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gnupg/sm/encrypt.c

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/* encrypt.c - Encrypt a message
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008,
* 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2001-2019 Werner Koch
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
2007-07-04 19:49:40 +00:00
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "gpgsm.h"
#include <gcrypt.h>
#include <ksba.h>
#include "keydb.h"
#include "../common/i18n.h"
#include "../common/compliance.h"
struct dek_s {
const char *algoid;
int algo;
gcry_cipher_hd_t chd;
char key[32];
int keylen;
char iv[32];
int ivlen;
};
typedef struct dek_s *DEK;
/* Callback parameters for the encryption. */
struct encrypt_cb_parm_s
{
estream_t fp;
DEK dek;
int eof_seen;
int ready;
int readerror;
int bufsize;
unsigned char *buffer;
int buflen;
};
/* Initialize the data encryption key (session key). */
static int
init_dek (DEK dek)
{
int rc=0, mode, i;
dek->algo = gcry_cipher_map_name (dek->algoid);
mode = gcry_cipher_mode_from_oid (dek->algoid);
if (!dek->algo || !mode)
{
log_error ("unsupported algorithm '%s'\n", dek->algoid);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
}
/* Extra check for algorithms we consider to be too weak for
encryption, although we support them for decryption. Note that
there is another check below discriminating on the key length. */
switch (dek->algo)
{
case GCRY_CIPHER_DES:
case GCRY_CIPHER_RFC2268_40:
log_error ("cipher algorithm '%s' not allowed: too weak\n",
gnupg_cipher_algo_name (dek->algo));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
default:
break;
}
dek->keylen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (dek->algo);
if (!dek->keylen || dek->keylen > sizeof (dek->key))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
dek->ivlen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (dek->algo);
if (!dek->ivlen || dek->ivlen > sizeof (dek->iv))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
/* Make sure we don't use weak keys. */
if (dek->keylen < 100/8)
{
log_error ("key length of '%s' too small\n", dek->algoid);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
}
rc = gcry_cipher_open (&dek->chd, dek->algo, mode, GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("failed to create cipher context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
{
gcry_randomize (dek->key, dek->keylen, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM );
rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (dek->chd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_WEAK_KEY)
break;
log_info(_("weak key created - retrying\n") );
}
if (rc)
{
log_error ("failed to set the key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
gcry_cipher_close (dek->chd);
dek->chd = NULL;
return rc;
}
gcry_create_nonce (dek->iv, dek->ivlen);
rc = gcry_cipher_setiv (dek->chd, dek->iv, dek->ivlen);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("failed to set the IV: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
gcry_cipher_close (dek->chd);
dek->chd = NULL;
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
/* Encode an RSA session key. */
static int
encode_session_key (DEK dek, gcry_sexp_t * r_data)
{
gcry_sexp_t data;
2008-06-23 14:43:14 +00:00
char *p;
int rc;
2008-06-23 14:43:14 +00:00
p = xtrymalloc (64 + 2 * dek->keylen);
if (!p)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
strcpy (p, "(data\n (flags pkcs1)\n (value #");
2008-06-23 14:43:14 +00:00
bin2hex (dek->key, dek->keylen, p + strlen (p));
strcat (p, "#))\n");
rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&data, NULL, p, strlen (p));
xfree (p);
*r_data = data;
return rc;
}
/* Encrypt DEK using ECDH. S_PKEY is the public key. On success the
* result is stored at R_ENCVAL. Example of a public key:
*
* (public-key (ecc (curve "1.3.132.0.34") (q #04B0[...]B8#)))
*
*/
static gpg_error_t
ecdh_encrypt (DEK dek, gcry_sexp_t s_pkey, gcry_sexp_t *r_encval)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t l1;
char *curvebuf = NULL;
const char *curve;
unsigned int curvebits;
const char *encr_algo_str;
const char *wrap_algo_str;
int hash_algo, cipher_algo;
sm: Allow decryption using dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. * sm/decrypt.c (ecdh_decrypt): Support dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. Factor key derive code out to ... (ecdh_derive_kek): new global function. Allow for hashs shorter than the key. (hash_ecc_cms_shared_info): Make file-only. * sm/encrypt.c (ecdh_encrypt): Replace derive code by a call to the new ecdh_derive_kek. Add test code to create data using dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. * sm/gpgsm.h (opt): Add member force_ecdh_sha1kdf. * sm/gpgsm.c: Add option --debug-force-ecdh-sha1kdf. -- I did some test against Governikus_Signer: 2.9.2.0 MCard security Provider: 2.4.0 Algorithm catalog from: 05.12.2019 using a Signature Card v2.0 and a nistp256 certificate. Encrypting with Governikus used the stdDH-sha1kdf scheme which we can now decrypt. Encrypting with GPGSM uses for that curve the recommended scheme sha256kdf but Governikus was not able to decrypt this (no usable error message). Encrypting using stdDH-sha1kdf with GPGSM by using the new --debug-force-ecdh-sha1kdf option showed that Governikus was able to decrypt this. FWIW: RFC5753 (Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms) has this requirement: Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static ECDH standard primitive: - MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and which Governikus seems not to fulfill. GnuPG-bug-id: 4098 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2020-05-08 18:08:50 +02:00
unsigned int keylen;
unsigned char key[32];
gcry_sexp_t s_data = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t s_encr = NULL;
gcry_buffer_t ioarray[2] = { {0}, {0} };
unsigned char *secret; /* Alias for ioarray[0]. */
unsigned int secretlen;
unsigned char *pubkey; /* Alias for ioarray[1]. */
unsigned int pubkeylen;
gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd = NULL;
unsigned char *result = NULL;
unsigned int resultlen;
*r_encval = NULL;
/* Figure out the encryption and wrap algo OIDs. */
/* Get the curve name if any, */
l1 = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_pkey, "curve", 0);
if (l1)
{
curvebuf = gcry_sexp_nth_string (l1, 1);
gcry_sexp_release (l1);
}
if (!curvebuf)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CURVE);
log_error ("%s: invalid public key: no curve\n", __func__);
goto leave;
}
/* We need to use our OpenPGP mapping to turn a curve name into its
* canonical numerical OID. We also use this to get the size of the
* curve which we need to figure out a suitable hash algo. We
* should have a Libgcrypt function to do this; see bug report #4926. */
curve = openpgp_curve_to_oid (curvebuf, &curvebits, NULL);
if (!curve)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE);
log_error ("%s: invalid public key: %s\n", __func__, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
xfree (curvebuf);
curvebuf = NULL;
/* Our mapping matches the recommended algorithms from RFC-5753 but
sm: Allow decryption using dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. * sm/decrypt.c (ecdh_decrypt): Support dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. Factor key derive code out to ... (ecdh_derive_kek): new global function. Allow for hashs shorter than the key. (hash_ecc_cms_shared_info): Make file-only. * sm/encrypt.c (ecdh_encrypt): Replace derive code by a call to the new ecdh_derive_kek. Add test code to create data using dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. * sm/gpgsm.h (opt): Add member force_ecdh_sha1kdf. * sm/gpgsm.c: Add option --debug-force-ecdh-sha1kdf. -- I did some test against Governikus_Signer: 2.9.2.0 MCard security Provider: 2.4.0 Algorithm catalog from: 05.12.2019 using a Signature Card v2.0 and a nistp256 certificate. Encrypting with Governikus used the stdDH-sha1kdf scheme which we can now decrypt. Encrypting with GPGSM uses for that curve the recommended scheme sha256kdf but Governikus was not able to decrypt this (no usable error message). Encrypting using stdDH-sha1kdf with GPGSM by using the new --debug-force-ecdh-sha1kdf option showed that Governikus was able to decrypt this. FWIW: RFC5753 (Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms) has this requirement: Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static ECDH standard primitive: - MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and which Governikus seems not to fulfill. GnuPG-bug-id: 4098 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2020-05-08 18:08:50 +02:00
* not supporting the short curves which would require 3DES. */
if (curvebits < 255)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE);
log_error ("%s: curve '%s' is not supported\n", __func__, curve);
goto leave;
}
sm: Allow decryption using dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. * sm/decrypt.c (ecdh_decrypt): Support dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. Factor key derive code out to ... (ecdh_derive_kek): new global function. Allow for hashs shorter than the key. (hash_ecc_cms_shared_info): Make file-only. * sm/encrypt.c (ecdh_encrypt): Replace derive code by a call to the new ecdh_derive_kek. Add test code to create data using dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. * sm/gpgsm.h (opt): Add member force_ecdh_sha1kdf. * sm/gpgsm.c: Add option --debug-force-ecdh-sha1kdf. -- I did some test against Governikus_Signer: 2.9.2.0 MCard security Provider: 2.4.0 Algorithm catalog from: 05.12.2019 using a Signature Card v2.0 and a nistp256 certificate. Encrypting with Governikus used the stdDH-sha1kdf scheme which we can now decrypt. Encrypting with GPGSM uses for that curve the recommended scheme sha256kdf but Governikus was not able to decrypt this (no usable error message). Encrypting using stdDH-sha1kdf with GPGSM by using the new --debug-force-ecdh-sha1kdf option showed that Governikus was able to decrypt this. FWIW: RFC5753 (Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms) has this requirement: Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static ECDH standard primitive: - MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and which Governikus seems not to fulfill. GnuPG-bug-id: 4098 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2020-05-08 18:08:50 +02:00
else if (opt.force_ecdh_sha1kdf)
{
/* dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme */
encr_algo_str = "1.3.133.16.840.63.0.2";
wrap_algo_str = "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.45";
hash_algo = GCRY_MD_SHA1;
cipher_algo = GCRY_CIPHER_AES256;
keylen = 32;
}
else if (curvebits <= 256)
{
/* dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme */
encr_algo_str = "1.3.132.1.11.1";
wrap_algo_str = "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.5";
hash_algo = GCRY_MD_SHA256;
cipher_algo = GCRY_CIPHER_AES128;
keylen = 16;
}
else if (curvebits <= 384)
{
/* dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme */
encr_algo_str = "1.3.132.1.11.2";
wrap_algo_str = "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.25";
hash_algo = GCRY_MD_SHA384;
cipher_algo = GCRY_CIPHER_AES256;
keylen = 24;
}
else
{
/* dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme*/
encr_algo_str = "1.3.132.1.11.3";
wrap_algo_str = "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.45";
hash_algo = GCRY_MD_SHA512;
cipher_algo = GCRY_CIPHER_AES256;
keylen = 32;
}
/* Create a secret and an ephemeral key. */
{
char *k;
k = gcry_random_bytes_secure ((curvebits+7)/8, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (k, (curvebits+7)/8, "ephm. k .:");
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL, "%b", (int)(curvebits+7)/8, k);
xfree (k);
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("%s: error building ephemeral secret: %s\n",
__func__, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_pk_encrypt (&s_encr, s_data, s_pkey);
if (err)
{
log_error ("%s: error encrypting ephemeral secret: %s\n",
__func__, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_encr, NULL, "&se",
&ioarray+0, ioarray+1, NULL);
if (err)
{
log_error ("%s: error extracting ephemeral key and secret: %s\n",
__func__, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
secret = ioarray[0].data;
secretlen = ioarray[0].len;
pubkey = ioarray[1].data;
pubkeylen = ioarray[1].len;
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
{
log_printhex (pubkey, pubkeylen, "pubkey ..:");
log_printhex (secret, secretlen, "secret ..:");
}
/* Extract X coordinate from SECRET. */
if (secretlen < 5) /* 5 because N could be reduced to (n-1)/2. */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
else if (*secret == 0x04)
{
secretlen--;
memmove (secret, secret+1, secretlen);
if ((secretlen & 1))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
goto leave;
}
secretlen /= 2;
}
else if (*secret == 0x40 || *secret == 0x41)
{
secretlen--;
memmove (secret, secret+1, secretlen);
}
else
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
if (err)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (secret, secretlen, "ECDH X ..:");
sm: Allow decryption using dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. * sm/decrypt.c (ecdh_decrypt): Support dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. Factor key derive code out to ... (ecdh_derive_kek): new global function. Allow for hashs shorter than the key. (hash_ecc_cms_shared_info): Make file-only. * sm/encrypt.c (ecdh_encrypt): Replace derive code by a call to the new ecdh_derive_kek. Add test code to create data using dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme. * sm/gpgsm.h (opt): Add member force_ecdh_sha1kdf. * sm/gpgsm.c: Add option --debug-force-ecdh-sha1kdf. -- I did some test against Governikus_Signer: 2.9.2.0 MCard security Provider: 2.4.0 Algorithm catalog from: 05.12.2019 using a Signature Card v2.0 and a nistp256 certificate. Encrypting with Governikus used the stdDH-sha1kdf scheme which we can now decrypt. Encrypting with GPGSM uses for that curve the recommended scheme sha256kdf but Governikus was not able to decrypt this (no usable error message). Encrypting using stdDH-sha1kdf with GPGSM by using the new --debug-force-ecdh-sha1kdf option showed that Governikus was able to decrypt this. FWIW: RFC5753 (Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms) has this requirement: Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static ECDH standard primitive: - MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and which Governikus seems not to fulfill. GnuPG-bug-id: 4098 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2020-05-08 18:08:50 +02:00
err = ecdh_derive_kek (key, keylen, hash_algo, wrap_algo_str,
secret, secretlen, NULL, 0);
if (err)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (key, keylen, "KEK .....:");
/* Wrap the key. */
if ((dek->keylen % 8) || dek->keylen < 16)
{
log_error ("%s: can't use a session key of %u bytes\n",
__func__, dek->keylen);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
goto leave;
}
resultlen = dek->keylen + 8;
result = xtrymalloc_secure (resultlen);
if (!result)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipher_hd, cipher_algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
if (err)
{
log_error ("%s: failed to initialize AESWRAP: %s\n",
__func__, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipher_hd, key, keylen);
wipememory (key, sizeof key);
if (err)
{
log_error ("%s: failed in gcry_cipher_setkey: %s\n",
__func__, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (cipher_hd, result, resultlen,
dek->key, dek->keylen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("%s: failed in gcry_cipher_encrypt: %s\n",
__func__, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (result, resultlen, "w(CEK) ..:");
err = gcry_sexp_build (r_encval, NULL,
"(enc-val(ecdh(e%b)(s%b)(encr-algo%s)(wrap-algo%s)))",
(int)pubkeylen, pubkey,
(int)resultlen, result,
encr_algo_str,
wrap_algo_str,
NULL);
if (err)
log_error ("%s: failed building final S-exp: %s\n",
__func__, gpg_strerror (err));
leave:
gcry_cipher_close (cipher_hd);
wipememory (key, sizeof key);
xfree (result);
xfree (ioarray[0].data);
xfree (ioarray[1].data);
gcry_sexp_release (s_data);
gcry_sexp_release (s_encr);
xfree (curvebuf);
return err;
}
/* Encrypt the DEK under the key contained in CERT and return it as a
* canonical S-expressions at ENCVAL. PK_ALGO is the public key
* algorithm which the caller has already retrieved from CERT. */
static int
encrypt_dek (const DEK dek, ksba_cert_t cert, int pk_algo,
unsigned char **encval)
{
gcry_sexp_t s_ciph, s_data, s_pkey;
int rc;
ksba_sexp_t buf;
size_t len;
*encval = NULL;
/* get the key from the cert */
buf = ksba_cert_get_public_key (cert);
if (!buf)
{
log_error ("no public key for recipient\n");
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
}
len = gcry_sexp_canon_len (buf, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (!len)
{
log_error ("libksba did not return a proper S-Exp\n");
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
}
rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_pkey, NULL, (char*)buf, len);
xfree (buf); buf = NULL;
if (rc)
{
log_error ("gcry_sexp_scan failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
{
log_printsexp (" pubkey:", s_pkey);
log_printhex (dek->key, dek->keylen, "CEK .....:");
}
2008-06-23 14:43:14 +00:00
/* Put the encoded cleartext into a simple list. */
s_data = NULL; /* (avoid compiler warning) */
if (pk_algo == GCRY_PK_ECC)
2008-06-23 14:43:14 +00:00
{
rc = ecdh_encrypt (dek, s_pkey, &s_ciph);
2008-06-23 14:43:14 +00:00
}
else
{
rc = encode_session_key (dek, &s_data);
if (rc)
{
gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
log_error ("encode_session_key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printsexp (" data:", s_data);
/* pass it to libgcrypt */
rc = gcry_pk_encrypt (&s_ciph, s_data, s_pkey);
}
gcry_sexp_release (s_data);
gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printsexp ("enc-val:", s_ciph);
/* Reformat it. */
if (!rc)
{
rc = make_canon_sexp (s_ciph, encval, NULL);
gcry_sexp_release (s_ciph);
}
return rc;
}
/* do the actual encryption */
static int
encrypt_cb (void *cb_value, char *buffer, size_t count, size_t *nread)
{
struct encrypt_cb_parm_s *parm = cb_value;
int blklen = parm->dek->ivlen;
unsigned char *p;
size_t n;
*nread = 0;
if (!buffer)
return -1; /* not supported */
if (parm->ready)
return -1;
if (count < blklen)
BUG ();
if (!parm->eof_seen)
{ /* fillup the buffer */
p = parm->buffer;
for (n=parm->buflen; n < parm->bufsize; n++)
{
int c = es_getc (parm->fp);
if (c == EOF)
{
if (es_ferror (parm->fp))
{
parm->readerror = errno;
return -1;
}
parm->eof_seen = 1;
break;
}
p[n] = c;
}
parm->buflen = n;
}
n = parm->buflen < count? parm->buflen : count;
n = n/blklen * blklen;
if (n)
{ /* encrypt the stuff */
gcry_cipher_encrypt (parm->dek->chd, buffer, n, parm->buffer, n);
*nread = n;
/* Who cares about cycles, take the easy way and shift the buffer */
parm->buflen -= n;
memmove (parm->buffer, parm->buffer+n, parm->buflen);
}
else if (parm->eof_seen)
{ /* no complete block but eof: add padding */
/* fixme: we should try to do this also in the above code path */
int i, npad = blklen - (parm->buflen % blklen);
p = parm->buffer;
for (n=parm->buflen, i=0; n < parm->bufsize && i < npad; n++, i++)
p[n] = npad;
gcry_cipher_encrypt (parm->dek->chd, buffer, n, parm->buffer, n);
*nread = n;
parm->ready = 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Perform an encrypt operation.
Encrypt the data received on DATA-FD and write it to OUT_FP. The
recipients are take from the certificate given in recplist; if this
is NULL it will be encrypted for a default recipient */
int
gpgsm_encrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, certlist_t recplist, int data_fd, estream_t out_fp)
{
int rc = 0;
gnupg_ksba_io_t b64writer = NULL;
gpg_error_t err;
ksba_writer_t writer;
ksba_reader_t reader = NULL;
ksba_cms_t cms = NULL;
ksba_stop_reason_t stopreason;
KEYDB_HANDLE kh = NULL;
struct encrypt_cb_parm_s encparm;
DEK dek = NULL;
int recpno;
estream_t data_fp = NULL;
2006-09-06 16:35:52 +00:00
certlist_t cl;
int count;
int compliant;
memset (&encparm, 0, sizeof encparm);
audit_set_type (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_TYPE_ENCRYPT);
/* Check that the certificate list is not empty and that at least
one certificate is not flagged as encrypt_to; i.e. is a real
recipient. */
for (cl = recplist; cl; cl = cl->next)
if (!cl->is_encrypt_to)
break;
if (!cl)
{
log_error(_("no valid recipients given\n"));
gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_NO_RECP, "0");
audit_log_i (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_GOT_RECIPIENTS, 0);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
goto leave;
}
for (count = 0, cl = recplist; cl; cl = cl->next)
count++;
audit_log_i (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_GOT_RECIPIENTS, count);
kh = keydb_new (ctrl);
if (!kh)
{
log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
}
/* Fixme: We should use the unlocked version of the es functions. */
data_fp = es_fdopen_nc (data_fd, "rb");
if (!data_fp)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("fdopen() failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
goto leave;
}
err = ksba_reader_new (&reader);
if (err)
rc = err;
if (!rc)
rc = ksba_reader_set_cb (reader, encrypt_cb, &encparm);
if (rc)
goto leave;
encparm.fp = data_fp;
ctrl->pem_name = "ENCRYPTED MESSAGE";
rc = gnupg_ksba_create_writer
(&b64writer, ((ctrl->create_pem? GNUPG_KSBA_IO_PEM : 0)
| (ctrl->create_base64? GNUPG_KSBA_IO_BASE64 : 0)),
ctrl->pem_name, out_fp, &writer);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("can't create writer: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
err = ksba_cms_new (&cms);
if (err)
{
rc = err;
goto leave;
}
err = ksba_cms_set_reader_writer (cms, reader, writer);
if (err)
{
log_error ("ksba_cms_set_reader_writer failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
rc = err;
goto leave;
}
audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_GOT_DATA);
/* We are going to create enveloped data with uninterpreted data as
inner content */
err = ksba_cms_set_content_type (cms, 0, KSBA_CT_ENVELOPED_DATA);
if (!err)
err = ksba_cms_set_content_type (cms, 1, KSBA_CT_DATA);
if (err)
{
log_error ("ksba_cms_set_content_type failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
rc = err;
goto leave;
}
/* Check compliance. */
if (!gnupg_cipher_is_allowed
(opt.compliance, 1, gcry_cipher_map_name (opt.def_cipher_algoid),
gcry_cipher_mode_from_oid (opt.def_cipher_algoid)))
{
log_error (_("cipher algorithm '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"),
opt.def_cipher_algoid,
gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO);
goto leave;
}
if (!gnupg_rng_is_compliant (opt.compliance))
{
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN);
log_error (_("%s is not compliant with %s mode\n"),
"RNG",
gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
gpgsm_status_with_error (ctrl, STATUS_ERROR,
"random-compliance", rc);
goto leave;
}
/* Create a session key */
dek = xtrycalloc_secure (1, sizeof *dek);
if (!dek)
2006-09-06 16:35:52 +00:00
rc = out_of_core ();
else
{
dek->algoid = opt.def_cipher_algoid;
rc = init_dek (dek);
}
if (rc)
{
log_error ("failed to create the session key: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
err = ksba_cms_set_content_enc_algo (cms, dek->algoid, dek->iv, dek->ivlen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("ksba_cms_set_content_enc_algo failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
rc = err;
goto leave;
}
encparm.dek = dek;
/* Use a ~8k (AES) or ~4k (3DES) buffer */
encparm.bufsize = 500 * dek->ivlen;
encparm.buffer = xtrymalloc (encparm.bufsize);
if (!encparm.buffer)
{
2006-09-06 16:35:52 +00:00
rc = out_of_core ();
goto leave;
}
audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SESSION_KEY, dek->algoid);
compliant = gnupg_cipher_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, dek->algo,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC);
/* Gather certificates of recipients, encrypt the session key for
each and store them in the CMS object */
for (recpno = 0, cl = recplist; cl; recpno++, cl = cl->next)
{
unsigned char *encval;
unsigned int nbits;
int pk_algo;
/* Check compliance. */
pk_algo = gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (cl->cert, &nbits);
if (!gnupg_pk_is_compliant (opt.compliance, pk_algo, 0,
NULL, nbits, NULL))
{
char kidstr[10+1];
snprintf (kidstr, sizeof kidstr, "0x%08lX",
gpgsm_get_short_fingerprint (cl->cert, NULL));
log_info (_("WARNING: key %s is not suitable for encryption"
" in %s mode\n"),
kidstr,
gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
}
/* Fixme: When adding ECC we need to provide the curvename and
* the key to gnupg_pk_is_compliant. */
if (compliant
&& !gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pk_algo, 0, NULL, nbits, NULL))
compliant = 0;
rc = encrypt_dek (dek, cl->cert, pk_algo, &encval);
if (rc)
{
audit_log_cert (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_ENCRYPTED_TO, cl->cert, rc);
log_error ("encryption failed for recipient no. %d: %s\n",
recpno, gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
err = ksba_cms_add_recipient (cms, cl->cert);
if (err)
{
audit_log_cert (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_ENCRYPTED_TO, cl->cert, err);
log_error ("ksba_cms_add_recipient failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
rc = err;
xfree (encval);
goto leave;
}
err = ksba_cms_set_enc_val (cms, recpno, encval);
xfree (encval);
audit_log_cert (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_ENCRYPTED_TO, cl->cert, err);
if (err)
{
log_error ("ksba_cms_set_enc_val failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
rc = err;
goto leave;
}
}
if (compliant && gnupg_gcrypt_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS))
gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_ENCRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,
gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS));
/* Main control loop for encryption. */
recpno = 0;
do
{
err = ksba_cms_build (cms, &stopreason);
if (err)
{
log_debug ("ksba_cms_build failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
rc = err;
goto leave;
}
}
while (stopreason != KSBA_SR_READY);
if (encparm.readerror)
{
log_error ("error reading input: %s\n", strerror (encparm.readerror));
rc = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (encparm.readerror));
goto leave;
}
rc = gnupg_ksba_finish_writer (b64writer);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("write failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_ENCRYPTION_DONE);
if (!opt.quiet)
log_info ("encrypted data created\n");
leave:
ksba_cms_release (cms);
gnupg_ksba_destroy_writer (b64writer);
ksba_reader_release (reader);
keydb_release (kh);
xfree (dek);
es_fclose (data_fp);
xfree (encparm.buffer);
return rc;
}