described at [[*Special%20field%20formats][*Special fields]].
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*** Field 2 - Validity
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This is a letter describing the computed validity of a key.
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Currently this is a single letter, but be prepared that additional
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information may follow in some future versions. Note that GnuPG <
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2.1 does not set this field for secret key listings.
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- o :: Unknown (this key is new to the system)
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- i :: The key is invalid (e.g. due to a missing self-signature)
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- d :: The key has been disabled
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(deprecated - use the 'D' in field 12 instead)
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- r :: The key has been revoked
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- e :: The key has expired
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- - :: Unknown validity (i.e. no value assigned)
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- q :: Undefined validity. '-' and 'q' may safely be treated as
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the same value for most purposes
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- n :: The key is not valid
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- m :: The key is marginal valid.
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- f :: The key is fully valid
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- u :: The key is ultimately valid. This often means that the
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secret key is available, but any key may be marked as
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ultimately valid.
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- w :: The key has a well known private part.
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- s :: The key has special validity. This means that it might be
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Fix more spelling
* NEWS, acinclude.m4, agent/command-ssh.c, agent/command.c,
agent/gpg-agent.c, agent/keyformat.txt, agent/protect-tool.c,
common/asshelp.c, common/b64enc.c, common/recsel.c, doc/DETAILS,
doc/HACKING, doc/Notes, doc/TRANSLATE, doc/dirmngr.texi,
doc/faq.org, doc/gpg-agent.texi, doc/gpg.texi, doc/gpgsm.texi,
doc/instguide.texi, g10/armor.c, g10/gpg.c, g10/keyedit.c,
g10/mainproc.c, g10/pkclist.c, g10/tofu.c, g13/sh-cmd.c,
g13/sh-dmcrypt.c, kbx/keybox-init.c, m4/pkg.m4, sm/call-dirmngr.c,
sm/gpgsm.c, tests/Makefile.am, tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt,
tests/gpgscm/scheme.c, tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm,
tests/openpgp/multisig.test, tests/openpgp/verify.scm,
tests/pkits/README, tools/applygnupgdefaults,
tools/gpg-connect-agent.c, tools/mime-maker.c, tools/mime-parser.c:
minor spelling cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
2016-09-15 20:21:15 +02:00
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self-signed and expected to be used in the STEED system.
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If the validity information is given for a UID or UAT record, it
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describes the validity calculated based on this user ID. If given
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for a key record it describes the validity taken from the best
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rated user ID.
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For X.509 certificates a 'u' is used for a trusted root
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certificate (i.e. for the trust anchor) and an 'f' for all other
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valid certificates.
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2018-04-12 17:53:17 +02:00
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In "sig" records, this field may have one of these values as first
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character:
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- ! :: Signature is good.
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- - :: Signature is bad.
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- ? :: No public key to verify signature or public key is not usable.
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- % :: Other error verifying a signature
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More values may be added later. The field may also be empty if
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gpg has been invoked in a non-checking mode (--list-sigs) or in a
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fast checking mode. Since 2.2.7 '?' will also be printed by the
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command --list-sigs if the key is not in the local keyring.
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*** Field 3 - Key length
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The length of key in bits.
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*** Field 4 - Public key algorithm
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The values here are those from the OpenPGP specs or if they are
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greather than 255 the algorithm ids as used by Libgcrypt.
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*** Field 5 - KeyID
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This is the 64 bit keyid as specified by OpenPGP and the last 64
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bit of the SHA-1 fingerprint of an X.509 certifciate.
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*** Field 6 - Creation date
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The creation date of the key is given in UTC. For UID and UAT
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records, this is used for the self-signature date. Note that the
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Fix more spelling
* NEWS, acinclude.m4, agent/command-ssh.c, agent/command.c,
agent/gpg-agent.c, agent/keyformat.txt, agent/protect-tool.c,
common/asshelp.c, common/b64enc.c, common/recsel.c, doc/DETAILS,
doc/HACKING, doc/Notes, doc/TRANSLATE, doc/dirmngr.texi,
doc/faq.org, doc/gpg-agent.texi, doc/gpg.texi, doc/gpgsm.texi,
doc/instguide.texi, g10/armor.c, g10/gpg.c, g10/keyedit.c,
g10/mainproc.c, g10/pkclist.c, g10/tofu.c, g13/sh-cmd.c,
g13/sh-dmcrypt.c, kbx/keybox-init.c, m4/pkg.m4, sm/call-dirmngr.c,
sm/gpgsm.c, tests/Makefile.am, tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt,
tests/gpgscm/scheme.c, tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm,
tests/openpgp/multisig.test, tests/openpgp/verify.scm,
tests/pkits/README, tools/applygnupgdefaults,
tools/gpg-connect-agent.c, tools/mime-maker.c, tools/mime-parser.c:
minor spelling cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
2016-09-15 20:21:15 +02:00
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date is usually printed in seconds since epoch, however, we are
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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migrating to an ISO 8601 format (e.g. "19660205T091500"). This is
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currently only relevant for X.509. A simple way to detect the new
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format is to scan for the 'T'. Note that old versions of gpg
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without using the =--fixed-list-mode= option used a "yyyy-mm-tt"
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format.
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*** Field 7 - Expiration date
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Key or UID/UAT expiration date or empty if it does not expire.
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*** Field 8 - Certificate S/N, UID hash, trust signature info
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Used for serial number in crt records. For UID and UAT records,
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this is a hash of the user ID contents used to represent that
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exact user ID. For trust signatures, this is the trust depth
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Fix more spelling
* NEWS, acinclude.m4, agent/command-ssh.c, agent/command.c,
agent/gpg-agent.c, agent/keyformat.txt, agent/protect-tool.c,
common/asshelp.c, common/b64enc.c, common/recsel.c, doc/DETAILS,
doc/HACKING, doc/Notes, doc/TRANSLATE, doc/dirmngr.texi,
doc/faq.org, doc/gpg-agent.texi, doc/gpg.texi, doc/gpgsm.texi,
doc/instguide.texi, g10/armor.c, g10/gpg.c, g10/keyedit.c,
g10/mainproc.c, g10/pkclist.c, g10/tofu.c, g13/sh-cmd.c,
g13/sh-dmcrypt.c, kbx/keybox-init.c, m4/pkg.m4, sm/call-dirmngr.c,
sm/gpgsm.c, tests/Makefile.am, tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt,
tests/gpgscm/scheme.c, tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm,
tests/openpgp/multisig.test, tests/openpgp/verify.scm,
tests/pkits/README, tools/applygnupgdefaults,
tools/gpg-connect-agent.c, tools/mime-maker.c, tools/mime-parser.c:
minor spelling cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
2016-09-15 20:21:15 +02:00
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separated by the trust value by a space.
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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*** Field 9 - Ownertrust
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This is only used on primary keys. This is a single letter, but
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be prepared that additional information may follow in future
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versions. For trust signatures with a regular expression, this is
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the regular expression value, quoted as in field 10.
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*** Field 10 - User-ID
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The value is quoted like a C string to avoid control characters
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(the colon is quoted =\x3a=). For a "pub" record this field is
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not used on --fixed-list-mode. A UAT record puts the attribute
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subpacket count here, a space, and then the total attribute
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subpacket size. In gpgsm the issuer name comes here. A FPR
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record stores the fingerprint here. The fingerprint of a
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revocation key is stored here.
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2017-03-28 09:37:18 +02:00
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*** Field 11 - Signature class
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Signature class as per RFC-4880. This is a 2 digit hexnumber
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followed by either the letter 'x' for an exportable signature or
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the letter 'l' for a local-only signature. The class byte of an
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revocation key is also given here, 'x' and 'l' is used the same
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way. This field if not used for X.509.
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2018-06-21 18:32:13 +02:00
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"rev" and "rvs" may be followed by a comma and a 2 digit hexnumber
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with the revocation reason.
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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*** Field 12 - Key capabilities
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The defined capabilities are:
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- e :: Encrypt
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- s :: Sign
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- c :: Certify
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- a :: Authentication
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2013-03-19 17:23:56 +01:00
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- ? :: Unknown capability
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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A key may have any combination of them in any order. In addition
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to these letters, the primary key has uppercase versions of the
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letters to denote the _usable_ capabilities of the entire key, and
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a potential letter 'D' to indicate a disabled key.
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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*** Field 13 - Issuer certificate fingerprint or other info
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Used in FPR records for S/MIME keys to store the fingerprint of
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the issuer certificate. This is useful to build the certificate
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path based on certificates stored in the local key database it is
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only filled if the issuer certificate is available. The root has
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been reached if this is the same string as the fingerprint. The
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advantage of using this value is that it is guaranteed to have
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2017-02-20 22:19:50 +01:00
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been built by the same lookup algorithm as gpgsm uses.
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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For "uid" records this field lists the preferences in the same way
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gpg's --edit-key menu does.
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2018-06-21 15:06:30 +02:00
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For "sig", "rev" and "rvs" records, this is the fingerprint of the
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key that issued the signature. Note that this may only be filled
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if the signature verified correctly. Note also that for various
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technical reasons, this fingerprint is only available if
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--no-sig-cache is used. Since 2.2.7 this field will also be set
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if the key is missing but the signature carries an issuer
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fingerprint as meta data.
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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*** Field 14 - Flag field
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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Flag field used in the --edit menu output
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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*** Field 15 - S/N of a token
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2015-03-06 10:46:40 +01:00
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Used in sec/ssb to print the serial number of a token (internal
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protect mode 1002) or a '#' if that key is a simple stub (internal
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2014-06-03 21:35:59 +02:00
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protect mode 1001). If the option --with-secret is used and a
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secret key is available for the public key, a '+' indicates this.
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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*** Field 16 - Hash algorithm
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
For sig records, this is the used hash algorithm. For example:
|
|
|
|
2 = SHA-1, 8 = SHA-256.
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-15 08:59:45 +01:00
|
|
|
*** Field 17 - Curve name
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-06 10:46:40 +01:00
|
|
|
For pub, sub, sec, and ssb records this field is used for the ECC
|
2013-11-15 08:59:45 +01:00
|
|
|
curve name.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-20 10:09:40 +01:00
|
|
|
*** Field 18 - Compliance flags
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-17 21:10:19 +02:00
|
|
|
Space separated list of asserted compliance modes and
|
|
|
|
screening result for this key.
|
2017-03-20 10:09:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Valid values are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 8 :: The key is compliant with RFC4880bis
|
|
|
|
- 23 :: The key is compliant with compliance mode "de-vs".
|
2017-10-17 21:10:19 +02:00
|
|
|
- 6001 :: Screening hit on the ROCA vulnerability.
|
2017-03-20 10:09:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-28 09:37:18 +02:00
|
|
|
*** Field 19 - Last update
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The timestamp of the last update of a key or user ID. The update
|
|
|
|
time of a key is defined a lookup of the key via its unique
|
|
|
|
identifier (fingerprint); the field is empty if not known. The
|
|
|
|
update time of a user ID is defined by a lookup of the key using a
|
|
|
|
trusted mapping from mail address to key.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** Field 20 - Origin
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The origin of the key or the user ID. This is an integer
|
|
|
|
optionally followed by a space and an URL. This goes along with
|
2017-07-20 17:27:48 +02:00
|
|
|
the previous field. The URL is quoted in C style.
|
2017-03-28 09:37:18 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-06-21 18:32:13 +02:00
|
|
|
*** Field 21 - Comment
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is currently only used in "rev" and "rvs" records to carry
|
|
|
|
the the comment field of the recocation reason. The value is
|
|
|
|
quoted in C style.
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
** Special fields
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
*** PKD - Public key data
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this:
|
|
|
|
#+begin_example
|
|
|
|
pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
|
|
|
|
! ! !-- the value
|
|
|
|
! !------ for information number of bits in the value
|
|
|
|
!--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y)
|
|
|
|
#+end_example
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-24 19:56:14 +02:00
|
|
|
*** TFS - TOFU statistics
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This field may follows a UID record to convey information about
|
|
|
|
the TOFU database. The information is similar to a TOFU_STATS
|
|
|
|
status line.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Field 2 :: tfs record version (must be 1)
|
|
|
|
- Field 3 :: validity - A number with validity code.
|
|
|
|
- Field 4 :: signcount - The number of signatures seen.
|
|
|
|
- Field 5 :: encrcount - The number of encryptions done.
|
|
|
|
- Field 6 :: policy - A string with the policy
|
2016-09-06 15:45:38 +02:00
|
|
|
- Field 7 :: signture-first-seen - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
|
|
|
|
- Field 8 :: signature-most-recent-seen - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
|
|
|
|
- Field 9 :: encryption-first-done - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
|
|
|
|
- Field 10 :: encryption-most-recent-done - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
|
2016-08-24 19:56:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
*** TRU - Trust database information
|
|
|
|
Example for a "tru" trust base record:
|
|
|
|
#+begin_example
|
|
|
|
tru:o:0:1166697654:1:3:1:5
|
|
|
|
#+end_example
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
- Field 2 :: Reason for staleness of trust. If this field is
|
|
|
|
empty, then the trustdb is not stale. This field may
|
|
|
|
have multiple flags in it:
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
- o :: Trustdb is old
|
|
|
|
- t :: Trustdb was built with a different trust model
|
|
|
|
than the one we are using now.
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
- Field 3 :: Trust model
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
- 0 :: Classic trust model, as used in PGP 2.x.
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: PGP trust model, as used in PGP 6 and later.
|
|
|
|
This is the same as the classic trust model,
|
|
|
|
except for the addition of trust signatures.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GnuPG before version 1.4 used the classic trust model
|
|
|
|
by default. GnuPG 1.4 and later uses the PGP trust
|
|
|
|
model by default.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Field 4 :: Date trustdb was created in seconds since Epoch.
|
|
|
|
- Field 5 :: Date trustdb will expire in seconds since Epoch.
|
|
|
|
- Field 6 :: Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
|
|
|
|
key signer (gpg's option --marginals-needed).
|
|
|
|
- Field 7 :: Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
|
|
|
|
key signer. (gpg's option --completes-needed)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Field 8 :: Maximum depth of a certification chain. (gpg's option
|
|
|
|
--max-cert-depth)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** SPK - Signature subpacket records
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Field 2 :: Subpacket number as per RFC-4880 and later.
|
|
|
|
- Field 3 :: Flags in hex. Currently the only two bits assigned
|
|
|
|
are 1, to indicate that the subpacket came from the
|
|
|
|
hashed part of the signature, and 2, to indicate the
|
|
|
|
subpacket was marked critical.
|
|
|
|
- Field 4 :: Length of the subpacket. Note that this is the
|
|
|
|
length of the subpacket, and not the length of field
|
|
|
|
5 below. Due to the need for %-encoding, the length
|
|
|
|
of field 5 may be up to 3x this value.
|
|
|
|
- Field 5 :: The subpacket data. Printable ASCII is shown as
|
|
|
|
ASCII, but other values are rendered as %XX where XX
|
|
|
|
is the hex value for the byte.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** CFG - Configuration data
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--list-config outputs information about the GnuPG configuration
|
|
|
|
for the benefit of frontends or other programs that call GnuPG.
|
|
|
|
There are several list-config items, all colon delimited like the
|
|
|
|
rest of the --with-colons output. The first field is always "cfg"
|
|
|
|
to indicate configuration information. The second field is one of
|
|
|
|
(with examples):
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- version :: The third field contains the version of GnuPG.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
: cfg:version:1.3.5
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- pubkey :: The third field contains the public key algorithms
|
|
|
|
this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
|
|
|
|
semicolons. The algorithm numbers are as specified in
|
|
|
|
RFC-4880. Note that in contrast to the --status-fd
|
|
|
|
interface these are _not_ the Libgcrypt identifiers.
|
2015-03-10 15:26:02 +01:00
|
|
|
Using =pubkeyname= prints names instead of numbers.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
: cfg:pubkey:1;2;3;16;17
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- cipher :: The third field contains the symmetric ciphers this
|
|
|
|
version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons.
|
|
|
|
The cipher numbers are as specified in RFC-4880.
|
2015-03-10 15:26:02 +01:00
|
|
|
Using =ciphername= prints names instead of numbers.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
: cfg:cipher:2;3;4;7;8;9;10
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- digest :: The third field contains the digest (hash) algorithms
|
|
|
|
this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
|
|
|
|
semicolons. The digest numbers are as specified in
|
2015-03-10 15:26:02 +01:00
|
|
|
RFC-4880. Using =digestname= prints names instead of
|
|
|
|
numbers.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
: cfg:digest:1;2;3;8;9;10
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- compress :: The third field contains the compression algorithms
|
|
|
|
this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
|
|
|
|
semicolons. The algorithm numbers are as specified
|
|
|
|
in RFC-4880.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
: cfg:compress:0;1;2;3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- group :: The third field contains the name of the group, and the
|
|
|
|
fourth field contains the values that the group expands
|
|
|
|
to, separated by semicolons.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For example, a group of:
|
|
|
|
: group mynames = paige 0x12345678 joe patti
|
|
|
|
would result in:
|
|
|
|
: cfg:group:mynames:patti;joe;0x12345678;paige
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-10 15:26:02 +01:00
|
|
|
- curve :: The third field contains the curve names this version
|
|
|
|
of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. Using
|
|
|
|
=curveoid= prints OIDs instead of numbers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
: cfg:curve:ed25519;nistp256;nistp384;nistp521
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* Format of the --status-fd output
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with
|
|
|
|
the type of the status line and some arguments depending on the type
|
2016-09-17 17:34:35 +02:00
|
|
|
(maybe none); an application should always be willing to ignore
|
|
|
|
unknown keywords that may be emitted by future versions of GnuPG.
|
|
|
|
Also, new versions of GnuPG may add arguments to existing keywords.
|
|
|
|
Any additional arguments should be ignored for forward-compatibility.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** General status codes
|
2016-06-13 10:40:34 +02:00
|
|
|
*** NEWSIG [<signers_uid>]
|
2015-03-19 20:38:25 +01:00
|
|
|
Is issued right before a signature verification starts. This is
|
2016-06-13 10:40:34 +02:00
|
|
|
useful to define a context for parsing ERROR status messages.
|
2017-11-14 16:34:34 +01:00
|
|
|
If SIGNERS_UID is given and is not "-" this is the percent-escaped
|
|
|
|
value of the OpenPGP Signer's User ID signature sub-packet.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** GOODSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
|
|
|
|
The signature with the keyid is good. For each signature only one
|
|
|
|
of the codes GOODSIG, BADSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, REVKEYSIG or
|
|
|
|
ERRSIG will be emitted. In the past they were used as a marker
|
|
|
|
for a new signature; new code should use the NEWSIG status
|
|
|
|
instead. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
|
|
|
|
escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
|
|
|
|
it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually
|
|
|
|
also be available for OpenPGP.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** EXPSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
|
|
|
|
The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature is
|
|
|
|
expired. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
|
|
|
|
escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
|
|
|
|
it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually
|
|
|
|
also be available for OpenPGP.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** EXPKEYSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
|
|
|
|
The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
|
|
|
|
by an expired key. The username is the primary one encoded in
|
|
|
|
UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the
|
|
|
|
long keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and
|
|
|
|
might eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** REVKEYSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
|
|
|
|
The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
|
|
|
|
by a revoked key. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8
|
|
|
|
and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long
|
|
|
|
keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might
|
|
|
|
eventually also beñ available for OpenPGP.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** BADSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
|
|
|
|
The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay. The
|
|
|
|
username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The
|
|
|
|
fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is
|
|
|
|
available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be
|
|
|
|
available for OpenPGP.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-12 16:41:05 +02:00
|
|
|
*** ERRSIG <keyid> <pkalgo> <hashalgo> <sig_class> <time> <rc> <fpr>
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
It was not possible to check the signature. This may be caused by
|
|
|
|
a missing public key or an unsupported algorithm. A RC of 4
|
|
|
|
indicates unknown algorithm, a 9 indicates a missing public
|
|
|
|
key. The other fields give more information about this signature.
|
|
|
|
sig_class is a 2 byte hex-value. The fingerprint may be used
|
2018-04-12 16:41:05 +02:00
|
|
|
instead of the long_keyid_or_fpr if it is available. This is the
|
|
|
|
case with gpgsm and might eventually also be available for
|
|
|
|
OpenPGP. The ERRSIG line has FPR filed which is only available
|
|
|
|
since 2.2.7; that FPR may either be missing or - if the signature
|
|
|
|
has no fingerprint as meta data.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note, that TIME may either be the number of seconds since Epoch or
|
|
|
|
an ISO 8601 string. The latter can be detected by the presence of
|
2014-11-04 21:29:58 +01:00
|
|
|
the letter 'T'.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** VALIDSIG <args>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The args are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- <fingerprint_in_hex>
|
|
|
|
- <sig_creation_date>
|
|
|
|
- <sig-timestamp>
|
|
|
|
- <expire-timestamp>
|
|
|
|
- <sig-version>
|
|
|
|
- <reserved>
|
|
|
|
- <pubkey-algo>
|
|
|
|
- <hash-algo>
|
|
|
|
- <sig-class>
|
|
|
|
- [ <primary-key-fpr> ]
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-07 18:00:16 +02:00
|
|
|
This status indicates that the signature is cryptographically
|
2015-08-11 06:01:26 +02:00
|
|
|
valid. This is similar to GOODSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, or REVKEYSIG
|
2015-07-07 18:00:16 +02:00
|
|
|
(depending on the date and the state of the signature and signing
|
|
|
|
key) but has the fingerprint as the argument. Multiple status
|
|
|
|
lines (VALIDSIG and the other appropriate *SIG status) are emitted
|
|
|
|
for a valid signature. All arguments here are on one long line.
|
|
|
|
sig-timestamp is the signature creation time in seconds after the
|
|
|
|
epoch. expire-timestamp is the signature expiration time in
|
|
|
|
seconds after the epoch (zero means "does not
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
expire"). sig-version, pubkey-algo, hash-algo, and sig-class (a
|
|
|
|
2-byte hex value) are all straight from the signature packet.
|
|
|
|
PRIMARY-KEY-FPR is the fingerprint of the primary key or identical
|
|
|
|
to the first argument. This is useful to get back to the primary
|
|
|
|
key without running gpg again for this purpose.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The primary-key-fpr parameter is used for OpenPGP and not
|
|
|
|
available for CMS signatures. The sig-version as well as the sig
|
2015-07-07 18:00:16 +02:00
|
|
|
class is not defined for CMS and currently set to 0 and 00.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note, that *-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
|
|
|
|
Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
|
|
|
|
of the letter 'T'.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** SIG_ID <radix64_string> <sig_creation_date> <sig-timestamp>
|
|
|
|
This is emitted only for signatures of class 0 or 1 which have
|
|
|
|
been verified okay. The string is a signature id and may be used
|
|
|
|
in applications to detect replay attacks of signed messages. Note
|
|
|
|
that only DLP algorithms give unique ids - others may yield
|
|
|
|
duplicated ones when they have been created in the same second.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note, that SIG-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
|
|
|
|
Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
|
|
|
|
of the letter 'T'.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** ENC_TO <long_keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
|
|
|
|
The message is encrypted to this LONG_KEYID. KEYTYPE is the
|
|
|
|
numerical value of the public key algorithm or 0 if it is not
|
|
|
|
known, KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known
|
|
|
|
(which is currently always the case). Gpg prints this line
|
|
|
|
always; Gpgsm only if it knows the certificate.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** BEGIN_DECRYPTION
|
|
|
|
Mark the start of the actual decryption process. This is also
|
|
|
|
emitted when in --list-only mode.
|
|
|
|
*** END_DECRYPTION
|
|
|
|
Mark the end of the actual decryption process. This are also
|
|
|
|
emitted when in --list-only mode.
|
2017-02-23 19:59:21 +01:00
|
|
|
*** DECRYPTION_KEY <fpr> <fpr2> <otrust>
|
|
|
|
This line is emitted when a public key decryption succeeded in
|
|
|
|
providing a session key. <fpr> is the hexified fingerprint of the
|
|
|
|
actual key used for descryption. <fpr2> is the fingerprint of the
|
|
|
|
primary key. <otrust> is the letter with the ownertrust; this is
|
|
|
|
in general a 'u' which stands for ultimately trusted.
|
2018-01-21 16:24:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*** DECRYPTION_INFO <mdc_method> <sym_algo> [<aead_algo>]
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
Print information about the symmetric encryption algorithm and the
|
|
|
|
MDC method. This will be emitted even if the decryption fails.
|
2018-05-29 12:43:39 +02:00
|
|
|
For an AEAD algorithm AEAD_ALGO is not 0. GPGSM currently does
|
|
|
|
not print such a status.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** DECRYPTION_FAILED
|
|
|
|
The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong
|
|
|
|
passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** DECRYPTION_OKAY
|
|
|
|
The decryption process succeeded. This means, that either the
|
|
|
|
correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase for a
|
2015-06-02 17:46:42 +02:00
|
|
|
symmetric encrypted message was given. The program itself may
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
return an errorcode because it may not be possible to verify a
|
|
|
|
signature for some reasons.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** SESSION_KEY <algo>:<hexdigits>
|
|
|
|
The session key used to decrypt the message. This message will
|
2013-12-11 10:20:15 +01:00
|
|
|
only be emitted if the option --show-session-key is used. The
|
|
|
|
format is suitable to be passed as value for the option
|
|
|
|
--override-session-key. It is not an indication that the
|
|
|
|
decryption will or has succeeded.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-01-21 16:24:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*** BEGIN_ENCRYPTION <mdc_method> <sym_algo> [<aead_algo>]
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
Mark the start of the actual encryption process.
|
2018-01-21 16:24:43 +01:00
|
|
|
MDC_METHOD shall be 0 if an AEAD_ALGO is not 0. Users should
|
|
|
|
however ignore MDC_METHOD if AEAD_ALGO is not 0.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** END_ENCRYPTION
|
|
|
|
Mark the end of the actual encryption process.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** FILE_START <what> <filename>
|
|
|
|
Start processing a file <filename>. <what> indicates the performed
|
|
|
|
operation:
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: verify
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: encrypt
|
|
|
|
- 3 :: decrypt
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** FILE_DONE
|
|
|
|
Marks the end of a file processing which has been started
|
|
|
|
by FILE_START.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** BEGIN_SIGNING
|
|
|
|
Mark the start of the actual signing process. This may be used as
|
|
|
|
an indication that all requested secret keys are ready for use.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** ALREADY_SIGNED <long-keyid>
|
|
|
|
Warning: This is experimental and might be removed at any time.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** SIG_CREATED <type> <pk_algo> <hash_algo> <class> <timestamp> <keyfpr>
|
|
|
|
A signature has been created using these parameters.
|
|
|
|
Values for type <type> are:
|
|
|
|
- D :: detached
|
|
|
|
- C :: cleartext
|
|
|
|
- S :: standard
|
|
|
|
(only the first character should be checked)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<class> are 2 hex digits with the OpenPGP signature class.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since Epoch
|
|
|
|
or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence of the
|
|
|
|
letter 'T'.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** NOTATION_
|
2016-05-31 15:43:51 +02:00
|
|
|
There are actually three related status codes to convey notation
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
data:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- NOTATION_NAME <name>
|
2016-05-31 15:43:51 +02:00
|
|
|
- NOTATION_FLAGS <critical> <human_readable>
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
- NOTATION_DATA <string>
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-31 15:43:51 +02:00
|
|
|
<name> and <string> are %XX escaped. The data may be split among
|
|
|
|
several NOTATION_DATA lines. NOTATION_FLAGS is emitted after
|
|
|
|
NOTATION_NAME and gives the critical and human readable flags;
|
|
|
|
the flag values are either 0 or 1.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** POLICY_URL <string>
|
|
|
|
Note that URL in <string> is %XX escaped.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** PLAINTEXT <format> <timestamp> <filename>
|
|
|
|
This indicates the format of the plaintext that is about to be
|
|
|
|
written. The format is a 1 byte hex code that shows the format of
|
|
|
|
the plaintext: 62 ('b') is binary data, 74 ('t') is text data with
|
|
|
|
no character set specified, and 75 ('u') is text data encoded in
|
|
|
|
the UTF-8 character set. The timestamp is in seconds since the
|
|
|
|
epoch. If a filename is available it gets printed as the third
|
|
|
|
argument, percent-escaped as usual.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** PLAINTEXT_LENGTH <length>
|
|
|
|
This indicates the length of the plaintext that is about to be
|
|
|
|
written. Note that if the plaintext packet has partial length
|
|
|
|
encoding it is not possible to know the length ahead of time. In
|
|
|
|
that case, this status tag does not appear.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** ATTRIBUTE <arguments>
|
2016-05-13 16:24:59 +02:00
|
|
|
The list or arguments are:
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
- <fpr>
|
|
|
|
- <octets>
|
|
|
|
- <type>
|
|
|
|
- <index>
|
|
|
|
- <count>
|
|
|
|
- <timestamp>
|
|
|
|
- <expiredate>
|
|
|
|
- <flags>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is one long line issued for each attribute subpacket when an
|
|
|
|
attribute packet is seen during key listing. <fpr> is the
|
|
|
|
fingerprint of the key. <octets> is the length of the attribute
|
|
|
|
subpacket. <type> is the attribute type (e.g. 1 for an image).
|
|
|
|
<index> and <count> indicate that this is the N-th indexed
|
|
|
|
subpacket of count total subpackets in this attribute packet.
|
|
|
|
<timestamp> and <expiredate> are from the self-signature on the
|
|
|
|
attribute packet. If the attribute packet does not have a valid
|
|
|
|
self-signature, then the timestamp is 0. <flags> are a bitwise OR
|
|
|
|
of:
|
|
|
|
- 0x01 :: this attribute packet is a primary uid
|
|
|
|
- 0x02 :: this attribute packet is revoked
|
|
|
|
- 0x04 :: this attribute packet is expired
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** SIG_SUBPACKET <type> <flags> <len> <data>
|
|
|
|
This indicates that a signature subpacket was seen. The format is
|
|
|
|
the same as the "spk" record above.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-20 09:25:56 +02:00
|
|
|
*** ENCRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE <flags>
|
|
|
|
Indicates that the current encryption operation was in compliance
|
|
|
|
with the given set of modes for all recipients. "flags" is a
|
|
|
|
space separated list of numerical flags, see "Field 18 -
|
|
|
|
Compliance flags" above.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-30 14:30:24 +02:00
|
|
|
*** DECRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE <flags>
|
|
|
|
Indicates that the current decryption operation is in compliance
|
|
|
|
with the given set of modes. "flags" is a space separated list of
|
|
|
|
numerical flags, see "Field 18 - Compliance flags" above.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE <flags>
|
|
|
|
Indicates that the current signature verification operation is in
|
|
|
|
compliance with the given set of modes. "flags" is a space
|
|
|
|
separated list of numerical flags, see "Field 18 - Compliance
|
|
|
|
flags" above.
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
** Key related
|
|
|
|
*** INV_RECP, INV_SGNR
|
|
|
|
The two similar status codes:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- INV_RECP <reason> <requested_recipient>
|
|
|
|
- INV_SGNR <reason> <requested_sender>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
are issued for each unusable recipient/sender. The reasons codes
|
|
|
|
currently in use are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0 :: No specific reason given
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: Not Found
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: Ambigious specification
|
|
|
|
- 3 :: Wrong key usage
|
|
|
|
- 4 :: Key revoked
|
|
|
|
- 5 :: Key expired
|
|
|
|
- 6 :: No CRL known
|
|
|
|
- 7 :: CRL too old
|
|
|
|
- 8 :: Policy mismatch
|
|
|
|
- 9 :: Not a secret key
|
|
|
|
- 10 :: Key not trusted
|
|
|
|
- 11 :: Missing certificate
|
|
|
|
- 12 :: Missing issuer certificate
|
2014-06-10 14:54:55 +02:00
|
|
|
- 13 :: Key disabled
|
|
|
|
- 14 :: Syntax error in specification
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-13 16:24:59 +02:00
|
|
|
If no specific reason was given a previously emitted status code
|
|
|
|
KEY_CONSIDERED may be used to analyzed the problem.
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
Note that for historical reasons the INV_RECP status is also used
|
|
|
|
for gpgsm's SIGNER command where it relates to signer's of course.
|
|
|
|
Newer GnuPG versions are using INV_SGNR; applications should
|
|
|
|
ignore the INV_RECP during the sender's command processing once
|
|
|
|
they have seen an INV_SGNR. Different codes are used so that they
|
|
|
|
can be distinguish while doing an encrypt+sign operation.
|
2016-05-13 16:24:59 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
*** NO_RECP <reserved>
|
|
|
|
Issued if no recipients are usable.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** NO_SGNR <reserved>
|
|
|
|
Issued if no senders are usable.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-13 16:24:59 +02:00
|
|
|
*** KEY_CONSIDERED <fpr> <flags>
|
|
|
|
Issued to explian the lookup of a key. FPR is the hexified
|
|
|
|
fingerprint of the primary key. The bit values for FLAGS are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: The key has not been selected.
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: All subkeys of the key are expired or have been revoked.
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
*** KEYEXPIRED <expire-timestamp>
|
|
|
|
The key has expired. expire-timestamp is the expiration time in
|
|
|
|
seconds since Epoch. This status line is not very useful because
|
|
|
|
it will also be emitted for expired subkeys even if this subkey is
|
|
|
|
not used. To check whether a key used to sign a message has
|
|
|
|
expired, the EXPKEYSIG status line is to be used.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note, that the TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
|
|
|
|
Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
|
|
|
|
of the letter 'T'.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** KEYREVOKED
|
|
|
|
The used key has been revoked by its owner. No arguments yet.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** NO_PUBKEY <long keyid>
|
2018-04-12 16:41:05 +02:00
|
|
|
The public key is not available. Note the arg should in general
|
|
|
|
not be used because it is better to take it from the ERRSIG
|
|
|
|
status line which is printed right before this one.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** NO_SECKEY <long keyid>
|
|
|
|
The secret key is not available
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** KEY_CREATED <type> <fingerprint> [<handle>]
|
|
|
|
A key has been created. Values for <type> are:
|
|
|
|
- B :: primary and subkey
|
|
|
|
- P :: primary
|
|
|
|
- S :: subkey
|
|
|
|
The fingerprint is one of the primary key for type B and P and the
|
|
|
|
one of the subkey for S. Handle is an arbitrary non-whitespace
|
|
|
|
string used to match key parameters from batch key creation run.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** KEY_NOT_CREATED [<handle>]
|
|
|
|
The key from batch run has not been created due to errors.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** TRUST_
|
|
|
|
These are several similar status codes:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- TRUST_UNDEFINED <error_token>
|
|
|
|
- TRUST_NEVER <error_token>
|
|
|
|
- TRUST_MARGINAL [0 [<validation_model>]]
|
|
|
|
- TRUST_FULLY [0 [<validation_model>]]
|
|
|
|
- TRUST_ULTIMATE [0 [<validation_model>]]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to
|
|
|
|
indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature.
|
|
|
|
The error token values are currently only emitted by gpgsm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VALIDATION_MODEL describes the algorithm used to check the
|
|
|
|
validity of the key. The defaults are the standard Web of Trust
|
2017-02-20 22:19:50 +01:00
|
|
|
model for gpg and the standard X.509 model for gpgsm. The
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
defined values are
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- pgp :: The standard PGP WoT.
|
|
|
|
- shell :: The standard X.509 model.
|
|
|
|
- chain :: The chain model.
|
|
|
|
- steed :: The STEED model.
|
2016-05-03 10:26:55 +02:00
|
|
|
- tofu :: The TOFU model
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that the term =TRUST_= in the status names is used for
|
|
|
|
historic reasons; we now speak of validity.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-03 10:26:55 +02:00
|
|
|
*** TOFU_USER <fingerprint_in_hex> <mbox>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This status identifies the key and the userid for all following
|
|
|
|
Tofu information. The fingerprint is the fingerprint of the
|
2016-05-21 11:06:24 +02:00
|
|
|
primary key and the mbox is in general the addr-spec part of the
|
2016-08-24 15:31:44 +02:00
|
|
|
userid encoded in UTF-8 and percent escaped. The fingerprint is
|
Fix more spelling
* NEWS, acinclude.m4, agent/command-ssh.c, agent/command.c,
agent/gpg-agent.c, agent/keyformat.txt, agent/protect-tool.c,
common/asshelp.c, common/b64enc.c, common/recsel.c, doc/DETAILS,
doc/HACKING, doc/Notes, doc/TRANSLATE, doc/dirmngr.texi,
doc/faq.org, doc/gpg-agent.texi, doc/gpg.texi, doc/gpgsm.texi,
doc/instguide.texi, g10/armor.c, g10/gpg.c, g10/keyedit.c,
g10/mainproc.c, g10/pkclist.c, g10/tofu.c, g13/sh-cmd.c,
g13/sh-dmcrypt.c, kbx/keybox-init.c, m4/pkg.m4, sm/call-dirmngr.c,
sm/gpgsm.c, tests/Makefile.am, tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt,
tests/gpgscm/scheme.c, tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm,
tests/openpgp/multisig.test, tests/openpgp/verify.scm,
tests/pkits/README, tools/applygnupgdefaults,
tools/gpg-connect-agent.c, tools/mime-maker.c, tools/mime-parser.c:
minor spelling cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
2016-09-15 20:21:15 +02:00
|
|
|
identical for all TOFU_USER lines up to a NEWSIG line.
|
2016-05-03 10:26:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 19:03:28 +01:00
|
|
|
*** TOFU_STATS <MANY_ARGS>
|
2016-05-03 10:26:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Statistics for the current user id.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 19:03:28 +01:00
|
|
|
The <MANY_ARGS> are the usual space delimited arguments. Here we
|
|
|
|
have too many of them to fit on one printed line and thus they are
|
|
|
|
given on 3 printed lines:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
: <summary> <sign-count> <encryption-count>
|
|
|
|
: [<policy> [<tm1> <tm2> <tm3> <tm4>
|
|
|
|
: [<validity> [<sign-days> <encrypt-days>]]]]
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-29 14:33:29 +01:00
|
|
|
Values for SUMMARY are:
|
|
|
|
- 0 :: attention, an interaction with the user is required (conflict)
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: key with no verification/encryption history
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: key with little history
|
2016-05-03 10:26:55 +02:00
|
|
|
- 3 :: key with enough history for basic trust
|
|
|
|
- 4 :: key with a lot of history
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Values for POLICY are:
|
|
|
|
- none :: No Policy set
|
|
|
|
- auto :: Policy is "auto"
|
|
|
|
- good :: Policy is "good"
|
|
|
|
- bad :: Policy is "bad"
|
|
|
|
- ask :: Policy is "ask"
|
2016-11-29 14:33:29 +01:00
|
|
|
- unknown :: Policy is "unknown" (TOFU information does not
|
|
|
|
contribute to the key's validity)
|
2016-05-03 10:26:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 14:32:27 +01:00
|
|
|
TM1 is the time the first message was verified. TM2 is the time
|
2016-09-06 15:45:38 +02:00
|
|
|
the most recent message was verified. TM3 is the time the first
|
|
|
|
message was encrypted. TM4 is the most recent encryption. All may
|
|
|
|
either be seconds since Epoch or an ISO time string
|
|
|
|
(yyyymmddThhmmss).
|
2016-05-03 10:26:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2016-11-29 14:33:29 +01:00
|
|
|
VALIDITY is the same as SUMMARY with the exception that VALIDITY
|
|
|
|
doesn't reflect whether the key needs attention. That is it never
|
|
|
|
takes on value 0. Instead, if there is a conflict, VALIDITY still
|
|
|
|
reflects the key's validity (values: 1-4).
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-06 12:26:01 +01:00
|
|
|
SUMMARY values use the euclidean distance (m = sqrt(a² + b²)) rather
|
|
|
|
then the sum of the magnitudes (m = a + b) to ensure a balance between
|
|
|
|
verified signatures and encrypted messages.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Values are calculated based on the number of days where a key was used
|
|
|
|
for verifying a signature or to encrypt to it.
|
|
|
|
The ranges for the values are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: signature_days + encryption_days == 0
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: 1 <= sqrt(signature_days² + encryption_days²) < 8
|
|
|
|
- 3 :: 8 <= sqrt(signature_days² + encryption_days²) < 42
|
|
|
|
- 4 :: sqrt(signature_days² + encryption_days²) >= 42
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 14:32:27 +01:00
|
|
|
SIGN-COUNT and ENCRYPTION-COUNT are the number of messages that we
|
|
|
|
have seen that have been signed by this key / encryption to this
|
|
|
|
key.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SIGN-DAYS and ENCRYPTION-DAYS are similar, but the number of days
|
|
|
|
(in UTC) on which we have seen messages signed by this key /
|
|
|
|
encrypted to this key.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-03 10:26:55 +02:00
|
|
|
*** TOFU_STATS_SHORT <long_string>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Information about the TOFU binding for the signature.
|
|
|
|
Example: "15 signatures verified. 10 messages encrypted"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** TOFU_STATS_LONG <long_string>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Information about the TOFU binding for the signature in verbose
|
|
|
|
format. The LONG_STRING is percent escaped.
|
|
|
|
Example: 'Verified 9 messages signed by "Werner Koch
|
|
|
|
(dist sig)" in the past 3 minutes, 40 seconds. The most
|
|
|
|
recent message was verified 4 seconds ago.'
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
*** PKA_TRUST_
|
2017-02-20 22:19:50 +01:00
|
|
|
This is one of:
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-21 11:06:24 +02:00
|
|
|
- PKA_TRUST_GOOD <addr-spec>
|
|
|
|
- PKA_TRUST_BAD <addr-spec>
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Depending on the outcome of the PKA check one of the above status
|
|
|
|
codes is emitted in addition to a =TRUST_*= status.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Remote control
|
|
|
|
*** GET_BOOL, GET_LINE, GET_HIDDEN, GOT_IT
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
These status line are used with --command-fd for interactive
|
|
|
|
control of the process.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** USERID_HINT <long main keyid> <string>
|
|
|
|
Give a hint about the user ID for a certain keyID.
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-07 20:18:31 +01:00
|
|
|
*** NEED_PASSPHRASE <long keyid> <long main keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
Issued whenever a passphrase is needed. KEYTYPE is the numerical
|
|
|
|
value of the public key algorithm or 0 if this is not applicable,
|
|
|
|
KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known (this
|
|
|
|
is currently always the case).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash>
|
|
|
|
Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN <card_type> <chvno> [<serialno>]
|
|
|
|
Issued whenever a PIN is requested to unlock a card.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** MISSING_PASSPHRASE
|
|
|
|
No passphrase was supplied. An application which encounters this
|
|
|
|
message may want to stop parsing immediately because the next
|
|
|
|
message will probably be a BAD_PASSPHRASE. However, if the
|
|
|
|
application is a wrapper around the key edit menu functionality it
|
|
|
|
might not make sense to stop parsing but simply ignoring the
|
|
|
|
following BAD_PASSPHRASE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
|
|
|
|
The supplied passphrase was wrong or not given. In the latter
|
|
|
|
case you may have seen a MISSING_PASSPHRASE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** GOOD_PASSPHRASE
|
|
|
|
The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material
|
|
|
|
is therefore usable.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Import/Export
|
|
|
|
*** IMPORT_CHECK <long keyid> <fingerprint> <user ID>
|
|
|
|
This status is emitted in interactive mode right before
|
|
|
|
the "import.okay" prompt.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** IMPORTED <long keyid> <username>
|
|
|
|
The keyid and name of the signature just imported
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** IMPORT_OK <reason> [<fingerprint>]
|
|
|
|
The key with the primary key's FINGERPRINT has been imported.
|
|
|
|
REASON flags are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0 :: Not actually changed
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: Entirely new key.
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: New user IDs
|
|
|
|
- 4 :: New signatures
|
|
|
|
- 8 :: New subkeys
|
|
|
|
- 16 :: Contains private key.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The flags may be ORed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** IMPORT_PROBLEM <reason> [<fingerprint>]
|
|
|
|
Issued for each import failure. Reason codes are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0 :: No specific reason given.
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: Invalid Certificate.
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: Issuer Certificate missing.
|
|
|
|
- 3 :: Certificate Chain too long.
|
|
|
|
- 4 :: Error storing certificate.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** IMPORT_RES <args>
|
|
|
|
Final statistics on import process (this is one long line). The
|
|
|
|
args are a list of unsigned numbers separated by white space:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- <count>
|
|
|
|
- <no_user_id>
|
|
|
|
- <imported>
|
2014-10-13 15:00:39 +02:00
|
|
|
- always 0 (formerly used for the number of RSA keys)
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
- <unchanged>
|
|
|
|
- <n_uids>
|
|
|
|
- <n_subk>
|
|
|
|
- <n_sigs>
|
|
|
|
- <n_revoc>
|
|
|
|
- <sec_read>
|
|
|
|
- <sec_imported>
|
|
|
|
- <sec_dups>
|
|
|
|
- <skipped_new_keys>
|
|
|
|
- <not_imported>
|
2014-11-19 10:34:32 +01:00
|
|
|
- <skipped_v3_keys>
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-11-12 17:02:18 +01:00
|
|
|
*** EXPORTED <fingerprint>
|
|
|
|
The key with <fingerprint> has been exported. The fingerprint is
|
|
|
|
the fingerprint of the primary key even if the primary key has
|
|
|
|
been replaced by a stub key during secret key export.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-12 16:02:35 +01:00
|
|
|
*** EXPORT_RES <args>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Final statistics on export process (this is one long line). The
|
|
|
|
args are a list of unsigned numbers separated by white space:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- <count>
|
|
|
|
- <secret_count>
|
|
|
|
- <exported>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
** Smartcard related
|
|
|
|
*** CARDCTRL <what> [<serialno>]
|
|
|
|
This is used to control smartcard operations. Defined values for
|
|
|
|
WHAT are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: Request insertion of a card. Serialnumber may be given
|
|
|
|
to request a specific card. Used by gpg 1.4 w/o
|
|
|
|
scdaemon
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: Request removal of a card. Used by gpg 1.4 w/o scdaemon.
|
|
|
|
- 3 :: Card with serialnumber detected
|
|
|
|
- 4 :: No card available
|
|
|
|
- 5 :: No card reader available
|
|
|
|
- 6 :: No card support available
|
2014-12-15 17:38:40 +01:00
|
|
|
- 7 :: Card is in termination state
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** SC_OP_FAILURE [<code>]
|
|
|
|
An operation on a smartcard definitely failed. Currently there is
|
|
|
|
no indication of the actual error code, but application should be
|
|
|
|
prepared to later accept more arguments. Defined values for
|
|
|
|
<code> are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 0 :: unspecified error (identically to a missing CODE)
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: canceled
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: bad PIN
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** SC_OP_SUCCESS
|
|
|
|
A smart card operaion succeeded. This status is only printed for
|
|
|
|
certain operation and is mostly useful to check whether a PIN
|
|
|
|
change really worked.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Miscellaneous status codes
|
|
|
|
*** NODATA <what>
|
|
|
|
No data has been found. Codes for WHAT are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: No armored data.
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: Expected a packet but did not found one.
|
|
|
|
- 3 :: Invalid packet found, this may indicate a non OpenPGP
|
|
|
|
message.
|
|
|
|
- 4 :: Signature expected but not found
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You may see more than one of these status lines.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** UNEXPECTED <what>
|
|
|
|
Unexpected data has been encountered. Codes for WHAT are:
|
|
|
|
- 0 :: Not further specified
|
2013-10-02 09:11:43 +02:00
|
|
|
- 1 :: Corrupted message structure
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** TRUNCATED <maxno>
|
|
|
|
The output was truncated to MAXNO items. This status code is
|
|
|
|
issued for certain external requests.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** ERROR <error location> <error code> [<more>]
|
|
|
|
This is a generic error status message, it might be followed by
|
|
|
|
error location specific data. <error code> and <error_location>
|
|
|
|
should not contain spaces. The error code is a either a string
|
|
|
|
commencing with a letter or such a string prefixed with a
|
|
|
|
numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".
|
2016-01-08 10:33:19 +01:00
|
|
|
*** WARNING <location> <error code> [<text>]
|
|
|
|
This is a generic warning status message, it might be followed by
|
|
|
|
error location specific data. <error code> and <location>
|
|
|
|
should not contain spaces. The error code is a either a string
|
|
|
|
commencing with a letter or such a string prefixed with a
|
|
|
|
numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
*** SUCCESS [<location>]
|
Fix more spelling
* NEWS, acinclude.m4, agent/command-ssh.c, agent/command.c,
agent/gpg-agent.c, agent/keyformat.txt, agent/protect-tool.c,
common/asshelp.c, common/b64enc.c, common/recsel.c, doc/DETAILS,
doc/HACKING, doc/Notes, doc/TRANSLATE, doc/dirmngr.texi,
doc/faq.org, doc/gpg-agent.texi, doc/gpg.texi, doc/gpgsm.texi,
doc/instguide.texi, g10/armor.c, g10/gpg.c, g10/keyedit.c,
g10/mainproc.c, g10/pkclist.c, g10/tofu.c, g13/sh-cmd.c,
g13/sh-dmcrypt.c, kbx/keybox-init.c, m4/pkg.m4, sm/call-dirmngr.c,
sm/gpgsm.c, tests/Makefile.am, tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt,
tests/gpgscm/scheme.c, tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm,
tests/openpgp/multisig.test, tests/openpgp/verify.scm,
tests/pkits/README, tools/applygnupgdefaults,
tools/gpg-connect-agent.c, tools/mime-maker.c, tools/mime-parser.c:
minor spelling cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
2016-09-15 20:21:15 +02:00
|
|
|
Positive confirmation that an operation succeeded. It is used
|
2015-08-25 09:03:31 +02:00
|
|
|
similar to ISO-C's EXIT_SUCCESS. <location> is optional but if
|
|
|
|
given should not contain spaces. Used only with a few commands.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** FAILURE <location> <error_code>
|
|
|
|
This is the counterpart to SUCCESS and used to indicate a program
|
More cleanup of "allow to".
* README, agent/command.c, agent/keyformat.txt, common/i18n.c,
common/iobuf.c, common/keyserver.h, dirmngr/cdblib.c,
dirmngr/ldap-wrapper.c, doc/DETAILS, doc/TRANSLATE,
doc/announce-2.1.txt, doc/gpg.texi, doc/gpgsm.texi,
doc/scdaemon.texi, doc/tools.texi, doc/whats-new-in-2.1.txt,
g10/export.c, g10/getkey.c, g10/import.c, g10/keyedit.c, m4/ksba.m4,
m4/libgcrypt.m4, m4/ntbtls.m4, po/ca.po, po/cs.po, po/da.po,
po/de.po, po/el.po, po/eo.po, po/es.po, po/et.po, po/fi.po,
po/fr.po, po/gl.po, po/hu.po, po/id.po, po/it.po, po/ja.po,
po/nb.po, po/pl.po, po/pt.po, po/ro.po, po/ru.po, po/sk.po,
po/sv.po, po/tr.po, po/uk.po, po/zh_CN.po, po/zh_TW.po,
scd/app-p15.c, scd/ccid-driver.c, scd/command.c, sm/gpgsm.c,
sm/sign.c, tools/gpgconf-comp.c, tools/gpgtar.h: replace "Allow to"
with clearer text.
In standard English, the normal construction is "${XXX} allows ${YYY}
to" -- that is, the subject (${XXX}) of the sentence is allowing the
object (${YYY}) to do something. When the object is missing, the
phrasing sounds awkward, even if the object is implied by context.
There's almost always a better construction that isn't as awkward.
These changes should make the language a bit clearer.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
2016-08-02 04:19:17 +02:00
|
|
|
failure. It is used similar to ISO-C's EXIT_FAILURE but allows
|
|
|
|
conveying more information, in particular a gpg-error error code.
|
2015-08-25 09:03:31 +02:00
|
|
|
That numerical error code may optionally have a suffix made of an
|
|
|
|
underscore and a string with an error symbol like "151011327_EOF".
|
|
|
|
A dash may be used instead of <location>.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** BADARMOR
|
|
|
|
The ASCII armor is corrupted. No arguments yet.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** DELETE_PROBLEM <reason_code>
|
|
|
|
Deleting a key failed. Reason codes are:
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: No such key
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: Must delete secret key first
|
|
|
|
- 3 :: Ambigious specification
|
2014-04-15 16:40:48 +02:00
|
|
|
- 4 :: Key is stored on a smartcard.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-09 16:22:24 +02:00
|
|
|
*** PROGRESS <what> <char> <cur> <total> [<units>]
|
2017-11-14 16:30:34 +01:00
|
|
|
Used by the primegen and public key functions to indicate
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
progress. <char> is the character displayed with no --status-fd
|
|
|
|
enabled, with the linefeed replaced by an 'X'. <cur> is the
|
|
|
|
current amount done and <total> is amount to be done; a <total> of
|
2017-11-14 16:30:34 +01:00
|
|
|
0 indicates that the total amount is not known. Both are
|
|
|
|
non-negative integers. The condition
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
: TOTAL && CUR == TOTAL
|
|
|
|
may be used to detect the end of an operation.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-14 16:30:34 +01:00
|
|
|
Well known values for <what> are:
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- pk_dsa :: DSA key generation
|
|
|
|
- pk_elg :: Elgamal key generation
|
|
|
|
- primegen :: Prime generation
|
|
|
|
- need_entropy :: Waiting for new entropy in the RNG
|
|
|
|
- tick :: Generic tick without any special meaning - useful
|
|
|
|
for letting clients know that the server is still
|
|
|
|
working.
|
|
|
|
- starting_agent :: A gpg-agent was started because it is not
|
|
|
|
running as a daemon.
|
|
|
|
- learncard :: Send by the agent and gpgsm while learing
|
|
|
|
the data of a smartcard.
|
|
|
|
- card_busy :: A smartcard is still working
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-14 16:30:34 +01:00
|
|
|
When <what> refers to a file path, it may be truncated.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<units> is sometimes used to describe the units for <current> and
|
2016-08-09 16:22:24 +02:00
|
|
|
<total>. For example "B", "KiB", or "MiB".
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
*** BACKUP_KEY_CREATED <fingerprint> <fname>
|
|
|
|
A backup of a key identified by <fingerprint> has been writte to
|
|
|
|
the file <fname>; <fname> is percent-escaped.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*** MOUNTPOINT <name>
|
|
|
|
<name> is a percent-plus escaped filename describing the
|
|
|
|
mountpoint for the current operation (e.g. used by "g13 --mount").
|
|
|
|
This may either be the specified mountpoint or one randomly
|
Fix more spelling
* NEWS, acinclude.m4, agent/command-ssh.c, agent/command.c,
agent/gpg-agent.c, agent/keyformat.txt, agent/protect-tool.c,
common/asshelp.c, common/b64enc.c, common/recsel.c, doc/DETAILS,
doc/HACKING, doc/Notes, doc/TRANSLATE, doc/dirmngr.texi,
doc/faq.org, doc/gpg-agent.texi, doc/gpg.texi, doc/gpgsm.texi,
doc/instguide.texi, g10/armor.c, g10/gpg.c, g10/keyedit.c,
g10/mainproc.c, g10/pkclist.c, g10/tofu.c, g13/sh-cmd.c,
g13/sh-dmcrypt.c, kbx/keybox-init.c, m4/pkg.m4, sm/call-dirmngr.c,
sm/gpgsm.c, tests/Makefile.am, tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt,
tests/gpgscm/scheme.c, tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm,
tests/openpgp/multisig.test, tests/openpgp/verify.scm,
tests/pkits/README, tools/applygnupgdefaults,
tools/gpg-connect-agent.c, tools/mime-maker.c, tools/mime-parser.c:
minor spelling cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
2016-09-15 20:21:15 +02:00
|
|
|
chosen by g13.
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-16 15:58:14 +01:00
|
|
|
*** PINENTRY_LAUNCHED <pid>[:<extra>]
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
This status line is emitted by gpg to notify a client that a
|
|
|
|
Pinentry has been launched. <pid> is the PID of the Pinentry. It
|
|
|
|
may be used to display a hint to the user but can't be used to
|
|
|
|
synchronize with Pinentry. Note that there is also an Assuan
|
|
|
|
inquiry line with the same name used internally or, if enabled,
|
|
|
|
send to the client instead of this status line. Such an inquiry
|
|
|
|
may be used to sync with Pinentry
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Obsolete status codes
|
|
|
|
*** SIGEXPIRED
|
|
|
|
Removed on 2011-02-04. This is deprecated in favor of KEYEXPIRED.
|
|
|
|
*** RSA_OR_IDEA
|
|
|
|
Obsolete. This status message used to be emitted for requests to
|
|
|
|
use the IDEA or RSA algorithms. It has been dropped from GnuPG
|
|
|
|
2.1 after the respective patents expired.
|
|
|
|
*** SHM_INFO, SHM_GET, SHM_GET_BOOL, SHM_GET_HIDDEN
|
|
|
|
These were used for the ancient shared memory based co-processing.
|
|
|
|
*** BEGIN_STREAM, END_STREAM
|
|
|
|
Used to issued by the experimental pipemode.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* Format of the --attribute-fd output
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When --attribute-fd is set, during key listings (--list-keys,
|
|
|
|
--list-secret-keys) GnuPG dumps each attribute packet to the file
|
|
|
|
descriptor specified. --attribute-fd is intended for use with
|
|
|
|
--status-fd as part of the required information is carried on the
|
|
|
|
ATTRIBUTE status tag (see above).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The contents of the attribute data is specified by RFC 4880. For
|
|
|
|
convenience, here is the Photo ID format, as it is currently the
|
|
|
|
only attribute defined:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Byte 0-1 :: The length of the image header. Due to a historical
|
|
|
|
accident (i.e. oops!) back in the NAI PGP days, this
|
|
|
|
is a little-endian number. Currently 16 (0x10 0x00).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Byte 2 :: The image header version. Currently 0x01.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Byte 3 :: Encoding format. 0x01 == JPEG.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Byte 4-15 :: Reserved, and currently unused.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
All other data after this header is raw image (JPEG) data.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* Layout of the TrustDB
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The TrustDB is built from fixed length records, where the first byte
|
|
|
|
describes the record type. All numeric values are stored in network
|
2015-06-15 15:37:30 +02:00
|
|
|
byte order. The length of each record is 40 bytes. The first
|
|
|
|
record of the DB is always of type 1 and this is the only record of
|
|
|
|
this type.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The record types: directory(2), key(3), uid(4), pref(5), sigrec(6),
|
|
|
|
and shadow directory(8) are not anymore used by version 2 of the
|
|
|
|
TrustDB.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Record type 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Unused record or deleted, can be reused for any purpose. Such
|
|
|
|
records should in general not exist because deleted records are of
|
|
|
|
type 254 and kept in a linked list.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Version info (RECTYPE_VER, 1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Version information for this TrustDB. This is always the first
|
|
|
|
record of the DB and the only one of this type.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 1).
|
|
|
|
- 3 byte :: Magic value ("gpg")
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: TrustDB version (value: 2).
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: =marginals=. How many marginal trusted keys are required.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: =completes=. How many completely trusted keys are
|
|
|
|
required.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: =max_cert_depth=. How deep is the WoT evaluated. Along
|
|
|
|
with =marginals= and =completes=, this value is used to
|
|
|
|
check whether the cached validity value from a [FIXME
|
|
|
|
dir] record can be used.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: =trust_model=
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: =min_cert_level=
|
|
|
|
- 2 byte :: Not used
|
|
|
|
- 1 u32 :: =created=. Timestamp of trustdb creation.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u32 :: =nextcheck=. Timestamp of last modification which may
|
|
|
|
affect the validity of keys in the trustdb. This value
|
|
|
|
is checked against the validity timestamp in the dir
|
|
|
|
records.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u32 :: =reserved=. Not used.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u32 :: =reserved2=. Not used.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u32 :: =firstfree=. Number of the record with the head record
|
|
|
|
of the RECTYPE_FREE linked list.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u32 :: =reserved3=. Not used.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u32 :: =trusthashtbl=. Record number of the trusthashtable.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Hash table (RECTYPE_HTBL, 10)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Due to the fact that we use fingerprints to lookup keys, we can
|
|
|
|
implement quick access by some simple hash methods, and avoid the
|
|
|
|
overhead of gdbm. A property of fingerprints is that they can be
|
|
|
|
used directly as hash values. What we use is a dynamic multilevel
|
|
|
|
architecture, which combines hash tables, record lists, and linked
|
|
|
|
lists.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This record is a hash table of 256 entries with the property that
|
|
|
|
all these records are stored consecutively to make one big
|
|
|
|
table. The hash value is simple the 1st, 2nd, ... byte of the
|
|
|
|
fingerprint (depending on the indirection level).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 10).
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: Reserved
|
|
|
|
- n u32 :: =recnum=. A table with the hash table items fitting into
|
|
|
|
this record. =n= depends on the record length:
|
|
|
|
$n=(reclen-2)/4$ which yields 9 for oure current record
|
|
|
|
length of 40 bytes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The total number of hash table records to form the table is:
|
|
|
|
$m=(256+n-1)/n$. This is 29 for our record length of 40.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To look up a key we use the first byte of the fingerprint to get
|
|
|
|
the recnum from this hash table and then look up the addressed
|
|
|
|
record:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- If that record is another hash table, we use 2nd byte to index
|
|
|
|
that hash table and so on;
|
|
|
|
- if that record is a hash list, we walk all entries until we find
|
|
|
|
a matching one; or
|
|
|
|
- if that record is a key record, we compare the fingerprint to
|
|
|
|
decide whether it is the requested key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Hash list (RECTYPE_HLST, 11)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See hash table above on how it is used. It may also be used for
|
|
|
|
other purposes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 11).
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u32 :: =next=. Record number of the next hash list record or 0
|
|
|
|
if none.
|
|
|
|
- n u32 :: =rnum=. Array with record numbers to values. With
|
|
|
|
$n=(reclen-5)/5$ and our record length of 40, n is 7.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Trust record (RECTYPE_TRUST, 12)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 12).
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
|
|
|
|
- 20 byte :: =fingerprint=.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: =ownertrust=.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: =depth=.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: =min_ownertrust=.
|
|
|
|
- 1 byte :: Not used.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u32 :: =validlist=.
|
|
|
|
- 10 byte :: Not used.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Validity record (RECTYPE_VALID, 13)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 13).
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
|
|
|
|
- 20 byte :: =namehash=.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: =validity=
|
|
|
|
- 1 u32 :: =next=.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: =full_count=.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: =marginal_count=.
|
|
|
|
- 11 byte :: Not used.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
** Free record (RECTYPE_FREE, 254)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
All these records form a linked list of unused records in the TrustDB.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 254)
|
|
|
|
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
|
|
|
|
- 1 u32 :: =next=. Record number of the next rcord of this type.
|
|
|
|
The record number to the head of this linked list is
|
|
|
|
stored in the version info record.
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-05 14:40:36 +02:00
|
|
|
* Database scheme for the TOFU info
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#+begin_src sql
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
|
|
-- The VERSION table holds the version of our TOFU data structures.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
|
|
CREATE TABLE version (
|
|
|
|
version integer -- As of now this is always 1
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
|
|
-- The BINDINGS table associates mail addresses with keys.
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
|
|
CREATE TABLE bindings (
|
|
|
|
oid integer primary key autoincrement,
|
|
|
|
fingerprint text, -- The key's fingerprint in hex
|
|
|
|
email text, -- The normalized mail address destilled from user_id
|
|
|
|
user_id text, -- The unmodified user id
|
|
|
|
time integer, -- The time this binding was first observed.
|
|
|
|
policy boolean check
|
|
|
|
(policy in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)), -- The trust policy with the values:
|
|
|
|
-- 1 := Auto
|
|
|
|
-- 2 := Good
|
|
|
|
-- 3 := Unknown
|
|
|
|
-- 4 := Bad
|
|
|
|
-- 5 := Ask
|
|
|
|
conflict string, -- NULL or a hex formatted fingerprint.
|
|
|
|
unique (fingerprint, email)
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CREATE INDEX bindings_fingerprint_email on bindings (fingerprint, email);
|
|
|
|
CREATE INDEX bindings_email on bindings (email);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
|
|
-- The SIGNATURES table records all data signatures we verified
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
|
|
CREATE TABLE signatures (
|
|
|
|
binding integer not null, -- Link to bindings table,
|
|
|
|
-- references bindings.oid.
|
|
|
|
sig_digest text, -- The digest of the signed message.
|
|
|
|
origin text, -- String describing who initially fed
|
|
|
|
-- the signature to gpg (e.g. "email:claws").
|
|
|
|
sig_time integer, -- Timestamp from the signature.
|
|
|
|
time integer, -- Time this record was created.
|
|
|
|
primary key (binding, sig_digest, origin)
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
#+end_src
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
|
|
|
* GNU extensions to the S2K algorithm
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-26 11:57:06 +01:00
|
|
|
1 octet - S2K Usage: either 254 or 255.
|
|
|
|
1 octet - S2K Cipher Algo: 0
|
|
|
|
1 octet - S2K Specifier: 101
|
|
|
|
3 octets - "GNU"
|
|
|
|
1 octet - GNU S2K Extension Number.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If such a GNU extension is used neither an IV nor any kind of
|
|
|
|
checksum is used. The defined GNU S2K Extension Numbers are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: Do not store the secret part at all. No specific data
|
|
|
|
follows.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: A stub to access smartcards. This data follows:
|
|
|
|
- One octet with the length of the following serial number.
|
|
|
|
- The serial number. Regardless of what the length octet
|
|
|
|
indicates no more than 16 octets are stored.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that gpg stores the GNU S2K Extension Number internally as an
|
|
|
|
S2K Specifier with an offset of 1000.
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
gpg: Revamp reading and writing of ring trust packets.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Rename to ...
(parse_ring_trust): this. Change args and implement new ring trust
packet format.
(parse): Add special ring trust packet handling.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_user_id): New fields KEYUPDATE, UPDATEURL, and
KEYSRC.
(PKT_public_key): Ditto.
(RING_TRUST_SIG, RING_TRUST_KEY, RING_TRUST_UID): New consts.
(PKT_ring_trust): New.
(struct packet_struct): Remove member RING_TRUST.
(strcu parse_packet_ctx_s): Add field SKIP_META.
(init_parse_packet): Init SKIPT_META.
* g10/free-packet.c (release_public_key_parts): Free UDPATEURL.
(free_user_id): Ditto.
* g10/mainproc.c (list_node): Remove printing of non-documented "rtv"
lines.
* g10/build-packet.c (build_packet_and_meta): New.
(do_ring_trust): New.
* g10/export.c (write_keyblock_to_output): Use build_packet_and_meta
in backup mode.
(do_export_one_keyblock): Ditto.
* g10/import.c (read_block): Add arg WITH_META. Skip ring trust
packets if that ism not set.
(import): Call read_block WITH_META in restore mode.
* g10/keydb.h (KEYSRC_UNKNOWN, KEYSRC_FILE, KEYSRC_KS, KEYSRC_PREF_KS)
(KEYSRC_WKD, KEYSRC_WKD_SD, KEYSRC_DANE): New constants. They are not
yet used, though.
* g10/keydb.c (parse_keyblock_image): Allow ring trust packets.
(build_keyblock_image): Ditto. Use build_packet_and_meta.
* g10/keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Remove specila treatment of
ring trust packets.
(write_keyblock): Use build_packet_and_meta. Remove special treatment
of ring trust packets and initialization of the signature caches.
--
This patch introduced the framework to store meta data for keys and
user ids in the keyrings/keyboxes. Ring trust packets are
implementation defined and have always been used in gpg to cache the
signature verification status.
Ring trust packets are only exported with the export option "backup"
and only imported with the import option "restore".
The new code uses a cleaner way to handle the ring trust packets: When
the parser reads a ring trust packet and the previously read packet
matches the type of that ring trust packet, the information is stored
in that previously read packet (signature, user id, or primary key)
and the next packet is read immediately. Thus only the parser sees
the ring trust packets. Ring trust packets are written by using the
new function build_packet_and_meta instead of build_packet. That
function writes a ring trust packet when the needed information is
available.
As a side-effect of this patch the signature status cache works again
and "gpg --check-sigs" is thus much faster.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2017-03-30 09:07:02 +02:00
|
|
|
* Format of the OpenPGP TRUST packet
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
According to RFC4880 (5.10), the trust packet (aka ring trust) is
|
|
|
|
only used within keyrings and contains data that records the user's
|
|
|
|
specifications of which key holds trusted introducers. The RFC also
|
|
|
|
states that the format of this packet is implementation defined and
|
|
|
|
SHOULD NOT be emitted to output streams or should be ignored on
|
|
|
|
import. GnuPG uses this packet in several additional ways:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- 1 octet :: Trust-Value (only used by Subtype SIG)
|
|
|
|
- 1 octet :: Signature-Cache (only used by Subtype SIG; value must
|
|
|
|
be less than 128)
|
|
|
|
- 3 octets :: Fixed value: "gpg"
|
|
|
|
- 1 octet :: Subtype
|
|
|
|
- 0 :: Signature cache (SIG)
|
|
|
|
- 1 :: Key source on the primary key (KEY)
|
|
|
|
- 2 :: Key source on a user id (UID)
|
|
|
|
- 1 octet :: Key Source; i.e. the origin of the key:
|
|
|
|
- 0 :: Unknown source.
|
2017-07-13 17:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
- 1 :: Public keyserver.
|
2017-07-20 14:49:07 +02:00
|
|
|
- 2 :: Preferred keyserver.
|
2017-07-13 17:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
- 3 :: OpenPGP DANE.
|
gpg: Revamp reading and writing of ring trust packets.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Rename to ...
(parse_ring_trust): this. Change args and implement new ring trust
packet format.
(parse): Add special ring trust packet handling.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_user_id): New fields KEYUPDATE, UPDATEURL, and
KEYSRC.
(PKT_public_key): Ditto.
(RING_TRUST_SIG, RING_TRUST_KEY, RING_TRUST_UID): New consts.
(PKT_ring_trust): New.
(struct packet_struct): Remove member RING_TRUST.
(strcu parse_packet_ctx_s): Add field SKIP_META.
(init_parse_packet): Init SKIPT_META.
* g10/free-packet.c (release_public_key_parts): Free UDPATEURL.
(free_user_id): Ditto.
* g10/mainproc.c (list_node): Remove printing of non-documented "rtv"
lines.
* g10/build-packet.c (build_packet_and_meta): New.
(do_ring_trust): New.
* g10/export.c (write_keyblock_to_output): Use build_packet_and_meta
in backup mode.
(do_export_one_keyblock): Ditto.
* g10/import.c (read_block): Add arg WITH_META. Skip ring trust
packets if that ism not set.
(import): Call read_block WITH_META in restore mode.
* g10/keydb.h (KEYSRC_UNKNOWN, KEYSRC_FILE, KEYSRC_KS, KEYSRC_PREF_KS)
(KEYSRC_WKD, KEYSRC_WKD_SD, KEYSRC_DANE): New constants. They are not
yet used, though.
* g10/keydb.c (parse_keyblock_image): Allow ring trust packets.
(build_keyblock_image): Ditto. Use build_packet_and_meta.
* g10/keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Remove specila treatment of
ring trust packets.
(write_keyblock): Use build_packet_and_meta. Remove special treatment
of ring trust packets and initialization of the signature caches.
--
This patch introduced the framework to store meta data for keys and
user ids in the keyrings/keyboxes. Ring trust packets are
implementation defined and have always been used in gpg to cache the
signature verification status.
Ring trust packets are only exported with the export option "backup"
and only imported with the import option "restore".
The new code uses a cleaner way to handle the ring trust packets: When
the parser reads a ring trust packet and the previously read packet
matches the type of that ring trust packet, the information is stored
in that previously read packet (signature, user id, or primary key)
and the next packet is read immediately. Thus only the parser sees
the ring trust packets. Ring trust packets are written by using the
new function build_packet_and_meta instead of build_packet. That
function writes a ring trust packet when the needed information is
available.
As a side-effect of this patch the signature status cache works again
and "gpg --check-sigs" is thus much faster.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2017-03-30 09:07:02 +02:00
|
|
|
- 4 :: Web Key Directory.
|
2017-07-13 17:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
- 5 :: Import from a trusted URL.
|
|
|
|
- 6 :: Import from a trusted file.
|
|
|
|
- 7 :: Self generated.
|
gpg: Revamp reading and writing of ring trust packets.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Rename to ...
(parse_ring_trust): this. Change args and implement new ring trust
packet format.
(parse): Add special ring trust packet handling.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_user_id): New fields KEYUPDATE, UPDATEURL, and
KEYSRC.
(PKT_public_key): Ditto.
(RING_TRUST_SIG, RING_TRUST_KEY, RING_TRUST_UID): New consts.
(PKT_ring_trust): New.
(struct packet_struct): Remove member RING_TRUST.
(strcu parse_packet_ctx_s): Add field SKIP_META.
(init_parse_packet): Init SKIPT_META.
* g10/free-packet.c (release_public_key_parts): Free UDPATEURL.
(free_user_id): Ditto.
* g10/mainproc.c (list_node): Remove printing of non-documented "rtv"
lines.
* g10/build-packet.c (build_packet_and_meta): New.
(do_ring_trust): New.
* g10/export.c (write_keyblock_to_output): Use build_packet_and_meta
in backup mode.
(do_export_one_keyblock): Ditto.
* g10/import.c (read_block): Add arg WITH_META. Skip ring trust
packets if that ism not set.
(import): Call read_block WITH_META in restore mode.
* g10/keydb.h (KEYSRC_UNKNOWN, KEYSRC_FILE, KEYSRC_KS, KEYSRC_PREF_KS)
(KEYSRC_WKD, KEYSRC_WKD_SD, KEYSRC_DANE): New constants. They are not
yet used, though.
* g10/keydb.c (parse_keyblock_image): Allow ring trust packets.
(build_keyblock_image): Ditto. Use build_packet_and_meta.
* g10/keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Remove specila treatment of
ring trust packets.
(write_keyblock): Use build_packet_and_meta. Remove special treatment
of ring trust packets and initialization of the signature caches.
--
This patch introduced the framework to store meta data for keys and
user ids in the keyrings/keyboxes. Ring trust packets are
implementation defined and have always been used in gpg to cache the
signature verification status.
Ring trust packets are only exported with the export option "backup"
and only imported with the import option "restore".
The new code uses a cleaner way to handle the ring trust packets: When
the parser reads a ring trust packet and the previously read packet
matches the type of that ring trust packet, the information is stored
in that previously read packet (signature, user id, or primary key)
and the next packet is read immediately. Thus only the parser sees
the ring trust packets. Ring trust packets are written by using the
new function build_packet_and_meta instead of build_packet. That
function writes a ring trust packet when the needed information is
available.
As a side-effect of this patch the signature status cache works again
and "gpg --check-sigs" is thus much faster.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2017-03-30 09:07:02 +02:00
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- 4 octets :: Time of last update. This is a a four-octet scalar
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with the seconds since Epoch.
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- 1 octet :: Scalar with the length of the following field.
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- N octets :: String with the URL of the source. This may be a
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zero-length string.
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If the packets contains only two octets a Subtype of 0 is assumed;
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this is the only format recognized by GnuPG versions < 2.1.18.
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Trust-Value and Signature-Cache must be zero for all subtypes other
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than SIG.
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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* Keyserver helper message format
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2016-08-05 14:40:36 +02:00
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*This information is obsolete*
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(Keyserver helpers have been replaced by dirmngr)
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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The keyserver may be contacted by a Unix Domain socket or via TCP.
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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The format of a request is:
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#+begin_example
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command-tag
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"Content-length:" digits
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CRLF
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#+end_example
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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Where command-tag is
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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#+begin_example
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NOOP
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GET <user-name>
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PUT
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DELETE <user-name>
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#+end_example
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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The format of a response is:
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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#+begin_example
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"GNUPG/1.0" status-code status-text
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"Content-length:" digits
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CRLF
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#+end_example
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followed by <digits> bytes of data
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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Status codes are:
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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- 1xx :: Informational - Request received, continuing process
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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- 2xx :: Success - The action was successfully received, understood,
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and accepted
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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- 4xx :: Client Error - The request contains bad syntax or cannot be
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fulfilled
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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- 5xx :: Server Error - The server failed to fulfill an apparently
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valid request
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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* Object identifiers
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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OIDs below the GnuPG arc:
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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#+begin_example
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1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2 GnuPG
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1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1 notation
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1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1.1 pkaAddress
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1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2 X.509 extensions
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1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.1 standaloneCertificate
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1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.2 wellKnownPrivateKey
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1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.12242973 invalid encoded OID
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#+end_example
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2016-12-19 09:41:15 +01:00
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* Debug flags
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This tables gives the flag values for the --debug option along with
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the alternative names used by the components.
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| | gpg | gpgsm | agent | scd | dirmngr | g13 | wks |
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|-------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------|
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| 1 | packet | x509 | | | x509 | mount | mime |
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| 2 | mpi | mpi | mpi | mpi | | | parser |
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| 4 | crypto | crypto | crypto | crypto | crypto | crypto | crypto |
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| 8 | filter | | | | | | |
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| 16 | iobuf | | | | dns | | |
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| 32 | memory | memory | memory | memory | memory | memory | memory |
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| 64 | cache | cache | cache | cache | cache | | |
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| 128 | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat |
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| 256 | trust | | | | | | |
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| 512 | hashing | hashing | hashing | hashing | hashing | | |
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| 1024 | ipc | ipc | ipc | ipc | ipc | ipc | ipc |
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| 2048 | | | | cardio | network | | |
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| 4096 | clock | | | reader | | | |
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| 8192 | lookup | | | | lookup | | |
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| 16384 | extprog | | | | | | extprog |
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Description of some debug flags:
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- cardio :: Used by scdaemon to trace the APDUs exchange with the
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card.
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- clock :: Show execution times of certain functions.
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- crypto :: Trace crypto operations.
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- hashing :: Create files with the hashed data.
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- ipc :: Trace the Assuan commands.
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- mpi :: Show the values of the MPIs.
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- reader :: Used by scdaemon to trace card reader related code. For
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example: Open and close reader.
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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* Miscellaneous notes
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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** v3 fingerprints
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For packet version 3 we calculate the keyids this way:
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- RSA :: Low 64 bits of n
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- ELGAMAL :: Build a v3 pubkey packet (with CTB 0x99) and
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calculate a RMD160 hash value from it. This is used
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as the fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid.
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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** Simplified revocation certificates
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Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet;
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"--import" knows how to handle this. The rationale behind it is to
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keep them small.
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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** Documentation on HKP (the http keyserver protocol):
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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A minimalistic HTTP server on port 11371 recognizes a GET for
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/pks/lookup. The standard http URL encoded query parameters are
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this (always key=value):
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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- op=index (like pgp -kv), op=vindex (like pgp -kvv) and op=get (like
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pgp -kxa)
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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- search=<stringlist>. This is a list of words that must occur in the key.
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The words are delimited with space, points, @ and so on. The delimiters
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are not searched for and the order of the words doesn't matter (but see
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next option).
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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- exact=on. This switch tells the hkp server to only report exact matching
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keys back. In this case the order and the "delimiters" are important.
|
2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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- fingerprint=on. Also reports the fingerprints when used with 'index' or
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'vindex'
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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The keyserver also recognizes http-POSTs to /pks/add. Use this to upload
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keys.
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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A better way to do this would be a request like:
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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/pks/lookup/<gnupg_formatierte_user_id>?op=<operation>
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2006-08-21 22:20:23 +02:00
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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This can be implemented using Hurd's translator mechanism.
|
2016-06-14 09:06:44 +02:00
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However, I think the whole keyserver stuff has to be re-thought;
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2013-01-30 18:54:23 +01:00
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I have some ideas and probably create a white paper.
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2015-01-28 09:11:02 +01:00
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** Algorithm names for the "keygen.algo" prompt
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When using a --command-fd controlled key generation or "addkey"
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there is way to know the number to enter on the "keygen.algo"
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prompt. The displayed numbers are for human reception and may
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change with releases. To provide a stable way to enter a desired
|
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algorithm choice the prompt also accepts predefined names for the
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algorithms, which will not change.
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| Name | No | Description |
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|---------+----+---------------------------------|
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| rsa+rsa | 1 | RSA and RSA (default) |
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| dsa+elg | 2 | DSA and Elgamal |
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| dsa | 3 | DSA (sign only) |
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| rsa/s | 4 | RSA (sign only) |
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| elg | 5 | Elgamal (encrypt only) |
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| rsa/e | 6 | RSA (encrypt only) |
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| dsa/* | 7 | DSA (set your own capabilities) |
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| rsa/* | 8 | RSA (set your own capabilities) |
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| ecc+ecc | 9 | ECC and ECC |
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| ecc/s | 10 | ECC (sign only) |
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| ecc/* | 11 | ECC (set your own capabilities) |
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| ecc/e | 12 | ECC (encrypt only) |
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| keygrip | 13 | Existing key |
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If one of the "foo/*" names are used a "keygen.flags" prompt needs
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to be answered as well. Instead of toggling the predefined flags,
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it is also possible to set them direct: Use a "=" character
|
2017-07-20 14:49:07 +02:00
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directly followed by a combination of "a" (for authentication), "s"
|
2015-01-28 09:11:02 +01:00
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(for signing), or "c" (for certification).
|