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# Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing
# DP3T - Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing
This repository contains a proposal for a secure and decentralized privacy-preserving proximity tracing system. Its goal is to simplify and accelerate the process of identifying people who have been in contact with an infected person, thus providing a technological foundation to help slow the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The system aims to minimise privacy and security risks for individuals and communities and guarantee the highest level of data protection.
This repository documents a secure, decentralized, privacy-preserving proximity tracing system. Its goal is to simplify and accelerate the process of identifying people who have been in contact with an infected person, thus providing a technological foundation to help slow the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The system aims to minimise privacy and security risks for individuals and communities and guarantee the highest level of data protection.
# Who we are
@ -8,29 +8,29 @@ We are a international consortium of technologists, legal experts, engineers and
The following people are behind this design:
**EPFL**: Prof. Carmela Troncoso, Prof. Mathias Payer, Prof. Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Prof. Marcel Salathé, Prof. James Larus, Prof. Edouard Bugnion, Dr. Wouter Lueks, Theresa Stadler, Dr. Apostolos Pyrgelis, Dr. Daniele Antonioli, Ludovic Barman, Sylvain Chatel
**ETHZ**: Prof. Kenneth Paterson, Prof. Srdjan Capkun, Prof. David Basin, Dr. Jan Beutel, Dennis Jackson
**KU Leuven**: Prof. Bart Preneel, Prof. Nigel Smart, Dr. Dave Singelee, Dr. Aysajan Abidin
**TU Delft**: Prof. Seda Gürses
**University College London**: Dr. Michael Veale
**CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security**: Prof. Cas Cremers, Prof. Michael Backes, Dr. Nils Ole Tippenhauer
**University of Oxford**: Dr. Reuben Binns
**University of Torino / ISI Foundation**: Prof. Ciro Cattuto
**University of Salerno**: Prof. Giuseppe Persiano
**IMDEA Software**: Prof. Dario Fiore
**University of Porto (FCUP) and INESC TEC**: Prof. Manuel Barbosa
**Stanford Univerity**: Prof. Dan Boneh
**EPFL**: Prof. Carmela Troncoso, Prof. Mathias Payer, Prof. Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Prof. Marcel Salathé, Prof. James Larus, Prof. Edouard Bugnion, Dr. Wouter Lueks, Theresa Stadler, Dr. Apostolos Pyrgelis, Dr. Daniele Antonioli, Ludovic Barman, Sylvain Chatel
**ETHZ**: Prof. Kenneth Paterson, Prof. Srdjan Capkun, Prof. David Basin, Dr. Jan Beutel, Dennis Jackson
**KU Leuven**: Prof. Bart Preneel, Prof. Nigel Smart, Dr. Dave Singelee, Dr. Aysajan Abidin
**TU Delft**: Prof. Seda Gürses
**University College London**: Dr. Michael Veale
**CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security**: Prof. Cas Cremers, Prof. Michael Backes, Dr. Nils Ole Tippenhauer
**University of Oxford**: Dr. Reuben Binns
**University of Torino / ISI Foundation**: Prof. Ciro Cattuto
**University of Salerno**: Prof. Giuseppe Persiano
**IMDEA Software**: Prof. Dario Fiore
**University of Porto (FCUP) and INESC TEC**: Prof. Manuel Barbosa
**Stanford University**: Prof. Dan Boneh
In this repository you will find various documents defining our specification. The [white paper document](DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf) is accompanied by an [overview of the data protection aspects of the design](DP3T%20-%20Data%20Protection%20and%20Security.pdf), and a [three page simplified introduction to the protocol](DP3T%20-%20Simplified%20Three%20Page%20Brief.pdf).
In this repository you will find various documents defining our specification. The [white paper](DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf) is accompanied by an [overview of the data protection aspects of the design](DP3T%20-%20Data%20Protection%20and%20Security.pdf), and a [three page simplified introduction to the protocol](DP3T%20-%20Simplified%20Three%20Page%20Brief.pdf).
In line with the [aims of the project](DP3T%20-%20Aims%20of%20the%20Project.pdf), by publishing these documents we seek feedback from a broad audience on the high-level design, its security and privacy properties, and the functionality it offers; so that further protection mechanisms can be added if weaknesses are identified. We feel it is vital that designs are made public so the wider community can verify their claimed privacy gaurantees before they are deployed across a whole population.
In line with the [aims of the project](DP3T%20-%20Aims%20of%20the%20Project.pdf), we seek feedback from a broad audience on the high-level design, its security and privacy properties, and the functionality it offers, so that further protection mechanisms can be added to correct weaknesses. We feel it is essential that designs be made public so the community as a whole can verify the claimed privacy guarantees before applications are deployed.
Open source implementations for iOS, Android, and the back-end server are available on the [other DP-3T repositories](https://github.com/DP-3T/). DP-3T alphas are public for testing and feedback: [Android](https://github.com/DP-3T/dp3t-app-android) and [iOS](https://github.com/DP-3T/dp3t-app-ios).
Open source implementations for iOS, Android, and the back-end server are available in [other DP-3T repositories](https://github.com/DP-3T/). The DP-3T app developed for Switzerland is publicly available [Android](https://github.com/DP-3T/dp3t-app-android) and [iOS](https://github.com/DP-3T/dp3t-app-ios) and can be used as the basis for other apps
An explanatory comic [is also available in many languages](public_engagement/cartoon).
An explanatory comic [available in many languages](public_engagement/cartoon).
We also publish privacy and security analysis of specific and general proximity tracing systems. We have published a [guidebook](Security%20analysis/Privacy%20and%20Security%20Attacks%20on%20Digital%20Proximity%20Tracing%20Systems.pdf) to privacy and security risks of the entire spectrum of digital proximity tracing tools, and analysis of the [PEPP-PT-NTK](Security%20analysis/PEPP-PT_%20Data%20Protection%20Architechture%20-%20Security%20and%20privacy%20analysis.pdf) and [PEPP-PT-ROBERT](Security%20analysis/ROBERT%20-%20Security%20and%20privacy%20analysis.pdf) protocols. We have also published proposals for and analysis of potential [mechanisms for upload authorisation](DP3T%20-%20Upload%20Authorisation%20Analysis%20and%20Guidelines.pdf).
We publish our privacy and security analysis of specific and general proximity tracing systems. We have published a [guidebook](Security%20analysis/Privacy%20and%20Security%20Attacks%20on%20Digital%20Proximity%20Tracing%20Systems.pdf) to privacy and security risks of the entire spectrum of digital proximity tracing tools, an analysis of [PEPP-PT-NTK](Security%20analysis/PEPP-PT_%20Data%20Protection%20Architechture%20-%20Security%20and%20privacy%20analysis.pdf), and an analysis of [PEPP-PT-ROBERT](Security%20analysis/ROBERT%20-%20Security%20and%20privacy%20analysis.pdf). We have also published proposals for and an analysis of [mechanisms for upload authorisation](DP3T%20-%20Upload%20Authorisation%20Analysis%20and%20Guidelines.pdf).
Contact email: [dp3t@groupes.epfl.ch](mailto:dp3t@groupes.epfl.ch).
@ -38,13 +38,23 @@ Contact email: [dp3t@groupes.epfl.ch](mailto:dp3t@groupes.epfl.ch).
DP-3T is listed as one of several privacy-preserving decentralized approaches to contact tracing in a joint statement from over 300 scientists from over 25 countries. The open letter is available [here](https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/sites/contact-tracing-joint-statement/).
## Apple and Google Proposal
## Apple / Google Exposure Notification
Apple and Google have released a [joint specification](https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/04/apple-and-google-partner-on-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology/) describing their system support for privacy-preserving proximity tracing on iOS and Android . Their proposal is very similar to our early proposal named ["Low-cost decentralized proximity tracing"](https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf).
Apple and Google released a [joint specification](https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/04/apple-and-google-partner-on-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology/) describing their system support for a privacy-preserving exposure notification system on iOS and Android. Their proposal is very similar to our early proposal ["Low-cost decentralized proximity tracing"](https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf).
DP-3T appreciates the endorsement of these two companies for our solution and is happy to work with both of them to implement our app on both platforms.
DP-3T appreciates the endorsement of these two companies for our solution and has been working with both of them to implement our app on their platforms.
The Google / Apple Exposure Notification system is still evolving, in particular, the calibration of the measurement of attenuation values and duration of exposure between iOS and Android and between different phone models is still incomplete. In this phase, we have set our attenuation and duration thresholds conservatively to reduce false positives. We will evolve these thresholds as calibration improves.
But, we also strongly believe that Apple and Google should adopt our subsequent enhancements, detailed in later versions of our [white paper](https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf), which increase user privacy. We also strongly encourage both companies to allow an external audit of their code to ensure its functionality corresponds to its specification.
We also strongly believe that Apple and Google should adopt our subsequent enhancements, detailed in our [white paper](https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf), that increase user privacy. We also strongly encourage both companies to allow an external audit of their code to ensure its functionality corresponds to its specification.
## Funding
The DP3T project is not funded by Google or Apple. All of the funding project’s expenses have come from Prof. James Larus’s discretionary funds at EPFL, in anticipation of a grant from the Botnar Foundation.
Two researchers involved with the project have received funding from Google in the past. In 2019, Prof. Carmela Troncoso received a Google Security and Privacy Research Award. In 2015, Prof. Edouard Bugnion’s student received a Google PhD Fellowship. In addition, Prof. Mathias Payer received a bug bounty for finding a 0day exploit.
No participants were funded by Apple.
## April 8th, 2020: The relationship between DP-3T and PEPP-PT